THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS THE FUTURE of THE SOUTHERN SLAVS BY A. H. E. TAYLOR 495381 8. 8. ^3 NEW YORK DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 1917 %63 T3>§ {All rights reserved) PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN PREFACE In the summer of 1915 it was suggested to me that an article contributed by me to the British Beview on the Benascence of Serbia might be expanded into a volume on the subject. When eventually I acted on this suggestion, instead of expanding the article in question I thought it better altogether to enlarge the scope of what I had written into a volume on the future of the Southern Slavs rather than to confine myself to the more limited design and to the past. Some paragraphs of Chapter I, and a portion of Chapter III section II, appeared in the British Beview for April 1915, and the greater part of the second section of Chapter VI dealing with the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 appeared in the same Beview for September 1915 ; the latter article in its original form was also reprinted by request in Mr. Crawford Price's book Light on the Balkan Darkness. With these slight exceptions the matter of this volume is entirely new. It has frequently been said in connection with proposed reconstructions of the map of Europe that you should not divide the bear's skin until you have killed the bear, and in some quarters all such proposals are consequently deprecated. In spite of the finality with which some people regard a proverb as being invested there are very good reasons why, so far as South-Eastern Europe is concerned, the supposed application of this particular proverb should be disregarded. It is, for instance, advisable if you are out hunting to know what sort of animal you are after ; if it is a bear that you are hunting it is not wise to arm yourself with a shot-gun. In this case, moreover, 8 PREFACE part of the bear's skin has been promised already by those in authority, so that the question has been opened up. More especially is such discussion not only advisable but even necessary in regard to the Balkans. Hitherto the attitude of the general public towards Balkan problems has been one of indifference tempered with annoyance at certain small nations whose affairs are continually threatening to set other people by the ears, while the attitude of our Foreign Office, if not actuated always by indifference, though indifference has largely been present, has constantly been based upon a misapprehension of the problems at issue. Our Balkan policy, if it deserves the name at all, has been carried on from hand to mouth and has usually at any given moment sought the line of least resistance regardless of the ultimate results. Even if popular opinion is to have less say on the subject of the terms of peace than is sometimes claimed for it, and if those terms are to be framed by those whose conduct of the Eastern Question has been so remiss, yet it is probable that the public will have much more influence than it has possessed in similar circumstances in the past. All classes of the community have suffered grievous losses in the war, and it is natural that they should demand that the settlement should be thorough and as permanent as possible. Unfortunately the mass even of educated people is but ill-informed of the real issues in the Balkans ; the problem has not been studied in the past, and consequently, so far as the general public is concerned, there is no clear idea of the aims to be pursued in the future settlement. Particularly is this true of the Southern Slav question whose solution for many is contained in the phrase " compensations for Serbia ". To the general indifference there has been one exception which is furnished by Bulgaria. Bulgaria has been regarded as almost the sole important factor in the Balkans, her well-advertised claims are known, and the ceaseless reiteration of them has in many people wrought the conviction that they must be well founded. While this result has been largely due to PREFACE 9 the skilful Bulgarian propaganda, it has also its origin in the circumstances under which Bulgaria gained her independence with the upshot that she, the Balkan Prussia, has taken a place in the hearts of some English- men which is really quite unique, and which furnishes a not inapt commentary on the concluding phrase, at any rate, of Bishop Creighton's remark when told that some- thing would go straight to the heart of the English people : "A very nasty place to go to, the last resting- place I should like to be found in — a sloppy sort of place, I take it ". My object, then, has been to attempt to set forth the main features of the Southern Slav problem as they exist to-day, and the solution at which we should aim. Of necessity, in discussing territorial questions I have assumed such a complete victory for the Allies as will result in the dismemberment of Austria. However unlikely such a victory may seem in view of the past mishandling of our resources, the want of grip and energy of our rulers, and the bungling ineptitude which seemed intended to prove the truth of the saying that a democracy can neither keep peace nor make war, it is the only possible basis for such a study as this. If the Central Powers win outright the peace will be dictated by them on their own terms, while, if the victory of either side be less complete, as the extent of such victory cannot be foreseen, -so no discussion is possible of the resultant terms of peace, which will vary with the nature of the victory. The hypothesis adopted enables us at any rate to examine what is the ideal settle- ment which should be aimed at in proportion to the success which may attend our arms and our consequent ability to enforce our views. Since the close of the Napoleonic wars there has been no such opportunity for a national readjust- ment of European relations, and if the opportunity be lost now it may never recur, and in any case can only recur at the same hideous cost. A partial settlement will leave a chronic state of unrest in the Balkans, and this fact must be realized [by the British public if its influence is to be 10 PREFACE used aright. No war weariness should induce us to relax our striving for an out-and-out victory, coute-que-coute, and not the least of the benefits to be attained will be found in the settlement of the Southern Slav question for, as I have endeavoured to indicate, it is in a real sense our affair also. The difficulty of writing such a book under present condi- tions has been greater than will be realized by those who have not essayed a similar task. Some topics have perforce been avoided altogether, others barely indicated, and this quite irrespective of their importance. I wish to offer my thanks to those to whom I am in various ways indebted. The publication of this book has been delayed for various reasons, and while the foreign matter has been brought up to date, the references to the English Government are to the administrations of Mr. Asquith. The circumstances attending the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's administration, the arguments ad- duced for the change, and, I think, the results already attained, afford an amply sufficient justification for the strictures on its immediate predecessors which may be found in these pages. I have used the Serbo-Croat names of the Dalmatian towns and islands, as the use of Italian names has proved a fertile cause of misapprehension as to the real nationality of their inhabitants. Moreover, this usage is in accordance with the growing practice of making use of the correct native names of places save where long familiarity and custom have resulted in a genuine English form which it would be pedantic to disregard. Serbo-Croat names have been spelt in accordance with the " Croatian orthography ". The Orthodox Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet which is phonetic, the Croats use the Latin alphabet modified in order to render the sounds of the language and to represent the more numerous letters of the Cyrillic. Thus c (which in pronunciation is either k or s) is rejected and made use of as an arbitrary symbol, while the sound of other letters is modified by various diacritic marks. It is a pity that the PREFACE 11 Croatin orthography is not more extensively used, as its adoption would avoid a great deal of unnecessary confusion. The name of General Zivkovi6, for example, I have seen spelt in at least six different ways (Jivkovitch, Givkovich, Zhivkovics, etc.), and similar cases sometimes leave one in doubt as to who or what is intended. The Croatian script is not an artificial " system " of transliteration, but the script in use for the common language by that part of the race which employs the Latin alphabet. Moreover, like the modern Cyrillic alphabet, it is the result of a scientific reform, the work of Serbo-Croat philologists of the early nineteenth century. There is consequently no need to supersede it by any " system " or attempt to render words phonetically, the latter in any case impossible, as the English letter-signs vary in value. I append a Table of the necessary letters. c = ts in sound j = y 6 = ch 1 j = liquid gl 6 = tch nj = liquid gn 8=sh r has a vowel sound, e.g., Srb. z = French j Lj is sometimes written (presumably in order that one Cyrillic symbol may be represented by one Latin symbol) 1; nj, n; and dj or gj, d: d2 corresponds to a single Cyrillic character. The following list of Serbo-Croat place-names with their equivalents may be of use : — Bar, Antivari Lopud, Mezzo Brae, Brazza Losinj, Lussin Cres, Cherso Mljet or Mlet, Meleda Dubrovnik, Bagusa Bijeka or Bieka, Fiume Gruz, Gravosa Sibenik, Sebenico Hvar, Lesina Sipan, Giuppana Korcula, Curzola Spljet or Splet or Split, Spalato Kotor, Cattaro Susac, Cazza Kranjska, Carniola Trogir, Trau Krk, Veglia Vis, Lissa Lastovo, Lagosta Zadar, Zara Ljubljana, Laibach Zagreb, Agram CONTENTS MM PREFACE ....... 7 CHAPTER I A PLEA FOR SERBIA 15 CHAPTER II A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY— I. THE RISE OP SERBIA : HISTORY OP SERBIA TILL THE DEATH OP STEPHEN DU§AN . . .28 II. THE SUBMERGENCE OP SERBIA : FROM THE DEATH OP DUSAN TILL 1804 — THE HUNGARIAN SERBS . 51 III. THE RESURGENCE OP SERBIA: 1804-1008 . . 64 CHAPTER III THE RENASCENCE OF SERBIA— I. EFFECTS OF THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OP BOSNIA — AUSTRIA AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV8 . . 80 II. THE RENASCENCE OF SERBIA: 1908-1914 . .94 CHAPTER IV THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC— I. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM . . . 105 II. GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL CLAIMS OF ITALY TO DALMATIA — CHARACTER OF THE VENETIAN RULE ...... 120 III. THE ETHNOGRAPHY OP DALMATIA IN THE PAST AND PRESENT ...... 128 IV. ITALIAN STRATEGIC CLAIM8 . . . .136 V. WHAT ITALY CAN RIGHTLY CLAIM . . . 150 VL THE DALMATIAN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ENTENTE AND ITALY . . . . . .161 14 CONTENTS CHAPTER V pt.au PROPOSED FRONTIERS . . . . .169 CHAPTER VI MACEDONIA: THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY OP 1912— I. HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF MACEDONIA . . 200 II. THE TREATY OP 1912 ..... 209 CHAPTER VII THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA . . .221 CHAPTER VIII THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE— I. AREA AND POPULATION ..... 249 II. FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER OF THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES .... 255 CHAPTER IX SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE . . 269 CHAPTER X THE EUROPEAN IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 304 INDEX . . . , . . . .321 MAP ...... Facing page 320 The Future of the Southern Slavs CHAPTER I A PLEA FOR SERBIA It might seem at first sight unnecessary to commence a volume dealing with our Balkan ally and the Southern Slavs with a plea for Serbia, whose enormous sacrifices in the common cause and indomitable valour entitle her to the fullest possible measure of gratitude from her allies. Unfortunately, however, such a plea is by no means superfluous, but forms a very necessary prelude to the study of the pressing problems that attend the future of the Southern Slavs, in view of the influences which are still working in England to their prejudice, and, looking upon them as mere pawns in the game, do not hesitate to urge that they should be sacrificed to the desires of their enemies, though it is true that the qualities of the Serb race, its progress, especially in military matters, and its prospects for the future, have won a recognition that in the past has been wanting, recognition even better founded in the history of Serbia during the last few years than is yet generally known. It is twenty years ago since the author first offered a plea for Serbia,1 and in those days and for long afterwards that plea stood almost alone, for a few quotations will show that anti-Serb feeling has its roots in days long before the assassination of Alexander and 1 A Plea for Serbia, " the Piedmont of the Balkans ". Westminster Review, July 1897. This article is disfigured by the anti-Russian prejudice common at the time which, with fuller knowledge, I abjured soon after. 16 16 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Draga. In that article I wrote, "Of all the recently emancipated communities in the Balkans the most interest- ing, both from its past history and its probable future, is probably Serbia. It is undoubtedly that which, to all appearance, and if it plays its cards well, has the most brilliant future before it ; for it will benefit not only by the break-up of the Turkish Empire in Europe, but also by the disappearance, in its present form, of another State — the Austrian". In that same year appeared Travels and Politics in the Near East, by that able and impartial authority Mr. William Miller, and it is interesting to note how widely different was his opinion. He gave it as his idea that the "dream of a great Serb Empire" was "un- practical". ■ Speaking of the Prince of Montenegro's play, The Empress of the Balkans, he remarked : " Into this drama the Prince has put those grand ideas which every Serb imbibes with his mother's milk and cherishes dearly, however unpractical he may admit them to be in his calmer moments. The restoration of the old Servian Empire, which rose with DuSan and fell, I believe, for ever, on the fatal field of Kosovo five centuries ago, is one of the Prince's daydreams ".2 Of the occupation of Bosnia by Austria he said: "The monarchy possesses resources, alike in men and money, which no independent Balkan State, no fantastic Servian Empire, could produce ".3 "The notion of a great Servian Empire, of which Bosnia and the Hercegovina would form a part, or parts, is one of those fantastic daydreams which are repugnant alike to the teachings of Balkan history and the dictates of common sense ".4 The use of the word "Empire" introduces a certain ambiguity into these judgments, but the general sense of the context and of what is generally meant by a Serb "empire" seems to include in his condemnation not only the idea of an empire, but of a greater Serbia confined to the Serb race, yet time has shown that these daydreams are, on the supposition of a victory for the Allies, on the eve of fulfilment. ' Op. cit. p. 33. 3 Ibid. p. 47. s Ibid. p. 119. * Ibid. p. 128. A PLEA FOR SERBIA 17 Mr. Miller, however, wrote with gravity and a real sympathy, and his conclusions were reluctant ; far other- wise was it with the generality of writers. M Milan's miserable nation of pig-drivers" was the expression of a weekly illustrated paper which affected, and affects, an interest in foreign politics. The same paper accused the Serbs in 1885 of having as little stomach for the fighting as they had in 1876 — the accusation of cowardice against this warlike and brave people has been a common one. On this latter point a leading Conservative paper in the mid nineties remarked that, having " little prestige to lose ", there existed in Serbia an " absence of the stimulus of pride in past prowess ". The same paper advocated about the same time the partition of Serbia between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. When the reform scheme for Macedonia was promulgated about eleven years ago, Old Serbia x was expressly excluded from its scope, the Serbs there being left to the mercy of Albanians. Mr. Brailsford, in his book Macedonia, remarked : " Servia is not exactly a credit to civilization, and one cannot say that her political extinction would be a serious loss to Europe ",2 a strange dictum from a Liberal and an adherent, in some cases a vehement adherent, of the principle of nationality. During the annexation crisis of 1908-9 the Saturday Beview described the Serbs as "this rascal nation"; while at the time when, during the Balkan War, the question of a Serb outlet to the Adriatic was under discussion, Mr. Nevinson, another Liberal and nationalist, wrote con- temptuously in the Daily Chronicle that doubtless a railway could be built to Porto Medua good enough to carry pigs. Mr. de Windt renewed the charge of cowardice: "As General B remarked, ' Every Servian is a soldier and 1 The term " Old Serbia " (Sfcara Srbija) is used throughout in its historic sense as denoting the territory roughly corresponding to the former Turkish vilayet of Kosovo with the Sanjak of Novipazar. Since the Balkan War, it is sometimes applied to the kingdom as existing from 1878 to 1912, the recent gains being designated M New Serbia ". This practice is needlessly confusing. 1 Macedonia, p. 819. 2 26 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS cultured gentleman of my acquaintance remarked that it would be well if the Balkans were put under the sea for twenty-four hours, and that he regarded the Serbs as little better than their own swine. The prejudice showed itself even in details — not until three or four years ago would writers acknowledge that after all perhaps the Serbs knew their own language best and that DuSan did not mean " the strangler". English ignorance of the Serbs was profound.1 On the occasion of an address by Father Nicholas Velimir- ovi6 a lady came up to him after he had concluded and asked him, in the writer's presence, in what language he would have spoken if he had spoken in his native tongue ! He replied with politeness and gravity that he would have spoken in Serb, which was a Slav language with a general affinity to Russian for example. The question interested others, for almost immediately a gentleman approached to say that he and his friends had been interested in his ability to speak English and would like to know what was his native tongue ; had the Serbs a "language of their own"? A second polite explanation was followed not long after by the approach of a third enquirer who had evidently a little dangerous knowledge of the ethnological perplexities of the Danubian regions. He asked whether the native language of the Serbs were not Cech ! Prejudice and ignorance form a powerful combination, and it is evident that, to a great extent, neither has been dispelled even yet. Unless, however, we are to make, or allow our rulers to make, great and lamentable mistakes at 1 So well-known a publicist and eminent colonial governor as Sir Harry Johnston has suggested the cession of the Hercegovina to Serbia as the solution of the Southern Slav question ! Such an idea from such a source gives the measure of the profound ignorance of the very elements of the Southern Slav problem which exists in the most " well- informed " quarters. " Reasonable compensation to Serbia and Monte- negro would take the form of the cession to Serbia of Herzegovina, to Montenegro of Cattaro, and to Serbia and Montenegro of tbe right to deal as they pleased with all Albania with the exception of the circum- scription of Valona and Epirus". — Germany, Africa, and the Terms of Peace. Nineteenth Century Review, April 1915, p. 765. Serbia and the Hercegovina are not coterminous 1 A PLEA FOR SERBIA 27 the end of the war it is essential not only that prejudice should be dissipated but ignorance dispelled. It is likely enough, and in view of the sorry record of our diplomatists reasonable enough, that the general body of public opinion will demand a much larger voice in the settling of the terms of peace than has been the case in the past, and if that public opinion is not itself to be misled and misleading it is necessary that the English people should possess not only a working knowledge of the historical past of the Serbs, but a clear appreciation of the nature and extent of the problems with which they are faced in the present. A boggled and patched-up peace in the Near East, born of shear weariness and distaste will be the sure precursor of fresh wars, and will even afford our present enemies opportunities of which none know better how to avail themselves. 20 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the outcome of a pledge for the future, otherwise all motive on the part of Turkey would be lacking. It would be difficult in any case to exceed the cynicism of the Bulgarian explanation even if the latter were taken at its face value. Possibly this very cynicism lent it credence, as being prima facie characteristic, at any rate Bulgaria's friends asked us to accept it as being correct, and appa- rently believed in it themselves. Finally came the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army on September 19, which followed the offer on September 1 of great con- cessions by Serbia. This mobilization could have only one meaning. There was a wide advertisement of a forth- coming Austro-German attack on Serbia, and an ominous significance attached to the fact that the final offer of concessions had been followed by silence on the part of King Ferdinand's government on that point while the possibility of a war with Serbia was more and more openly canvassed. A last exhibition of duplicity was given when Professor Stephanov came to England and gave what he called a message from M. Radoslavov to the English people,1 breathing nothing but goodwill and expressions of devotion. This, we were assured by her friends, represented the real sentiment of Bulgaria, and all would yet be well. Their eyes were shut to the evidence of double dealing, and they continued to urge upon the country the policy of sacrificing our friends to our foes. Beyond this the extreme Bulgarophils in England proceeded at every turn to dot the i's and cross the t's of our diplomacy in their own sense and in a manner that was most injurious to our interests. The result was a general impression of feebleness on our part. We seemed to be going cap in hand to Bulgaria, as though success or failure in the war were dependent upon the line which she might choose to adopt, we were told continually that Bulgaria held the key to the Balkan position and that she must be made the pivot of our Balkan policy. Our natural 1 Vide interview in the Morning Post, September 28, 1915. A PLEA FOR SERBIA 21 friends became more and more bewildered and nneasy, and less and less inclined to throw in their lot with a side which seemed to care less for the interests of its friends than of its enemies, till at length we reaped the results which usually attend the conduct that sacrifices friends in order to placate enemies. In England a vigorous Press campaign was waged, and it was even seriously suggested that Russia should "coerce" Serbia, while the other Powers should threaten Greece with blockade, with a view to landing troops in Salonica to occupy Macedonia/or Bulgaria ! The whole treatment of our ally savoured of inequality. National rights which in Dalmatia had been disregarded to the detriment of the Southern Slavs became a sine qud non when it was alleged that they favoured Bulgaria; the strategic claims which elsewhere had weighed down the balance against Serbia became a feather-weight when urged on her behalf, and while the Entente set itself to realize Bulgarian unity it would not, and in view of its previous engagements to Italy could not, guarantee the unity of the Serbo-Croats. The concessions agreed to by Serbia went to the utmost limit of what it was reasonable to ask, and beyond : she abandoned the Salonica railway, placed another customs barrier between herself and the iEgean, surrendered Bitolj (Monastir) , the terminus of another line to Salonica, while the reservation of Ochrida maintained contact with Greece in a purely formal manner, for a line to Salonica thence would perforce pass through Bitolj, though in the future a very roundabout way might be made through Korica and Castoria. With the exception of Ochrida and Prilip it was a return to 1912, in spite of all that had passed since then — the treacherous attack of her former ally, the blood shed in the second Balkan war, and the attitude of her foe during the present war. She gave far more than had seemed at all likely. I well remember the answer of a Serb publicist to a query of mine with reference to a possible surrender of the Monastir region : " Yes — after another Kosovo". Even so Bulgaria was not satisfied — nor were her friends in England. 22 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS The unwillingness to face facts, the blind adherence to the Bulgarian legend, were maintained to the very end. It was not unnatural that Sir Edwin Pears, with his close and honourable connection with the very rebirth of the Bulgarian people should be willing, so late as October 8, apparently to accept assurances given to him from Bulgaria that no ministry could last a week, which proposed war with Russia or opposition to England, and that nothing would ever induce the Bulgarians to fight on the side of Turkey, and to plead that Bulgaria should be given another chance,1 but others had not the same excuse. Even after the Russian ultimatum the Daily News on October 6 remarked, " We should like to think that the offer of the Entente Powers was still valid." Speaking two days later, Mr. C. R. Buxton said that he was not convinced that Bulgaria was going to war, and that he failed to find certain evidence, although to any one not wilfully self-blinded then at least the matter was clear to probation. Mr. H. M. Wallis, in a letter to The Times written on October 5, thought that the Bulgarian nation stood " in a light calling for our deep commiseration and forbearance ". He added that in a popular song which he had received from Sofia, it was " the Greek and the Serb who are held up to execra- tion. And with some reason ". Two days before the news arrived of the Bulgarian attack, on October 9, the Nation still thought that there was a possibility that the German officers in Bulgaria were only on their way to Turkey, or existed only in the heated imagination of a hostile Balkan witness. It urged even greater concessions ; " the offer might very easily be improved. It is worth while making a good offer, a high bid not merely for active support, but for a benevolent neutrality ".2 Yet, as has been seen, the offer was already as high as could be expected — Bulgaria's legitimate 1 Letter to the Nation of October 9. * It is only fair to state that the Nation gave an admirable example of impartiality by admitting to its columns lengthy letters whose con- tents would certainly not have received editorial endorsement, and this at a time when it was not easy to obtain a hearing for Serbia's case elsewhere. A PLEA FOR SERBIA 23 claims had been more than met. Even the outbreak of war was followed by a final appeal from Messrs. C. R. and N. Buxton, which caused renewed hesitations in neutral Balkan quarters. The net result was to create the impres- sion, as indeed it showed the reality, of excessive weakness on the part of our Foreign Office, and an inability to grasp the essential facts of the situation. The warnings which we had received from Serbia fell on deaf ears and met with no response. As early as April our Foreign Office was informed that Bulgaria had come to an understanding with the Central Powers, but nothing was done to avert the danger that thus presented itself. On July 7 the Minister of Serbia in London suggested the the sending of British troops to Serbia, but the military authorities replied that we had no troops to send, being then engaged in a further extension of the disastrous Dardanelles expedition, which could only be carried on at all so long as Serbia remained unsubdued. It was in truth one of the most crucial points of the war, and the neglect of Serb advice and interest has entailed vast responsibilities and difficulties on the Allies. Following on the Bulgarian mobilization of September 19 Sir Edward Grey " was pressed " on September 27 for his opinion on the Serb proposal to strike at Bulgaria while that Power was in the midst of mobilization — a contingency which forms the nightmare of every general staff — and gave a reply which could only be construed as a refusal. It was Serbia's last chance, hazardous indeed,- but the only course which in the absence of allied aid J promised any prospect of success, but it was denied to her and she was left alone to bear the double attack made upon her when her ad- versaries had completed all their preparations methodically and without let or hindrance. * • To the very end our Government had yielded itself to the Bulgar obsession which has marked our dealings with 1 On September 24 an offer was made to Greece to send troops to Salonica in order to aid her in the fulfilment of her treaty obligations. They began to land on October 5. 24 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the Balkans ever since 1878, an obsession which nothing that Bulgaria could do or leave undone was able to shake. Everything was looked upon from the standpoint of Bulgaria, her claims were always just, her opponents always in the wrong, nor was any penalty ever to be exacted from her however often she might bite the hand that had fed her. For thirty years she has been the spoilt child of Europe immune from the criticism and the exigencies which are the lot of other States. The excuse made for our diplomacy in the spring and summer of 1915 that its aim was to restore the Balkan League, means in effect that our Foreign Office had set itself to a task which was foredoomed to failure and which it was unable to recognize as based upon an utter ignorance of realities ; it was the hegemony of the Balkans which Bulgaria desired and not an accord based on mutual rights. M. Rizov has stated ■ that a governing motive was to prevent Serbo-Croat union and the formation of a Southern Slav State which would be more powerful than Bulgaria. People and ruler were at one, the Bulgarians have always docilely followed the lead of King Ferdinand, and in the absence of any serious movement of dissent must be held to have endorsed his policy. When the last two Obrenovi6 sovereigns of Serbia pursued an anti-national policy Serbia was in a continual ferment, as all the world was made aware, and when finally no other way of escape from ruin offered itself the issue was the tragedy of 1903. No such exhibitions of opposition to the policy of King Ferdinand have ever manifested themselves among the Bulgarians, and the attempt to dissociate the people from their ruler fails. It is difficult to sum up this political desertion in any other terms but as the betrayal of Serbia, and whatever may be the outcome a terrible responsibility lies upon our Government for all the misery that has ensued to that unhappy country, the devastation of her towns and 1 Vide report of an interview given by M. Rizov, Minister in Berlin, to a German paper, in Westminster Gazette of November 17. A PLEA FOR SERBIA 25 villages, the losses of her Army, the hideous sufferings of her people, the death of thousands of women and children, the exile of her aged and heroic King. For the blood of these martyred women and children whose bodies littered the via dolorosa to the Adriatic our Govern- ment stands largely answerable at the bar of history and to the Serb race. Even the (promise of aid given by our Foreign Minister in the House of Commons on September 28 was subsequently explained away as being a promise to Greece to help her to keep her treaty obligations ! In more senses than one we owe an immense debt to the valiant and sorely tried Serbs, and a plea on their behalf is not out of place as a prelude to the study of Serbia's future. That country has suffered much from the nature of the news diligently disseminated throughout Europe by Austro- Hungarian agencies. No tale was too disgraceful nor too unlikely for use as a means of prejudicing western European opinion. Rumours of plots that had no existence, of un- speakable infamies concocted by the ingenious brains of the Ballplatz, of unrest and disorder, were spread abroad in the justified anticipation that if enough mud were thrown some would be sure to stick. The result has been that perhaps no people in the world has been more misrepresented and misunderstood than the Serbs. Its strong spirit of national feeling became mere turbulence, its justifiable hopes lawless ambitions against the consecrated status quo, its impatience of misrule a sign of its anarchical proclivities. No English journalist was resident in Serbia, and all" news came through tainted sources. One example will suffice here. When King Alexander was killed all the world was told that his body had been hacked about and thrown out of the window into the garden beneath, where it was left to lie all night, yet I have been informed that there is no word of truth in these details. My informant was the son of one of King Alexander's Prime Ministers, and his own authority was the personal testimony given to him by the king's physician. " It was all an Austrian lie " was the sense if not the actual words of my informant's summing up. Not long ago a 26 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS cultured gentleman of my acquaintance remarked that it would be well if the Balkans were put under the sea for twenty-four hours, and that he regarded the Serbs as little better than their own swine. The prejudice showed itself even in details — not until three or four years ago would writers acknowledge that after all perhaps the Serbs knew their own language best and that Du&an did not mean " the strangler". English ignorance of the Serbs was profound.1 On the occasion of an address by Father Nicholas Velimir- ovi6 a lady came up to him after he had concluded and asked him, in the writer's presence, in what language he would have spoken if he had spoken in his native tongue ! He replied with politeness and gravity that he would have spoken in Serb, which was a Slav language with a general affinity to Russian for example. The question interested others, for almost immediately a gentleman approached to say that he and his friends had been interested in his ability to speak English and would like to know what was his native tongue ; had the Serbs a " language of their own"? A second polite explanation was followed not long after by the approach of a third enquirer who had evidently a little dangerous knowledge of the ethnological perplexities of the Danubian regions. He asked whether the native language of the Serbs were not Cech ! Prejudice and ignorance form a powerful combination, and it is evident that, to a great extent, neither has been dispelled even yet. Unless, however, we are to make, or allow our rulers to make, great and lamentable mistakes at 1 So well-known a publicist and eminent colonial governor as Sir Harry Johnston has suggested the cession of the Hercegovina to Serbia as the solution of the Southern Slav question ! Such an idea from such a source gives the measure of the profound ignorance of the very elements of the Southern Slav problem which exists in the most " well- informed" quarters. "Reasonable compensation to Serbia and Monte- negro would take the form of the cession to Serbia of Herzegovina, to Montenegro of Cattaro, and to Serbia and Montenegro of the right to deal as they pleased with all Albania with the exception of the circum- scription of Valona and Epirus". — Germany, Africa, and the Terms of Peace. Nineteenth Century Iievieiv, April 1915, p. 765. Serbia and the Hercegovina are not coterminous 1 A PLEA FOR SERBIA 27 the end of the war it is essential not only that prejudice should be dissipated but ignorance dispelled. It is likely enough, and in view of the sorry record of our diplomatists reasonable enough, that the general body of public opinion will demand a much larger voice in the settling of the terms of peace than has been the case in the past, and if that public opinion is not itself to be misled and misleading it is necessary that the English people should possess not only a working knowledge of the historical past of the Serbs, but a clear appreciation of the nature and extent of the problems with which they are faced in the present. A boggled and patched-up peace in the Near East, born of shear weariness and distaste will be the sure precursor of fresh wars, and will even afford our present enemies opportunities of which none know better how to avail themselves. CHAPTEE II A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY I The Rise of Seebia A short sketch of the history of the Serbs will serve the purpose, which is all that is attempted here, of setting out recent events and their outcome in something of their historical setting, the aim being rather to illustrate the forces at work than to give a full account of events which in so short a compass would be impossible, and if attempted useless. We are accustomed to speak of the Balkan peoples as young nations, and the phrase is, of course, abundantly justified if we regard the present scale of their culture and the stage which they have attained in political growth. It has to be remembered at the same time that in another sense they are by no means young nations. They had reached and passed their early zenith before Prussia had come into existence, and in the Middle Ages they were the legitimate heirs of, and sharers in, the culture of Byzantium. It has been their tragedy that just when they seemed on the point of entering on the course of development which marked the fifteenth century — and this applies in a very real degree to the Serbs — they came under the curse of the Turkish blight. It was not so much that the current of their development was changed, or even forced to take a subordinate position, but that all they were, or possessed, in the way of political develop- ment, cultural achievement, architectural and artistic 28 A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 29 aspiration, was stamped flat under the Turkish hoof, and simply ceased to exist. For four hundred years only their heroic ballads served to keep alive among the Serbs the memory of past greatness, and to lift, in even the slightest degree, the life of the people above the level of an arduous struggle for mere physical existence. When in the nine- teenth century these people attained again to a national independence it is not surprising, not only that they re- tained many of the marks of long generations of servitude, but that they took up the threads of national life where they had been snapped short by the Turkish conquest. It is this that without doubt largely accounts for the " historical " bias which has marked their renewed con- sciousness. If we could imagine English history a blank from the reign of Richard II to our own days, how much more real and present a character would seem Edward III, and with what different eyes should we look upon the battles of Crecy and Poictiers, the question of Calais and Guienne. It is not altogether their fault if they are apt to exasperate the twentieth century with detailed claims derived from the fourteenth. All this has to be remem- bered if we would understand and sympathize with, in the proper sense of the word, their present aspirations and outlook. The original home of the Southern Slavs, which term is usually confined in practice to the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but in this connection includes the primitive Slav element in the Bulgarian people, is supposed to have been to the north of the Carpathians between the Vistula and the Dnieper. They entered the Balkan Peninsula towards the end of the sixth century, and in 620 are said to have been invited to migrate into his dominions by the Emperor Heraclius, though a steady infiltration had been going over a long time. The general appellation of these tribes was Slovene, and it was not till the ninth century that specific designations for their main divisions emerge. The term Slovene is used also in the same general sense as its English derivative Slav, e.g. in such expressions as 30 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Slovenski Jug — Slavonic South — Macedo-Slovenes, and so forth. It is apparently an accident of history that the term has become also the specific appellation of one of the three branches of the Southern Slavs, possibly because that small branch retained the original general name while its more numerous neighbours acquired particular desig- nations of their own. The terms Croat and Serb emerge in the ninth century, but it is significant of the funda- mental identity of these two kindreds that to the early Byzantine historians the terms are interchangeable.1 The origin of these names is unknown, but it is interesting to note that the name Serb is applied to themselves by the nearly extinct Slavs of northern Saxony and the adjacent part of Brandenburg who are usually known to us as Sorbs or Wends. When the Serbs and Croats eventually differ- entiated themselves the former are found to be occupying roughly the kingdom of Serbia, as existing from 1878 to 1912, Old Serbia (the country round Prizren, PriStina, etc.), the late sanjak of Novipazar, Montenegro, southern Dalmatia, the Hercegovina, Bosnia and Srem or Syrmia, the Timok being their immemorial boundary on the east while in Dalmatia the Cetina divided them from the Croats who occupied northern Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, the Triune Kingdom as it came later to be called. In addition to these regions the early Slav invaders overran the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. The modern Bulgaria and Macedonia were occupied by them, while the population of Albania and northern Greece has a large Slav element in its composition which in the former case is specifically Serb.2 The easterly and southern invaders seem to have been largely lacking in the sense of a specific national consciousness, as has been the case to the present day in the case of the Macedonians^ possibly 1 Cit. Nevill Forbes. The Southern Slavs, p. 16. * " Perhaps the majority of place-names of central and northern Albania are Slavonic ". H. M. Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 231. Pro- fessor Eliot Smith holds that the Albanians are part of the original Slav population. British Association Meeting, 1915. 3 See also Chapter VI. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 31 because the original population of these regions was more numerous than in the north-west, and so the invaders became more mixed in blood. In 679 the Bulgarians under Isperich conquered Lower Moesia, inhabited by these Slav invaders, and founded their first Balkan Bulgarian Kingdom. The new-comers were of Tartar origin, and though they were to a certain extent absorbed by the conquered, the nation has always been marked by many of the characteristics of its non- Slav ancestors. Though the new immigrants learned the Slav tongue — to this day Serb and Bulgar can understand one another, "when they choose", as Sir Charles Eliot says — their manners and polity remained sharply dis- tinguished from those of their Serb neighbours. They owned the sway of an autocratic Khan who lived in Oriental seclusion, and throughout its history the people has been marked by the passivity with which it has submitted to its rulers. The absence of any really serious revolt against Turkish domination cannot be ascribed entirely to the geographical features and position of the country, less difficult than Serbia or Greece, less remote than Roumania. The acquiescence in the absolute rule of the powerful Stambulov, and latterly with disastrous results in that of King Ferdinand, seems to be of a piece with what is known of their ancient history. In early days indeed this trait in their character allowed of a rapid development of the power of the Bulgarians, lending itself to the designs of their Khans and Tsars, and in consequence they were centuries before the Serbs in the consolidation of a serious political power. With the advent of the Bulgarians the era of considerable invasions of the Balkan Peninsula came to an end till the coming of the Turks. At this period, then, we find the north-western area in the hands of the Serbs, with the Bulgars to the east of them. In Albania the original stock had been pushed back into the utmost recesses of the country — the Mirdites are said never to have come under the effective sway of any foreign Power — while in the rest of the 32 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS land there was a considerable infiltration of Serb blood. Macedonia had been largely occupied by a Slav stock which must have been akin to the Serbs, but here their blood was largely diluted with elements derived from the provincial population of the later Empire. To this day the still dwindling element of that stock — much more numerous in the Middle Ages — perched on the mountain- tops of the Pindus and its offshoots overlooking the land that once was theirs preserves alike in its language and its name — Aromuni — the boast of descent from the lords of the ancient world, though these Vlachs (Kutzo-Vlachs, lame Vlachs) as they are generally known, can have had but comparatively little genuine Roman blood. Still, Romanized Thracians as they were, they have pre- served to us the "provincial" of the Empire. The metropolitan province of Constantinople was Greek, though, as has been seen, in its native land Greek blood was now largely intermingled with Slav. In organization the Serbs were poles asunder from the Bulgarians. They owned to no fixed central authority, but were a congeries of tribes acknowledging the rule of their tribal chiefs known as Supans but knowing nothing, save at rare intervals, of a national ruler. Indeed, to the end of the Middle Ages not only were Croats and Serbs separate, but the Serbs of Bosnia under their Bans occupied a position of precarious and delicately balanced independence between the rival claims to suzerainty of the Kings of Hungary and the Kings and Tsars of Serbia. From time to time one zupan more powerful than his contemporaries would succeed in uniting a large part of the nation under his sway as Grand Zupan. The fissiparous tendencies of Serb political life have been the bane of the nation, a truth that at long last has been bitten deep into the consciousness of the Southern Slavs. It has, however, to be remembered that this very impatience of restraint and fierce love of independence has been of untold value to the people in times of adversity, keeping alive through centuries of oppression the hope of eventual A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 33 national restoration and a burning desire to achieve it. Time and again they rose against the Turks till the very name of Serb stank in Turkish nostrils, and they never sank as others into a sluggish and oriental acquiescence in their servile political lot. The character of their country also, mountainous and split up into a number of comparatively small valleys, and mountain-surrounded basins — the poljes of Balkan geography — as it forbad any easy road to national unity so it fostered a sturdy love of independence and a vigorous local life. Of the early centuries of Serb history but little is known, and in a brief sketch such as this that little need not detain us long. It is not till 830 that we find definite mention of the name of a Grand Zupan in Voislav, while shortly after in the rule of one Radoslav occurred the most momentous event of early Serb history, and one of the most momentous in the whole history of the race, the conversion of the people to Christianity according to the Orthodox Eastern rite by the Southern Slav apostles, SS. Cyril and Methodius, who in the reign of Boris of Bulgaria converted the people of that country also. The Croats received their religion from western Roman sources, and for centuries the difference in religion has been perhaps the most weighty of the causes which have kept the two branches of the race apart. One of the causes of this difference is to be found not only in the more westerly position of the Croats, and the greater accessibility of their land to Western influences, but in the fact that, roughly speaking, the dividing line between Croat and Serb had been the old dividing line of the Eastern and Western Empires as it became that of Eastern and Western Christianity. From S. Cyril is derived the name of the " Orthodox " alphabet in use among the Serbs which has undergone various modifications since its introduction, perhaps in the form of what is known as the Glagolica alphabet ; the Croats on the contrary use the Latin alphabet with various diacritic marks in order to represent the sounds of the language, the Cyrillic alphabet being 3 34 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS phonetic. The reign of the Grand £upan Vlastimir was marked by a three-year attack by the Bulgarians under Presjam, the predecessor of Boris, which was beaten back. This is perhaps the earliest occasion on which the two peoples came into conflict since their institutions had crystallized into something like a definite polity, and marks the beginning of the secular struggle between them. The almost constant state of warfare between Serbs and Bulgars may be likened in its insistence, if not in its scale, to the agelong conflict between France and "the Empire", and both alike have been renewed in our own days with an intensity of feeling which has certainly not lessened with the passage of the centuries. This is sometimes forgotten by those who, ignorant apparently that the mutual animosity has its roots deep down in the history and his- torical consciousness of Serb and Bulgar, not only preach, as well they may, a gospel of peace to them, but allow their desires to outrun the realities of the situation, and either take their hopes for facts or grow impatient if those hopes are deceived. That nothing in the Balkan Peninsula is so desirable as the laying aside of the feud which has worked such incalculable mischief is as true as that the same applies to Frenchman and German, or Englishman and German, in the west, and the two feuds are likely to have their end about the same time. At any rate it is not for western Europe to take up a superior attitude of pained surprise or lofty disdain towards the blindness to their real interests of the two peoples who might well respond with Quis tulerit Gracchos ? This hatred between the two kindred peoples is a fact which is as saddening in the thought for the future as in the record of the past, but it is a fact to ignore which is simply a mark of incom- petence. The two nations are antipathetic, which may be due to the fact that after all the Bulgars are at least as Mongol, or at any rate non-Slav, as Slav. Boris renewed the attack against the sons of Vlastimir but was unsuccessful, and Muntimir, the eldest of them, succeeded his father as Grand £upan, an office which was tending to become hereditary. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 35 What Boris had been unable to accomplish was effected by his son the great Tsar Simeon, founder of the first Bulgarian Empire. Under him the territory ruled by the Bulgarians touched the three seas which are the goal of Ferdinand in our own time, and included the eastern part of Serbia with Ni§ and Belgrade. In 917 Simeon made Paul Brankovic Grand Zupan after Peter his pre- decessor had been decoyed into the Bulgarian camp and treacherously murdered. Frequent Serb revolts were put down with ruthless severity and the country ravaged to desolation. After the death of Simeon Serbia became independent under Ceslav, who succeeded in driving out the Bulgars, but after his death Serb history becomes again almost a blank illumined by the emergence of one or two names. We hear of a John Vladimir who was defeated by Samuel the successor of Sisman, who had founded the "western Bulgarian Empire", and sub- sequently murdered by John Vladislav the last of the early Bulgar tsars. As nearly always, the fortunes of the two nations were inversely connected, and the fall of the Bulgars and their subjection to the Eastern Empire for a century and a half saw the dawn of a better day for the Serbs, and in 1040 Stephen Voislav ruled as an independent sovereign over Zahumlija, Zeta, and Ra§ka, while Michael his son was even recognized as king by Gregory VII, though he was wise enough to maintain his peace with the Emperor. Both Serb and Bulgar rulers engaged in an occasional flirtation with the Papacy when they required aid against Constantinople. It was with the accession of the Nemanja dynasty in the middle of the twelfth century that the heroic epoch of Serb history began. It must be remembered that the kingdom of Serbia as it existed from 1878 to 1912 is1^ by no means the cradle of the original Serb State, and cannot be spoken of in any historical sense as Serbia " proper " as is sometimes loosely done. The designation ' " Serbia " has been a political term for that portion of the | Serb lands which has been independent, and Danubian , 36 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Serbia in no sense corresponds to East and West Prussia as "Prussia proper". At this time the Serb tribes had coalesced in certain fairly constant State formations both in the Primorija or coast region along the Adriatic, and Zagorija or transmontane region of the interior. Bosnia, as the name implies, had its centre in the basin of the river Bosna. To the south lay Zahumlija, or the land of Hum or Primorija, corresponding roughly to the modern Hercegovina. Zeta, another subdivision of the territory, was the representative of the present Crnagora, or Monte- negro. The main Serb State was Raska, which compre- hended the late sanjak of Novipazar, Old Serbia to the Sar mountains, and western Serbia (as we know it) as its permanent elements, the eastern part of Serbia was at times in dispute with the Bulgars, as Belgrade and the Maeva were with the Hungarians, for in those days as in our own time the configuration of the latter region made it hard to defend. Vidin in Bulgaria was also a subject of dispute. Stephen Nemanja, whose accession to power is variously dated as 1143 or 1160, succeeded after conflict with his brothers in uniting Zahumlija, Zeta, and Ra§ka under his sway as Grand Zupan, and henceforth to RaSka in its varying extent may be applied the name of Serbia. He was born at Dioclea in Zeta in which town, now ruined, some have seen the origin of the name of Diocletian. For a time he succeeded in uniting Bosnia also to his dominions. His attempts, however, to throw off the suzerainty of Con- stantinople ended in failure, and he was obliged to make a humiliating submission to the Emperor Manuel Comnenus. After the death of Manuel in 1180 Nemanja was able to gather strength, and he added NiS to his territories, and five years later he assumed the title of king though he was never crowned. In 1195 he abdicated the throne in favour of his son, became a monk under the name of Simeon and retired to the famous monastery of Hilindar which he had founded on Mount Athos, where he died four years later. From his time the sovereigns of Serbia A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 37 almost without exception bore the name of Stephen, probably from its signification — a crown. The titles of these sovereigns are variously given : I have followed the simplest nomenclature, giving the other designa- tions by which they are sometimes known in brackets. Nemanja's son Stephen II (sometimes called Stephen UroS) had to contest his right with one of his brothers stirred up by Andrew II of Hungary, jealous of the rising power of Serbia, but the quarrel after some fighting waa allayed by the king's youngest brother who had taken orders and is known in Serb history as S. Sava. The latter indeed might almost in some respects be considered the veritable founder of the new State, composing quarrels, organizing the Church, and pressing on the work of civili- zation.1 Stephen II at one time coquetted with the Pope and was even crowned by a Papal legate ; but this act, though undertaken for political reasons, aroused the Ortho- dox resentment of his subjects. He was acknowledged by Baldwin the first Latin Emperor of Constantinople as independent King of Serbia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. S. Sava, who became Archbishop of Uzice, crowned his brother again and henceforth the latter was known as Prvoven6ani, " the first crowned ". The organization of the State was completed by the recognition accorded by the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Serb Church as an autonomous body in 1219. War with Hungary followed the acquisition of Bosnia with results favourable to the Serbs. The reigns of Stephen III (Rodoslav) and his brother Vladislav were contemporaneous with the growth of the second Bulgarian Empire under John Asen IL The former of these sovereigns obtained Syrmia, a province which throughout the Middle Ages had a close connection with Serbia and stood somewhat apart from the kingdom of Croatia- Slavonia, from Hungary and Vidin from Bulgaria, but the latter acquisition was lost by his brother. 1 "If the father endowed the Serbian State with a body, the son gave it a soul". Father Nicholas Velimirovid, Religion and Nationality in Serbia, p. 7. 38 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS The country made notable progress during the reign of a third brother, Stephen IV the Great (Stephen Uros I), who ascended the throne of Serbia in 1242. He married Helena, a niece of Baldwin of Constantinople, of whom her husband's subjects were lavish in praise for the manner in which she seconded the king's efforts for the advance- ment of his people. A curious memorial of her is to be found in the ruined church of Gradac, in the former sanjak of Novipazar, which in a strange land bears the impress of the French Gothic of her own people. The reign was one of peace on the whole, though Serbia had to undergo a terrible invasion of the Mongols, who were not defeated till they had ravaged the country to the shores of the Adriatic. Among other measures taken for the develop- ment of the country was the opening up of the mining industry, for which experts were sought, it is interesting to note, from Germany. His son Dragutin was married to a daughter of Bela IV of Hungary, and the close of the old king's reign was marked by one of the domestic trage- dies which form so great a blot on the medieval history of Serbia. Assisted bj' the Hungarians, his son rebelled, and Stephen the Great was forced to abdicate in 1276. Stephen Dragutin did not long enjoy the fruits of his unfilial conduct, for, stung by remorse, he abdicated in favour of his younger brother, reserving for himself the Ma6va and Syrmia, which for many years he ruled with success. Under Stephen VI Milutin (Uro§ II Milutin), Serbia entered upon a vigorous policy which aimed at aggrandize- ment at the expense of the Eastern Empire, which since the decline of the Bulgarian realm, under the successors of John Asen II, had been in possession of Macedonia. Milutin's first campaign was completely successful, and the Serb armies penetrated to Seres, to the Aegean, and the lakes of Ochrida and Prespa. Not all these conquests were retained, however, but northern and a part of central Mace- donia remained in his hands. Equally successful against the Bulgarians, he took Vidin in 1291, and on a renewal A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 39 of the struggle against the Greeks made himself master of Durazzo and northern Albania, gains which were partly offset by the loss of the Ma5va to Hungary on the death of his brother, the Hungarian king claiming that province equally with Syrmia as a fief of his crown. A new foe was encountered by the Serbs for the first time in the reign of Milutin. The rapid advance of the Turks in Asia Minor might well give pause to the Balkan sovereigns who were wasting their manhood in perpetual warfare among them- selves. Possibly it was an appreciation of this danger that caused Milutin during the latter half of his reign to pursue a policy of peace and alliance with Constantinople. This alliance was sealed by the marriage of Milutin, a widower, with Simonis, daughter of Andronicus II. In 1303 the Serbs, in alliance with the Greeks, crossed into Asia Minor and took part in the victory of Angora, in which the Turks were defeated. Twelve years later Serbia again came to the help of Constantinople, in dire straits owing to an inva- sion of Thrace itself by the Turks. Again the Serbs were successful, and the Turks were swept into the Sea of Mar- mora. Progress was marked in the development of civili- zation in the kingdom, and Milutin has been called the " roi batisseur " of his dynasty. The monastery of Hilindar was rebuilt on a larger scale by him, and religious or charit- able foundations, the results of his munificence, were found in cities so widely dispersed as Salonica, Skoplje, Seres, Constantinople, and even Jerusalem, while the church of Banjska, near Mitrovica, also owned him as founder. In his reign the archiepiscopal see of Serbia was removed from Uzice to Pe6, in Old Serbia, which since 1913 has been included in Montenegro. His later domestic relations were unhappy, for his wife Simonis intrigued against the suc- cession of his eldest son in favour of her own child. The former was exiled to Constantinople, and his stepmother is said to have given orders for him to be blinded ; but the executioner only pretended to do his horrid work, and after seven years the prince returned to his country with eye- sight unimpaired, and in 1321 ascended the throne as 40 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Stephen VII, Dc£anski (UroS III). Milutin was buried at Sofia.1 The new monarch's surname was derived from the most magnificent monument of medieval Serb art in existence, the Monastery of Decani, near to Pec, and, like that town, now included in Montenegro. Built of red and white marble by an architect from Kotor (Cattaro), one of the Serb seaports, it has impressed itself with a species of superstitious veneration upon the minds of even the wild Albanians in its vicinity, and retains to this day the con- temporary frescoes of early Serb monarchs. During the retreat of the Serb army in 1915 the Albanians are said to have made an attempt to destroy that which they have respected through the centuries, so contaminating are the methods of war as practised by the apostles of kultur.2 Stephen Decanski's short reign was marked by almost continuous warfare. The king of Hungary attacked the Wallachs, who were allies of Stephen, and the latter crossed the Danube and inflicted a crushing defeat upon his enemies. In 1325 he lost Zahumlija to Kutromanic, Ban of Bosnia, in a war which had been caused by a revolt of the Serb king's half-brother. At the end of his reign he had to face a combination of Bulgaria and the Eastern Empire. His action was prompt and brilliantly successful. Inter- posing himself between the forces of the two allies he crushed the former State in the battle of Velbuzd, not far from Kustendil, in which the Bulgarian Tsar, who had repudiated his wife, Stephen's sister, was killed. Stephen placed his sister on the Bulgarian throne as regent, and henceforth, almost till the final destruction of Bulgaria by the Turks, that State remained the vassal of her western neighbour. The Greek forces retreated without awaiting 1 The " Church of the Holy King " in which he was buried has lately been renamed by the Bulgars, who glory in the desecration of Milutin's remains. 3 The report apparently has done an injustice to the Albanians. That which the wild caterans respected was left to the Austro-Bulgars to spoil. The treasures of Decani have been carried away and a sordid dispute has been carried on by the robbers as to their respective shares. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 41 an attack. Yet again domestic differences marked the close of a Serb king's reign. Unmindful of all that he had suffered, Decanski took a Greek princess for his second wife, with the usual result that she intrigued against her stepson Stephen — the role of royal women in Balkan politics has indeed been miserable. Stephen took up arms against his father and dethroned him. Shortly after, in 1331, the old king was strangled, it is said against the new king's wish and at the instigation of the nobles. With the reign of the new king Stephen VIII, Dusan, medieval Serbia reached its zenith. For years the surname of this monarch was derived by English historians from a Serb word, du§iti, to strangle, and was translated as " the strangler ", or " throttler ". It is now agreed that the Serbs were right in deriving it from dusa, " the soul ", and that it means the soul or darling, i.e. of the people. A Serb has informed me that the former derivation was absolutely impossible on grammatical grounds. He resumed the war against the Byzantines, and his earlier campaigns were completely successful, Andronicus III himself being forced to suffer a siege in Salonica, and to agree to terms of peace. As a result of the treaty of 1340 DuSan was left in posses- sion of Albania, with the exception of Durazzo, Epirus, Acarnania, Thessaly, and Macedonia to Seres, except for the town of Salonica, while Bulgaria was a vassal State, so that he was master of the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. Soon after he intervened in the civil war waged between the Empress Anne and John Cantacuzene, taking at first the side of the latter, but reversing his action when Cantacuzene called in the aid of the Turks. Here we can perceive the prescience of Du§an, and perhaps the first germs of the project on which he was occupied at the time of his death. So great was his power and so extensive his dominions that the title of king no longer sufficed for him, and he assumed the title of Emperor or Tsar. A cor- responding increase of dignity was conferred upon the Archbishop of Pec, who was elevated to the title of patri- arch, and so commenced the long and glorious history of 42 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the Patriarchs of Pe6, who wore in sadder circumstances to uphold the standard of Serb nationalism when all temporal authorities had been forced to bow the neck to the Turkish yoke. The Patriarch of Constantinople protested, and it was not till some thirty years after that he consented to recognize the new dignity of the Serb metropolitan. One of the first acts of the new Patriarch was to crown his sovereign in company with the Archbishop of Ochrida, the occupant of which ancient and historic see was titular metropolitan of Bulgaria and Justiniana Prima. At Skoplje on Easter Day, 1346, Stephen Dusan was crowned and proclaimed " Emperor of the Serbs and Romans ". The title was in itself a challenge to Byzantium, and seems a clear indication that the Tsar had by this time definitely decided on his grand design, though it was another nine years before he put it into execution. Henceforth the Tsar assumed imperial state and titles, while he founded an order of chivalry, the Order of S. Stephen. Nor was Dusan a conqueror only; he resembled the great sovereigns of history in being a lawgiver also. He caused a code to be drawn up based upon a recension of Byzantine law to which some two hundred articles were added, said to have been largely derived from the laws of the Adriatic seaport Budva, and in 1349 was promulgated his famous Zakonik, or law code. So far as I know this code has never been translated into English, and the most complete analysis of some of its main provisions is to be found in Prince Lazarovic-Hrebel- janovic's book The Servian People. What is there set forth is sufficient to arouse the interest of any one who has passed through the Oxford History School and possesses a working knowledge of medieval English law and the social conditions on which early law throws so illumi- nating a light. It is to be hoped that, when peace restores our scholars to their accustomed studies, one of them, his interest aroused in our Balkan ally, will give himself to the work of bringing out an annotated edition of this code, even though the actual translation should be the A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 43 work of another hand. It shows us a state of society and a law procedure which can fitly be compared with their countertypes in the West, while to the interest of the resemblances is added the force of contrast provided by those elements which were due either to native Serb conditions or to the influence of Byzantine elements. The Tsar was also a patron of learning, and built many schools and churches. The following year saw the conclusion of a fresh peace, this time between DuSan and Cantacuzene who had made himself master of the Greek Empire and with Turkish aid had won back some of DuSan's most easterly conquests. What the latter, however, lost in the east he more than recovered in the west. Louis the Great of Hungary, jealous of the Tsar's power, invaded the latter's dominions only to experience the fortune that had attended the Hungarian adventure against Stephen Decanski. Defeated by Dufian he was compelled to give up Belgrade, while Bosnia, together with Zahumlija (the Hercegovina), which latter province had belonged to Bosnia since 1325, passed under DuSan's hand. Kotor, Budva, Bar (Antivari), on the Adriatic were likewise part of the Serb realm, that particular portion of the Adriatic being known as the Serb Sea, while friendly relations were entertained with the independent Serb republic of Dubrovnik (Kagusa). Thus was formed at length the medieval Great Serbia, the union of the Serb stock in one realm. Even before this year — ten years earlier if the date be correct — DuSan had claimed the lordship of Bosnia. Sir Arthur Evans has told how in the Franciscan monastery of Fonjica in Bosnia he saw " The Book of Arms of the Nobility of Bosnia or Illyria, and Serbia, together set forth by Stanislaus Rub6i6, priest, to the glory of Stephen Nemanja, Tsar of the Serbs and Bosnians. In the year 1340 " ; the book, however, being a late medieval copy of the original. The present aspirations of the Southern Slavs are here prefigured, for among the quarterings of the various Serb provinces surrounding the white double 44 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS eagle are to be found the three bearded kings of Dalmatia, the hounds of Slavonia, and the red and silver chequer of Croatia. In 1355 Dusan took up in earnest his great design. The Greek Empire was growing feebler and feebler. Apart from a short stretch of the coast of Asia Minor all that re- mained to the successors of the Roman Emperors was the metropolitan province of Constantinople and Thrace; the Turks were passing from conquest to conquest, and already the Serbs had met them in battle in Europe ; evidently Constantinople was doomed to pass into alien hands, and Dusan determined that those hands should be his own. He formed the magnificent project, altogether justified by circumstances, of seizing Constantinople and refounding the Eastern Empire under himself. Had the scheme succeeded, and had Dusan lived out his life to a normal span, the whole current of European history might have been changed. As it was the strength of the imperial city enabled it to hold out for another hundred years, and if it had been held by a young and vigorous race, reawakening to life the dry bones of the Empire, re- juvenating its population and institutions with fresh impulses and a new awakening, it might well have been that the Turks would have thundered at its gates in vain, and south-eastern Europe have been spared five hundred years of misery, bloodshed, and decay. Not less than 80,000 men were gathered beneath the Tsar's standard, he had sympathizers in the city, and there was no adequate military force to oppose him. Adrianople and Thrace fell into his hands, and he had approached within forty miles of the capital when he was suddenly taken ill and died in December 1355, the circumstances raising the suspicion that he had been poisoned by the Greeks. He was not yet fifty years of age. His forces immediately turned back, and bore the body of the great Tsar to be buried in the monastery which he had founded in Prizren the Tsarigrad. In that tomb was laid also the future of Serbia. In estimating the civilization of the medieval Serbs we A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 45 are faced not merely with scanty documentary evidence but with the almost -complete obliteration of those enduring monuments which in happier lands speak so eloquently across the ages. Yet sufficient remains to indicate that they were not the savages or mere copyists that they have been represented to be. Their civilization has two sources; the more immediate was Byzantium with its great traditions and continuous life from Roman times, on the other hand, especially through Dubrovnik, that lamp of the eastern Adriatic, Serbia lay open to the influences of Italy and the West : the historic role of Serbia imposed upon her by her geographical position is to be at once the keeper of the gate between East and West and interpreter of the one to the other — a role which it is to be hoped she will shortly resume. But little description has appeared of the relics of Serb architecture, even from those who have seen them. It is necessary to go back to Denton's Servia and the Servians, published so far back as 1862, for anything like a reasoned account of some of its features.1 Throughout, Serb architecture seems to have exhibited a melange of western and eastern forms, which in some respects becomes more marked towards the close of the period. Some of the most beautiful churches, though by no means large judged by western standards, date from the last years of Serb independence and are the work of "Tsar" Lazar, his wife, and son. Such is the extremely beautiful little church at KruSevac, and the fine fortified monastery of Manassija, 1 A short account is given in Servia by the Servians, edited by A. Stead. This section of the book, however, suffers from bad trans- lation, the translator having apparently but little acquaintance with architectural terms. The term "Roman" for example is applied not only to Romanesque art, but, as the context shows, to Gothic. ''Tambour" is untranslated, though its literal rendering, a "drum," is also correct technically. The climax is reached when, by a slip, the fourteenth-century churches are stated to be marked by the occurrence of a "polygamous tambour," a feature surely more suited to Mohammedan than Christian art 1 Still, read with care, the section is interesting and instructive. 46 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS whose towered enceinte still remains. It has been said that Serbia was on the point of developing a new style "First Pointed Byzantine," that is to say a style which combines many of the features of "First Pointed Gothic" with those of Byzantine architecture. From the latter this later Serb architecture is dis- tinguished by several features. Byzantine churches though they show a transept in elevation, do not generally show one in plan (in York Cathedral the great transept projects beyond the line of the aisles and therefore shows in plan, the smaller eastern transept shows in elevation, but as it is practically flush with the aisle walls does not show in plan) ; the Serb churches, however, which we are considering, possess slightly projecting transepts the projection taking the form of polygonal transverse apses. The place of a dome is taken by a low octagonal tower not unlike those to be found in some " Early English " churches as at Uffington, and these towers were covered by a pyramidal cap originally, though in some cases these have been mistakenly "restored" with bulbous domes of Russian type. Rose windows are a very prominent feature, and the likeness to Gothic is sometimes enhanced by the occurrence of "lancet" windows grouped in pairs, with a circle in the head but not under a containing arch. It is much to be hoped that in the future Serb architects, instead of copying the present academic art of the west, will set themselves to follow up the trend of their own traditions : to possess a national style of architecture which has not been " worked out " is indeed a boon, the greatness of which they do not seem hitherto to have appreciated as they ought. Owing to their history, moreover, it has never been superseded by any other tradition, only a few important buildings having been erected in recent times. Of the social conditions which prevailed in medieval Serbia we can get information from Tsar Dusan's Zakonik.1 1 I rely in the following paragraphs on the analysis given in Prince Lazarovid-Hrebeljanovid's book already cited, vol. i, chap. vi. Some of his comments and comparisons are by no means free from partiality, A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 47 At the head of the great officers of State stood the Chancellor (Logothet) and by his side were found a High Steward (Veliki Celnik) and Treasurer (Riznickni Celnik). For administrative purposes the country was divided into districts under administrators with the title of Knez. The Crown possessed large estates whose revenues, as was the case with the "ancient demesne" of England, were applicable alike to the personal expenses of the ruler and to the needs of State, while other receipts were derived from the hearth tax, from the mines, from judicial fines, customs dues, and the fixed contribution paid by Dubrovnik (Ragusa) in lieu of individual trade licences. Local administration was exercised through the Zupa and the village (selo) each of which possessed its local assembly, the centre of the former being the grad, whose attributes and origin seem to be closely analogous to the Saxon burh. The nobles (vlastela) were divided into two grades, great and small, both of which had places in the Sabor, or national council, to the exclusion of the commoners, though originally these latter had possessed rights of representation. The landed property of the nobles fell under two classifica- tions, baStina and pronja. The former of these was freehold, it could be disposed of after the consent had been obtained of the family, or zadruga, and confirmation by the Crown. The holder was bound to give military service and to pay the hearth tax. The second form of noble tenure was the pronja (irpovoia). This was not a freehold but a life tenure, it could not be disposed of by sale or gift* and on the death of the holder it returned to Crown. Article 57 declared the pronja to be forfeit in the event of oppression of the tenants. The pronja represented an usufruct granted as stipend to State officials and dignitaries. Below the nobles came the commoner (sebar). The first order of these, called Slobodnji Ljudi, or independent people, possessed ba&tina, or freehold property, and was liable but I see no reason to doubt tbe correctness of the translations given by him or statements made as of fact. Tbe allusions to medieval English conditions are my own. 48 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS to military service. His position in other respects seems to have been in general not dissimilar in its social relationships to that of the English freeholder or tenant in socage, account being had of the fact that in Serbia the feudal system had but little hold in its organized western form. The second order of sebri was composed of the merops or kmets. This latter class composed the great mass of the population. Their property might consist either of baStina, which however was encumbered with servitudes towards a noble's demesne, or of land rented from such a demesne. The ba§tina could be aliened (Article 174) provided that there should be a work-hand to perform labour (robot) due to the lord's demesne. The duties are denned in Article 68 which forbad any exaction beyond the robot prescribed by law, and in the event of such exaction the kmet could cite the lord before the royal court, an improvement on the rights of the villein in the English court customary. Each merop house had to give the labour of one man for two days in the week, each tenant was further bound to give one day's work (all the tenants working together) at haymaking, and another in the vineyard ; the hearth tax and military service were also due, as well as labour on public works, fortresses, and the like, the latter taking the place of the contributions in the form of taxes levied for a similar purpose on the nobles. Lodging and hospitality had also to be given to certain State officials on circuit. The position of the merop was so far superior to that of the English villein in that he was capable of possessing freehold property (baStina) which the villein could not ; on the other hand he owed labour service for his freehold, so that he was in respect of the latter some- what in the position of the class in England which held their land in what has sometimes been called villein socage, the smallest class of manorial freeholders. In other respects, and if none of his land were freehold, he occupied very much the same place in rural and social economy as the villein. Article 22 enacted : " Merops who have A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 49 abandoned their land to go and settle on Church lands shall return to their original domain", and Article 201 : "If a merop abandons his tenure, the overlord of his [sic ?the] domain, upon finding him, can have him punished, and exact a bond for good behaviour, but he cannot seize any of that merop's property". The appli- cation would seem to be to a merop not owning baStina of his own, but holding of the lord. The lowest class of all was formed by the otroks. These were strictly ascripti glebae but could not be transferred apart from the estate. Civil cases between otroks were decided before their lord, for criminal offences they were answerable to the royal courts. They may be compared to the lowest class of English villeins, the bordars and cottars of early documents. Legal slavery there was none. Article 21 enacted: "Whoever sells a Christian shall lose his hand and have his nose slit ". The administration of justice was in the hands of the royal courts, the country being divided into circuits (Article 179), while local justice was administered in the " grads M (head seat of a zupa) by the court of the grad presided over by the Tjephalia (Greek kephalia), the captain or governor of the grad, in the villages by village courts composed of judges locally elected styled " good men " (dobri ljudi) presided over by the village elder : the suitors were the judges. In addition there were the ecclesiastical and commercial courts. Article 171 expressly enacted the subjection of the Sovereign to the laws ; " In case My Imperial Majesty should give to any person a ' writing ' . . . which is contrary to the law . . . the judge shall pay no heed to that writing, and shall judge regularly and according to law and shall see to it that his judgment is executed ". Articles 184 and 185 forbad imprisonment without a writ of judgment or order of a judge — an anti- cipation by three hundred years of our Habeas Corpus. The pristavs, or sheriffs, were forbidden to act save in accordance with legal provisions. Article 152 ordained that both in civil and criminal cases a man could be 4 50 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS judged only by his peers "as in the time of my grand- father, the holy King Milutin ". The two blots on the code were the inequality of punishment for the same offence and the draconian severity of some of these punishments. Personal injury inflicted by a great vlastelin upon a lesser vlastelin was punished with a fine of one hundred perpers (one perper was equal to half a Venetian ducat or Serb zlatnik whose value was about nine shillings), in the contrary case the punishment was a fine of one hundred perpers and corporal punishment, but this differentiation did not extend to crimes against public order or the State. Article 145 ordered that villages where was found a robber or a thief should be dispersed, the robber hanged, the thief blinded. Parricides were burnt at the stake. Some examples exhibit both defects. Manslaughter committed by a noble against a sebar was punished by a fine of one thousand perpers, in the contrary event by a fine of three hundred perpers and loss of a hand. If a nobleman violated a gentlewoman both his hands were to be chopped off and his nose slit, for a like offence the sebar was hanged, but if, in the latter case, the sebar's offence was against one of his own order the punishment was loss of both hands and the nose to be slit, as in the case of a noble offending against his own order. Such draconian severity does not, however, ever seem to have been exercised in cases where the offence was obviously disproportionate; the cruelty, if such it be called, was reserved for crimes which rightly excited detestation and was not exercised in wantonness. Merchants were protected and a brisk commerce was done with Dubrovnik (Ragusa). The produce of the mines enabled the sovereigns to hire mercenaries, heavy cavalry, from France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. On the whole the picture presented is by no means unattractive. The Zahonih itself, in view of its date, deserves a very high place in legal records, and indicates a high degree of social and legal organization — Tsar Dusan A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 51 was no semi-barbarous monarch ruling his dominions with oriental caprice and despotism. The general position of the mass of the people was certainly superior to that occupied by the similar classes in central and western Europe with the exception, perhaps, of our own. There was no feudal oppression, nor feudal justice, or rather in- justice, such as ground down the countryside where feudal- ism reigned supreme in its full development, as it never did in England, and the French peasant of the eighteenth century would probably have very willingly changed places with his Serb brother of the fourteenth. Speaking generally DuSan's code was superior to the contemporary systems prevailing in western Europe even in the more advanced States, and surprising though this may seem at first sight it is not so much to be wondered at when we remember that he had at his immediate disposal the code of Justinian and those legal principles which have so profoundly influenced modern western legal systems. Doubt- less administration of this code would vary at different times. In a state of almost constant warfare the organs of govern- ment would frequently be functioning very badly, as they did in our country under the weak Lancastrian adminis- tration which led to the demand for "more abundant governance," yet it remains that the great Tsar endued his country with a good legal system in advance of those generally prevailing. II The Fall of Serbia The Serb Empire as distinct from the Kingdom of Serbia had been the work of Dusan and fell with his death. He had had no time in which to assimilate its new acquisitions or to set up therein a tradition of organized government under Serb auspices. Even in the Serb provinces the old fissiparous tendencies manifested themselves anew. The problem of all medieval States of any size was the difficulty 52 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS of maintaining the central authority in their outlying provinces, the governors of which continually strove to establish for themselves an independent position ; the Roman Empire alone with its close central authority and organized hierarchical services had achieved a solution the merits of which alone enabled its eastern member to endure till the fifteenth century. Added to this in Serbia the nature of the country itself, divided into separate river basins with difficult intercommunication, as it had facilitated in the early migrations the setting up of small clan States, so now made for the dissolution of the Empire into its com- ponent elements. Immediately the strong hand of Dugan was removed from the governors these began to agitate their independence. His successor was the young Tsar UroS (Uro§ V), a youth of nineteen and devoid of the vigour and decision of character which had marked out his father even at that age. Thessaly became independent, the- Albanians regained their usual condition of inde- pendence or anarchy, Bulgaria ceased to be the vassal of the Tsar, Belgrade was lost to the Hungarians, and Bosnia under Stephen Tvrtko fell away from the Empire, which became now not even a pan- Serb Kingdom. Within the Kingdom itself the same process proceeded apace, and is intimately connected with the name of Vukasin MrnjavSevic. It is a proof that the Serbs themselves were keenly conscious of the cause of their ruin that their popular legends hold up to detestation the names of the great rebels, and indeed impute to them crimes of which they were innocent, guilty as was their general conduct. Vukasm, who was governor of Macedonia, pro- claimed his independence of the Tsar and even assumed the title of King of Serbia in 1366. According to legend he attacked Uro§ and contrived his death some time in 1367 ; as a matter of fact, however, the Tsar survived his rebellious vassal.1 In the meantime the Turks had occupied Adrianople, in 1360, and made it the capital of 1 Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire Generate, Tome iii, chap xviii, p. 915. This chapter is by the late Stojan Novakovic and A. Malet. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 53 their Empire, and began, under Murad I, to press upon the small Serb States which had been formed beyond the Struma. In 1371 King Vukasm, at the head of a combined army of Slavs, Greeks, Hungarians, and Wallachs marched against Adrianople, and suffered on the banks of the Marica a disastrous defeat at a spot thereafter known as Srb Sindin — " The Serb Rout ". Vukasm himself is said to have been drowned in the river, or, as other accounts have it, was murdered after the battle for the sake of the gold ornaments he wore. In what remained to Tsar tiros' the Balcic of the Zeta (Montenegro), and the Altomanovic of the land soon to be the Hercegovina had broken away before the death of the Tsar two months after the battle of Adrianople in December 1371. Uro§ had left no direct heirs and his dominions were disputed among the Serb princes. Of these Lazar Hrebeljanovic, a connection of the Royal House whose name has become the very symbol of the tragedy of Serbia, was recognized as the ruler of Serbia north of the Sar mountains, with the exception of the territories mentioned above. Although he is always called in the legends Tsar Lazar, and is commonly considered the last of the Tsars, he never assumed the title, which indeed would hardly have consorted with his actual power, but entitled himself merely Knez or Prince. Another relative of the Nemanjas Tvrtko of Bosnia entertained designs on .the higher dignity, and in 1376 proclaimed himself King of Serbia and Bosnia, but no warfare ensued between the two princes. Macedonia had fallen under the suzerainty of the Turks which was acknowledged by its ruler, the son of Vukasin, the far-famed Marko Kraljevic (Marko the King's son) the great hero of a cycle of ballads which deal with his marvellous exploits and those of his magic horse &arac. His seat was at Prilip, where he was to sleep till the hour of national resurrection was to strike, and when, in the first Balkan War of 1912, the Serbs avenged Kosovo, many of the soldiers ascribed their success to the presence, which they 54 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS affirmed, of Marko on Sarac who led them to the assault. In sober history he was a vassal of the Turk, and it is a mystery of popular legend how and why his figure assumed in the imagination of the whole of the Southern Slav race the place which it occupies. Lazar's strength was diminished by the necessity of beating back the attacks of the Hungarians, and in 1386 the Turks captured Ni§ and forced the prince to pay tribute and provide mercenaries for the Turkish armies. Three years later occurred the great disaster which has burnt itself into the memory and historical consciousness of the Serb race ever since. Lazar had fixed the capital of Serbia, which at various times had been located at Raska (Novipazar), Pri§tina, Prizren, and Skoplje, at KruSevac not far from the junction of the two main streams of the Morava, where he built thebeautiful church which still exists, and the "White Tower", now in ruins, from which he set out on his last fateful campaign. An alliance was formed between Serbia, the Zeta, and Bosnia for a great attempt to drive back the tide of Turkish invasion. The two armies met on June 15, 1389, on the field of Kosovo (the "Field of Blackbirds "), and then was settled for five hundred years the fate of the Balkan Peninsula. The battle was long and stubbornly contested and the result was only decided, according to the legend, by the treachery of Vuk Brankovic,1 a Serb noble who was in command of one wing of the Christian host and, while the issue was still in suspense, rode off the field at the head of 12,000 men in accordance with a previous agreement with Murad, who had promised him the throne of Serbia.2 The Serbs, 1 The legends have dealt hardly with his name. There seems to be no proof in fact of his alleged treachery, and his family became the leaders of the Serbs in their subsequent resistance. ' " The story is often repeated in Bosnia that at the time of the Austro- Hungarian occupation in 1878 an old Serb Moslem Bey named Brankovid was taunted by a Hungarian officer of Hussars who said, ' It was one of your name who ran away at Kosovo, and gave the country to the Turks'. 'Yes, yes, we know that, alas I ' said the Bey, 'but remember, Major, the men under him were a contingent of Hungarian mercenaries ' ". Prince Lazarovic-Hrebeljanovid, The Servian People, vol. i, p. 290 note. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 55 overwhelmed by weight of numbers, gave way : the Turkish victory was complete. Both sovereigns lost their lives, for Murad, riding over the scene of the battle when all was over, was killed by a Serb knight, Milo§ Obilic or Kobili6. The catastrophe impressed itself deeply on the minds of the Southern Slavs and has become the centre of the " Kosovo cycle " of Serb popular poetry and legend. In these poems, where fact is mingled with fiction, all the incidents preceding and attending the battle are dealt with ; the departure of Lazar the " Golden Crown of Serbia " from the White Tower of Krusevac ; his attend- ance by his father-in-law Jug Bogdan and his brothers-in- law the nine Jugovic ; the choice offered him by the Virgin of a heavenly or an earthly crown and his acceptance of the former ; the taunt levelled by Brankovic against the courage of MiloS ; the proof offered to the latter who stole to the Turkish camp before the battle and slew the Sultan — this is the popular version — the fall of Lazar in the thick of the press (for the ballads will not admit that he was taken prisoner and executed) ; the news of the death of her hus- band and brothers brought to the Tsarica Milica at Krusevac by two ravens ; and the curse of the Serbs on the head of Vuk Brankovic who on the field of battle had betrayed the all-glorious Tsar. Ever since, June 15th has been a day of mourning, while the red and black cap of the Montenegrins is said to typify the blood that was shed at Kosovo and mourning for the event. These legends served to keep alive the national consciousness of the defeated, and at Kumanovo it was to shouts of " Kosovo, Kosovo ! " that the Serb infantry charged the Turkish line when the long- delayed day of vengeance was come and they were to enter again the great Dusan's capital. With the battle of Kosovo ended the existence of Serbia as a sovereign State, but for some years it maintained its internal autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. Bajazet, the successor of Murad, was in no condition to push matters to extremes, and Stephen Lazarevi6 was permitted by ithe conqueror to retain his father's dominions as " Despot " on 56 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS payment of an annual tribute and the furnishing of a Serb contingent to the Ottoman forces ; his sister, also, married the Sultan — a fact which gave the latter's successors a claim to the throne. The new ruler set himself to the organiza- tion of his State, procured Belgrade from the Hungarians and made it his capital, a change significant of the altered posi- tion of the country. Like his father, and indeed all the Nemanji6i, he was a benefactor of the Church, and founded the great monastery of Manassija. After proving himself a loyal tributary to the Sultans — and it must be said in extenuation that he may well have considered that resist- ance would bring him worse evils in its train, while the Hungarians who had attacked UroS V and Lazar on several occasions and had done nothing previously to give assistance against the Turks could not complain if now they had to fight without Serb aid — the Despot died in 1427. The remainder of this period of Serb history need not detain us long in so cursory a survey. As he had no heirs Stephen Lazarevic nominated as his successor George Brankovic, son of that Vuk who had betrayed, according to legend, his country at Kosovo. His title was disputed by Murad II the great-grandson of Tsar Lazar, but he succeeded in maintaining it against Turkish intervention. The reign of the new ruler was one long-continued struggle with the Turks, waged now with, now without, the aid of the Hungarians under the famous John Hunyad, for it was inevitable that Serbia, less fortunate in some ways in its geographical position than the Roumanian principalities, should be bowed down completely under the Turkish yoke. The Turks were now pressing on into Hungary, and Serbia, which holds the gate of the East and therefore of the West, lay directly in their path, and suffered the fate of every State which holds an important strategical position with inadequate forces, just as at the present time she has been subjected to the reverse pressure of the German Drang nach Osten — only when there is a strong Southern Slav Kingdom will there be a tolerable guarantee of peace in the Balkans, and all efforts by whatever motive induced, to weaken the A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 57 Serbo-Croats will be direct causes of further struggles. After a long life replete with even more than the usual vicissitudes of Balkan sovereigns, George Brankovic died in 1457 at a great age. To him is due the great castle of Smederevo (Semendria) with its defiant cross worked into the structure of its walls now in ruins, and still further damaged, according to report, by the Austro-German bom- bardment. His death was followed by fresh dissensions, and in 1459 the Turks, their hands freed by the capture of Constantinople, put a definite end to all semblance of independence, and what remained of Serbia became the Turkish pashalik of Belgrade. The fate of the sister Serb State was not long delayed. Stephen Tvrtko I of Bosnia, as has been seen, had pro- claimed himself king in 1376, and a year later had occupied the land of Hum, Zahumlija or Primorija later the Herce- govina, a province whose medieval history, though popu- larly it is now generally looked upon as a part of Bosnia, had been generally linked with that of Serbia, and whose inhabitants differ in some traits of character from the Bosnians. Bosnia, however, was distracted by religious strife between the Catholic sovereigns on the one side and the majority of the population on the other. The latter were largely Orthodox, and perhaps still more largely Bogomil. The Bogomils, of the origin of whose name more than one account is given — the meaning is perhaps " dear to God " — had embraced a form of Manichaeism, and were in fact the forerunners of the Albigenses, though to term them the forefathers of the Reformation is to strain analogy and to ignore decisive differences. Their religion seems to have been free from those darker elements of devil-worship which accompanied pure Manichaeism, and which, it has been suggested,1 formed the real gravamen against the Knights Templars and led to their suppression throughout Europe, while the Hospitallers were left unmolested. Their religion was of a simple Puritan cast, but it brought 1 By Mr. Hilaire Belloc in a magazine article written some seven years ago, whose title I forget. 58 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS down upon them the thunders of Rome whose obedient servants the Bosnian kings were. Add to these internal discords, oppressions, and risings, the struggle with the Hungarians on the one side and the Turks on the other, and it is easy to see how depressing is the tale of the last years of Bosnian freedom without even the relief — and the inspiration — of a heroic tragedy such as Kosovo. The integrity of the new kingdom was not long maintained, for the separate traditions of Primorija found expression in 1448 when Stephen Vuk6ic became Duke of Primorija.1 For his title he adopted the German " Herzog " Serbized into Hercega, hence his realm became known as the Hercegovina " the Duchy ", the name which it has always since borne. In 1463 Bosnia fell before the Turks, who were actually welcomed by the Bogomils as liberators from Catholic oppression. A few years later, about 1482, the Hercegovina fell likewise. In these provinces the nobility largely apostatized to Islam in order to retain their posses- sions led also, as were many of the peasantry, by their Bogomilism to see in Mohammedanism a religion with elements akin to their own, so that ultimately we may see in the religious oppression of the Roman Curia one of the causes of that strange anomaly a large European Moslem element in the north-western Balkans. Such names as those of the Kulenovic and Kapitanovic among the present Bosnian Begs who are, many of them, the descendants of the old nobility take us back to the earliest days of Bosnian history. One State alone maintained through the centuries in its rugged mountains the standard of Serb independence, the ever-unconquered Crnagora, or Montenegro, whose inhabi- tants, recruited by those Serb nobles who had not been killed by the Turks, for they disdained apostasy, have never come under Turkish rule. 1 This is suggested as the proper title by Sir Arthur Evans. The Dukes were popularly known as the Dukes of S. Sava, a piecing together of their first title with another " Keeper of the Sepulchre of S. Sava." Vide Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina, p. xlvii note. A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY 59 With the final conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks Serb history divides itself into two main streams, that of the Serbs who remained in their old homes, and that of those of the nation who migrated into southern Hungary. The record of the former is one of almost unceasing struggle against the conquerors linked from time to time with the story of the efforts made by the House of Habsburg to drive back the tide of Ottoman invasion. The Turkish Serbs were not altogether without an element of national unity, for the Turks, not so much from policy as from their theocratic conception of the State, allowed the Orthodox Church a great deal of autonomy not only in religious but in secular affairs also, the ecclesiastical functionaries acting as the go-between through whom the Sultan acted. The settlement of the Spahis as a territorial aristocracy was attended by great exactions of a financial order, while the inequality of Christian and Moslem before the law denied a remedy in these as in other matters. Yet the most grievous exaction of all was the " devchurme ", or blood tax. Every seven years the children of the conquered were examined, and the strongest and brightest were carried off to Constantinople to be trained in the Moslem faith and ultimately to be enrolled in the corps of Janissaries who spread the terror of the Turkish name wherever they went. Thus the nation was deprived of the promise of its soundest elements, while the Ottoman State, like some monstrous vampire, throve on the blood which it sucked from its victims and turned the vital forces of the conquered to their own destruction. To one, however, of those who had been thus seized the Serbs owed a great debt. One of the greatest of all the Grand Viziers was Mehemet Sokolovi6, the minister of Suleyman the Magnificent, who in childhood had been seized under the devchurme. The fall of the Serb kingdom had entailed the fall of the Serb patriarchate of Pe6 and the Church was included in the Archiepiscopal See of Ochrida which had been in Greek hands since the fall of the second Bulgarian Empire. For some years all 60 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the efforts of the Serbs for their religious autonomy were unavailing, but in 1557 Mehemet Sokolovie, after an interview with his brother the monk Macarius restored the patriarchate of Pec with an extensive jurisdiction over the Serb lands, a few central Macedonian sees alone being reserved to the See of Ochrida as suffragans, as that chair could not be destroyed and from its historical associations had been respected by Dusan himself. Macarius was made patriarch and became the recognized head of the Turkish Serbs, affording them a certain measure of protection and supplying a focus of national unity. This restored patri- archate which formed part of the great scheme of re- organization carried out by Sokolovie, who divided the Empire into beglerbegliks and sanjaks, endured till 1767 when, together with the See of Ochrida, it was sacrificed to the jealousy of the Greeks and the fears of the Turks. Sokolovie was by no means the only high official — apart from those recruited from the Phanar — of non-Turkish birth. Six other Grand Viziers were the product of the blood tax, and so numerous were the Serbs in the Imperial service that it is stated * that till the eighteenth century a large proportion of the administrative documents in Constantinople were drawn up in Serb. " It has been rightly said that if during the period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Servian people had been willing to abjure their Christian faith, the Ottoman State would be to-day a Servian Empire of Mohammedan faith ". That may be an exaggeration: the Serbs, however, re- mained in the great mass true to their religion in spite of all temptation, while the national spirit was kept alive by the recital of the heroic ballads of their past glories, the memory of which treasured in popular song -and story contributed largely to the keen historical consciousness of the race, and imbued it with the vital and enduring conviction that a people with such a past could look forward with ultimate confidence to a future. Not all State forms perished, for while the bulk of the 1 Lazarovid-Hrebeljanovi. cit, p. 59. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 145 so because whilst neutralization would mean for Serbia that she would have no fleet, it would mean for us that we should have one in the Mediterranean, ready, whenever hostilities should bring about a rupture of the treaty to enter the Adriatic [my italics] ; the more so because neutraliza- tion would signify the exclusion from the Adriatic of every other fleet, and especially of the Russian, for which, once free ingress into the Mediterranean has been obtained, a Serb Cattaro would become the point d'appui.1 " Nor are we under any illusions as to the eternity of neutralization. All agreements are subject to revision once there is a change in the equilibrium of forces from which they sprung. But we maintain that Serbia would have no interest in violating the neutralization and thus entering into conflict with us, save on the day on which it would be equally to her interest to contest with us the possession of Dalmatia. But, whilst neutralization would mean that we should find ourselves ranged against a Serbia, in possession indeed of Dalmatia, but without a fleet, and therefore of a useless Dalmatia [my italics] , where it would Ije easy to disembark, the conquest of Dalmatia [i.e. if Italy had northern Dalmatia and Serbia the southern part] would find us against a Serbia in possession of Cattaro and of a fleet which, with the addition of the Russian or the Greek, would not be despicable. Without being profound strategists, the first hypothesis seems to us preferable to the second ".a 1 The writer here contradicts his own observation made two pages previously that a united Southern Slav State, having no more to get from Russia would pursue an independent policy. 9 " Neutralizzare l'Adriatico, ossia impedire l'entrata a qualunque flotta, impedire la fortificazione di qualunque isola o porto della Dalmazia, sarebbe per noi una guaranzia a3sai migliore del possesBO di due terzi della Dalmazia dai quali fosse escluso Cattaro. Tanto piu che mentre la neutralizzione significherebbe per la Serbia non avere flotta, per noi significherebbe averla in Mediterraneo, pronta, qualora le ostilita rompessero il trattato, a penetrare nelT Adriatico ; tanto piu che la neutralizzione significherebbe l'esclusione dall'Adriatico di ogni altra flotta, e specialmente di quella russa, per la quale, una volta ottenuto il 10 146 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS The arguments which are here adduced in favour of the prohibition to the future Southern Slav kingdom of the creation of a fleet, whether combined or not with the occupation of northern Dalmatia, are sufficient to bring out the essential unfairness of any such proposal, and it is well therefore to have had them stated by a man of such moderation in his general handling of the problem. The policy of prohibiting a Southern Slav navy is based avowedly on the fact that such a prohibition would leave the Southern Slavs in their maritime activities more at the mercy of the Italians, even though the latter relin- quished all claims to Dalmatia, than would the occupation of a large part of the province without any such pro- hibition. It is pointed out with truth that Italy would still have her fleet in the Mediterranean (there being under ordinary circumstances no occasion for stationing it in the Adriatic), ready to enter the latter sea at a moment's notice, without the Serbs being in a position to take any safeguards whatever. The Serbs would hold a "useless" Dalmatia on which the Italians could land troops at will. In a word, while surrendering physical possession of Dalmatia Italy would in fact hold the destinies of that province in the hollow of her hand, and with it absolute power over any and every form of Serb maritime activity. Serb merchant vessels would navigate at Italy's good pleasure, the fishermen would fish by her permission, libero ingresso nel Mediterraneo, Cattaro diventera il punto di appoggio. Ne ci facciamo lillusioni sulla perennita della neutralizzione. Tutti i patti son soggetti a revisione una volta che sia mutato l'equilibrio di forze dal quale nacquero. Ma noi sosteniamo che la Serbia non avrebbe interesse a rompere la neutralizzionne e quindi a entrare in lotta con noi, che quel giorno in cui lo avesse egualmenfce per contes- tarci il dominio della Dalmazia. Ma, mentre la neutralizzione ci farebbe trovare contro una Serbia, sia pure in possesso della Dalmazia, ma senza flotta e dunque di una Dalmazia inutile, dove sarebbe facile sbarcare, la conquista della Dalmazia ci porrebbe contro a una Serbia in possesso di Cattar© e di una flotta che, con l'aggunta di quella russa o di quella greca, non sarebbe spregevole. Senza essere profondi strateghi, la prima ipotesi ci pare preferibile alia seconda." G. Prezzolini, op. cit., pp. 62, 63. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 147 exportation would proceed under her practical surveillance, and the inhabitants of the coast towns would be able to call themselves Serb subjects just so long as it did not please Italy to annex them, for any sort of fortification would be forbidden and not merely the formation of fortified naval bases. I know of no such limitation in modern history of the sovereign rights of an independent State over its own shores : no such requirement that they should lie open to enemy attack. The Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris forbade the presence of war fleets in the Euxine to all alike, and theoretically the configura- tion of its entrance would have enabled the guaranteeing Powers to prevent the violation of the provisions, save indeed in the case of a surprise movement of a Turkish iEgean squadron through the Straits. In any case Turkey lay open to easy coercion in case of violation. In all these points the Black Sea clauses are fundamentally and essentially differentiated from the proposals before us. Britain is the mistress of the seas, and upon her mastery depends not only her empire but almost her very existence, at any rate her existence as a first-class Power and cer- tainly her existence in times of war. Yet she has never made any such demands as these upon Holland. The importance of the Dutch ports to us is enormous ; it is a maxim that whoever touches Holland, and especially who- ever touches Rotterdam or Flushing, touches England, and one of the reasons for which we are at war is that Germany has touched Belgium and Antwerp. Yet we have never demanded that Holland should possess no navy, we have never denied the right of the Netherlands to fortify their ports and their coasts. Even in the case of the fortifica- tion of Flushing, with its bearing upon the freedom of the Scheldt and our treaty right to succour Antwerp, we made no protest, we allowed full Dutch sovereignty over the mouth of the Scheldt, and drew the conclusion that we could not succour Antwerp by the sea, advantageous as such a course would have been. It is difficult then to see by what moral right Italy could assume the attitude 148 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS here proposed for her by some of her publicists ; she may be in a position to dictate such a prohibition, but it will only be on the principle that might is right — the very principle against which the other Allies, at any rate, are fighting. Nor would greater Serbia be left only at the mercy of Italy, but equally at the mercy of any other Power which possesses a navy of even the smallest dimensions, for who will care to guarantee international respect for the neutralization of Dalmatia? Any such prohibition would in fact be of the nature of an " uncon- scionable " agreement which would only lead to endless friction and the reopening of the question on the first convenient opportunity. The history of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris already cited is full of warning. They created in Russia a resolution to put a term to their validity on the earliest possible occasion, and unhappily for one of the authors of them that occa- sion proved to be the Franco-German war, when Bismarck was enabled to offer to Russia as a bribe for her com- plaisance the abrogation of them. It would not be altogether far-fetched to see in the present world war a not too remote consequence of that portion of the Treaty of Paris ; at any rate, but for their existence the attitude of Russia in 1870 might easily have been different, and in consequence the subsequent history of Europe. Limitations of national sovereignty in the case of a proud and indepen- dent people always and inevitably lead to the same result, a vehement desire to be rid of the shackles imposed. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said already as to the limited means available to Serbia (I use the word as a short term for the future Southern Slavdom) for the creation of a large war fleet, but the absence of any desire on her part to engage in such a task will bear repetition. If Italy does not antagonize her but shows herself a friend, the Southern Slavs will be eager to reciprocate her attitude, and in such reciprocity will be under no temptation to undertake so expensive, and under the circumstances so useless, a burden. In a word, THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 149 Serbia will be unable to create a great navy if she would, and if Italy proves a friend would not if she could. It is the reaction to Italian hostility or suspicion, above all the candid admission ithat Italy desires for Serbia a " useless " Dalmatia at Italian mercy, that alone will cause Serbia to create such naval forces as will lie within her competence ; apart from that attitude on the side of her neighbour her ambitions will be limited to a very modest form of naval defence. Even if it be admitted that submarines and mines will enable small States to play a more important part in naval affairs in the future, as has been seen, that would only mean a reversion to an older state of affairs ; so far, moreover, the submarine has failed as an offensive weapon. Of the idea of neutralization little need be said apart from the naval consequences just discussed. There are still to be found publicists who talk of a possible "neu- tralized " State of Constantinople, for example. If after the events of the past two years there are those who still believe that the word contains a valid international sig- nificance in point of fact, that is a striking testimony to their idealism. For myself I do not consider the " neu- tralization " of Dalmatia or of anything else to be worth discussing. A hundred years hence international engage- ments may carry with them some assurance of sub- stantial existence, and neutralizations may be left till then. It will be long before any faith will be placed in the public law of mankind, and no Southern Slav can be expected to place any faith in neutralization — ironically enough Corfu, the training-place of the remnants of the Serb army for future employment, is neutralized. The legitimate claims of Italy, then, on strategical grounds cannot be held to extend to the incorporation in her dominions of the Serbo-Croat province of Dalmatia. Moreover in no event, whether Italy obtains a portion of Dalmatia or not, is there any justification for the demand that Serbia should not be allowed to possess any fleet. It is not only against Italy that a coast defence fleet might 150 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS be required, and as we all know the neutralization of Dalmatia would give no guarantee to the Serbs. Serbia, then, will have the right, like every other State, to build such a fleet as she may deem necessary whether she obtains all Dalmatia or not, and the more friendly Italy shows herself the more insignificant will be any fleet that Serbia may desire to construct. The strategical conditions in the Adriatic constitute, nevertheless, a source of legitimate anxiety for Italy which is abundantly entitled to demand that in any general resettlement she shall be placed in possession of adequate guarantees for the sufficiency of her naval defence, and that her position shall receive due recognition so that she may be able to face the future with confidence. Such guarantees can be given to her without any undue infringe- ment of the principle of nationality, without creating on the side of others a sense of grievance akin to her own, and without inflicting on others injuries out of proportion to the real benefits received by Italy. She is entitled to urge that however friendly may be the Southern Slavs at the present time no government can conduct its policy upon the supposition that future enmity is never to be feared from the friends of to-day ; that though the Southern Slavs number less than a third of her population yet their territory is large, some three-fourths of the extent of the Italian peninsula, and being at present comparatively thinly populated as compared with her own territory will be able to support in the future a population much more nearly approaching her own, even when due allowance has been made for the large unproductive Karst region and the absence of any such fertile area of great extent as the valley of the Po and its tributaries, a deficiency in part counterbalanced by a probable considerably higher mineralization ; and that consequently she is entitled in the settlement to consider not only the conditions of to-day but those which may be present in a not too distant future. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 151 Italy is already in occupation of Valona and its district, and it is certain that her continued occupation of the " gate of the Adriatic " after the war will not be called in question by any of the Allies. The occupation of this place in itself alters the whole strategical position in that sea. Its importance has been alluded to already, and was so highly valued by both Austria and Italy that neither would permit of its falling into the hands of the other. It is idle for any one to seek to diminish its strategical value at the present time, for any assertions to that effect are belied by the policy of the two Adriatic Powers in the past. They have set the seal of their military and naval judgment upon its position as giving the possibility of the command of the entry into the Adriatic, Italy placed so high a value upon it that its retention formed a demand sine qud non in the course of her negotiations with her rival previous to her entry into the war, and it cannot be pretended now that it is a position not of such value that its possession by Italy may be taken as going a long way towards meeting her legitimate claims. Guarding the forty-mile wide Strait of Otranto with its vis-a-vis Brindisi already in Italian hands, and Taranto in its gulf "round the corner" a great naval arsenal, Valona will enable Italy to close or open the Adriatic at her will, and that the more easily owing to the development of the mine and submarine. Its possession will enable Italy to exercise a permanent surveillance over all Southern Slav maritime activity other than merely local, and will give its owner a position of unquestioned mastery ; the jealousy of Austria in the past on this question is a proof of the fact. At the head of the Adriatic — to anticipate some of the conclusions of the next chapter — Italy can claim the great commercial port of Trieste, Monfalcone, and the enormously strong naval base of Pola. Installed thus at Valona, Brindisi, and Taranto at the entrance of the Adriatic, and at Venice, Trieste, and Pola at the head of the sea, Italy will be its veritable mistress, and will turn it into an Italian lake to as large an extent as is compatible with 152 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the just rights of the Southern Slavs as owners of the eastern shore, for after all they, as owners of one side of the Adriatic in virtue of nationality, have certain rights in that sea, the more so as it is their only coast, while Italy has her frontage south and west to the Mediterranean also. It is asserted that the island of Losmj (Lussin) forms a " back door " to Pola and is in a sense complementary to that naval arsenal. If that be so, and if Italy set store upon its occupation, that demand also may be conceded without any great violation of the principle of nationality, since it possesses a large Italian element in its population, a fact which distinguishes it from the other islands of the Quarnero. Beyond the above it is difficult to see that Italy can put forward any well-grounded pretensions if her aim be merely the security of her own coasts. Other demands have the appearance of aiming not at securing her own position but of dominating that of her neighbours. These other demands are asserted, it is true, in the name of defence, but if defence be construed in this fashion then nothing will satisfy it but complete physical possession of the Adriatic. It is difficult, or impossible, to set a term to what can be demanded in the name of defence, for the only complete defence is sole possession. Readers of Beaconsfield's speeches in connection with the Treaty of Berlin may remember the indignant communication which he said that he had received from a correspondent in Cape Town. The latter pointed out that Kars was the key of Asia Minor, the latter in turn was the key of Egypt, as Egypt was of the Sudan, and so the chain of keys was lengthened till it ended at Cape Town. The Russian occupation of Kars, to which Beaconsfield had agreed, constituted therefore a menace to Cape Town. We may suspect that this correspondent had no existence outside Beaconsfield's dialectic, but the alleged letter was no exaggerated satire on a certain mode of reasoning which finds favour not only with the amateur strategist. Of such a texture are Italian demands beyond the great and valuable concessions outlined above. In particular it is THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 153 difficult to see how any case can be made out for an Italian occupation of Vis (Lissa). It has been called the key of the central Adriatic, and without a doubt it is one of the extremely numerous keys of that well-locked gulf, but this key at any rate might be left to its more natural possessors — no man would care to live in a house of which he possessed not a single key. Some, at any rate, of the importance it assumes in the eyes of Italians is due to the defeat of Persano off its harbour in 1866, an event which has always rankled in their minds, while the value of its position is enhanced by the possession of a fine harbour. It lies, however, close to the eastern shore, and is rather an outlying defence of that coast than of the western. It is in fact a pistol pointed at the heart of Serb Dalmatia, and if it were in the hands of the Italians the latter would be in a position not only to threaten Spljet and Gruz, but to dominate the whole of the Serb Adriatic coast and to exercise a close surveillance over even the coastwise trade of greater Serbia. Losmj in their hands would enable them already to close the Quarnero, and therefore Rijeka, and Vis would perform the same function for southern Dalmatia. In a word, Valona and the entrance to the Adriatic would be Italy's, as also Trieste, Pola, and Istria at the head of the sea ; the western shore is hers already ; and finally the Slav eastern coast would be com- manded in the north by Losmj and the centre and south by Vis, so that Rijeka, Spljet, and Gruz would be useful to their owners only so long as Italy wished. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is this and not legitimate anxiety for self-defence that forms the real underlying motive of the claim to Vis. As an outpost of the eastern coast without which sovereignty over that coast would be wellnigh nugatory, " useless ", jto use Prezzolini's phrase, and as being Slav by race, the island should go to the Southern Slavs free of those naval limitations which have been already considered. It was said by Mr. Paton that Bosnia was a head without a face, and Dalmatia a face without a head, and 154 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS it is true that the future of Dalmatia is bound up with its backland. The separation of the two provinces, when- ever they have been separated, has always been unnatural, and the possessor of the one has inevitably sought the dominion of the other also. In the Middle Ages till the fall of the Slav States they were not so separated, and their reunion achieved in a limited sense by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia should be extended and consolidated ; their permanent severance is unthinkable. The ports of Dalmatia are the natural outlets of the trade of the interior. Sibenik and Spljet by the continuation of the existing railway to form junctions with the interior systems, in the north by the valley of the Una and in the centre via the Arzano pass and Bugojno will be the natural ports for the greater part of Bosnia, and to the latter leads one of the traces of the proposed Danube-Adriatic line which would find its terminus here rather than farther south. This so-called Danube-Adriatic line is of course merely a portion of a much more extensive and important connection being designed to bring Roumania and Russia into direct contact with that sea by the shortest through route. Dubrovnik to the south though eventually, when the narrow-gauge line is widened and a more direct route with the interior opened up by the extension of the short Trebinje spur, important for the trade of Danubian Serbia and the Hercegovina, is not the natural outlet for the larger part of Bosnia or of eastern Slavonia, as a glance at the map will show. Separated from the interior Dalmatia would languish, it would be bereft of its natural trade, and the connection with Italy would offer no com- pensation, for mutual trade postulates mutual prosperity, and of the latter Dalmatia, cut off from the resources of the inland and deprived of the transit trade, would have no share: its ports cannot thrive on purely local traffic. In Serb hands they would as a fact benefit Italian trade, for through them would pass manufactures from northern Italy, whose artizans in return would receive the agri- cultural products, the wheat and the meat, of Serbia. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 155 The settlement of this question on just lines and with a due consideration of the claims of both parties is of interest not merely to the countries immediately concerned. The Southern Slav problem as a whole is a matter of vital concern to Europe and the cause of European peace, and the solution of the Adriatic question as a crucial part of that problem affects in its consequences the other European States which are deeply involved in the future course of Serbo-Italian relations. The past relations between Italy and Austria have been very largely, if not entirely, the result of a settlement partial and incomplete instead of final and conclusive, and a settlement of similar character between Serbia and Italy would inevitably be followed by similar consequences. If the eventual settlement of the Dalmatian question, for this is the kernel of the matter, be just and fair the result will be a permanent peace, as political permanency goes, in the Adriatic and a fruitful friendship between Italy and the Southern Slavs. If, on the other hand, Serbia be left with a festering sore in its territorial and national relationships, then the result after a period of suppression and inflammation will be that it will discharge in renewed bloodshed. The result of the annexation of a large area of Slav territory to Italy would be the creation of a Serbia Irredenta, and the ultimate con- sequence, not necessarily to-day or to-morrow, would be the outbreak of a fresh war, for to the Southern Slavs this unredeemed land would be what Italia Irredenta has been to Italy. "It is terrible to think", a well-known Croat leader remarked to me, " that, after all this horrible war in which the divided Southern Slavs have suffered so much, we should have to look forward in the future to yet another", and his manner expressed the pain which he felt at the prospect. It is necessary to look facts in the face, we have too long ignored the opinions, rights, and interests of the Southern Slavs, we have suffered grievously as the result, and worse lies before if we do not conduct our relations with them upon a basis of sympathy and know- ledge. The mishandling of the whole Balkan affair con- 156 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS tains abundant instruction and warning to all who do not wilfully or foolishly blunt their appreciations. If the war in its deeper aspects is teaching us anything it is the hideous failure of soullessness in diplomacy and national policy. The prime object of statesmanship in the remodelling of Europe should be to settle old questions without creating fresh ones of the same kind, but if the Adriatic settlement should involve the handing over of hundreds of thousands of Southern Slavs to Italian rule the result would be nothing less than a European disaster. For the present Austro-Serb question would be substituted an Italo-Serb problem of the same character and malignity, a problem which would evoke the sullen anger of the Southern Slavs and eat like a canker into the peace of south-eastern Europe. " If you imprison a Slav idea in the deepest dungeon of a fortress it will end by blowing up the whole fortress in its effort to escape ", but Slav per- tinacity and memory should be devoted to more fruitful aims than the relentless preparation for yet another day of reckoning. " The Balkans will be Austria's grave ", said Prince Gorcakov, and he has proved a true prophet ; there is warning here for others. On the other hand, a frank and friendly policy on Italy's part would redound to her advantage, free her from diplomatic and strategical preoccupations, and enable her to develop relations, com- mercial, political, and cultural, that would benefit both her and Serbia. The reaction of an unsatisfactory settlement may not improbably drive one or other of the two States into the arms of Germany in the future. It must not be forgotten that the Germans have for long looked upon Trieste as their future window on the Adriatic, an aspiration which has brought them into conflict with the Slovenes who block the way — always we return to the fact that the Southern Slavs are the bulwark against the eastward and southward trend of Germanism, the Drang nach Osten and the Stoss sudwarts. So long ago as 1876 Sir Arthur Evans, in his book Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina, gave an THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 157 instructive quotation from a German traveller who six years previously had been travelling through the Southern Slav lands : " We must not spare ourselves the realization of the bitter truth that the greater part of Styria and Carinthia [thus Sir A. Evans's author, but the "greater" part is incorrect as applied to these two provinces], and the whole of Carniola, Gorizia, Gradisca, and Istria, with the avenue to the Adriatic, are lost to us. Even supposing the whole of Southern Germany to have been fused with Northern, and the German element in Austria either under compulsion or of its free will to have followed the already torn away Bohemia and Moravia [!] even then we should have neither the might nor the right — though it matters less about the right — to break forcibly through Illyria to the Adriatic".1 It was said to me by a Croatian, "If our cause is deserted by the Entente then by and by we may have to look for friends elsewhere — in Austria or," with a shrug, " in Germany ". The bearing of the words, though the topic was not pursued, was sufficiently evi- dent, and, while I should not wish to press unduly anything said under the influence of the chagrin caused by the then recently concluded Dalmatian agreement, the remark is symptomatic of the feelings which might be engendered by a mishandling of the question, and the possible tendency indicated calls not for surprise but for the most serious consideration. On the other hand it might be Italy which would enter upon the path indi- cated : her ties with Germany are very strong. Neither resultant of the extraordinarily complicated cross-currents involved is desirable for Europe. Italy, with a knowledge of German ambitions for Trieste, may be reckoning on the alliance of the Southern Slavs willy nilly in the event of a future advance in that direction by Germany, since the latter could only reach Trieste conveniently through part of the Slovene country, not only through Gorica and GradiSka but also through the most western part of 1 Sir A. Evans, op. cit., p. 8, quoting Franz Maurer, Reise (lurch Bosnian, etc., p. 45. 158 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Kranjska (Carniola) where the railway, after reaching Tolmino from Trieste, passes through the north-west corner of Kranjska to Villach, while the retention of Trieste would entail as well the possession of at least a part of Istria. It may be thought, therefore, that a German advance southwards would of necessity bring Germany up against the Southern Slavs, concerned to defend Kranjska against invasion and possible spoliation, and possibly unwilling to sacrifice a portion of that province even for Dalmatia and the islands — a very doubtful proposition. Thus Kranjska, a wedge of Southern Slav territory between Istria and German Austria, would become a bulwark of Italian Trieste, and the Southern Slavs might be compelled on this supposition to side with Italy against a German push to the Adriatic, thus becoming, to the ironic amusement of their allies, the champions of the alien lords of Dalmatia. On the other hand, the more Slav territory Italy acquires the less convincing does such a line of reasoning become. If Italy obtains all Istria and Gorica-Gradi§ka as well as a large part of Dalmatia with the islands together with south- western Kranjska then the interest of the Southern Slavs to come, pro domo sua, to Italy's aid becomes sensibly less and a German-Slav accord easier. Kranjska, though desirable for a German possessor of Trieste, is not absolutely essential if that possessor hold all the county of Gorica (apart from any possible acquisition of the line through Udine) and Gorica will already belong to Italy. Thus it would be open to Germany to offer the bribe of Dalmatia and the islands and to engage herself to respect Kranjska while pointing out that it should be a matter of indifference to the Southern Slavs whether Istria and Gorica were in Italian or German hands. It is extremely difficult to understand in what manner Italian politicians envisage the future in these regions. What is evident, however, is that a policy which should estrange the Southern Slavs opens up a vista of extreme peril to Italy, unless indeed she contemplates a reinsurance treaty, and with the Italians the THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 159 Southern Slavs might be dragged down also, for the pity of the whole controversy involved in this tangled Adriatic problem lies in the fact that the essential interests of Italians and Southern Slavs are identical, and they should be the closest allies. Italy can hardly oppose front both to Germany and the Southern Slavs. It must be remembered that in any case the Germans will remain a strong nation and that the time may come when, if favourable circum- stances offer, they may be tempted to renew their attempt to push not only eastwards but southwards. In such an eventuality it would obviously not be a matter of indifference to the other members of the Grand Alliance whether the Adriatic settlement which they would be called upon to defend were intrinsically just or not. Moreover, under those circumstances the Southern Slavs should be the natural and fervent allies of the Italians, and their aid will grow in importance with the years. A settlement which should risk throwing them into the arms of Germany would represent to Italy a double loss. The alternatives ultimately narrow themselves down to two ; on the one hand a hostility between the two peoples which will eventually result in war whenever a favourable opportunity occurs, which admittedly may not be for many a long year though it may occur sooner than is thought ; on the other hand a fair settlement resulting not merely in friendly relations but in a definite alliance. Under such circumstances Serbia and Italy left alone on the Adriatic to their mutual satisfaction would have every interest in combining against any Power which should threaten the newly established status quo, since any such aggression would be equally to the disadvantage of both. Neither would wish to see Germany installed in Trieste and neither would desire any weakening in the territorial position of the other. Indeed to remove Italian suspicion it might be laid down as a condition for the adoption of the Southern Slav contention that the new State should enter into a treaty of alliance with Italy for a term of years, fourteen or twenty, by which each would be bound to resist in common 160 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS any attempt to alter the new status quo in the Adriatic or the territories adjoining. The advantage of the aid of Italy to the Southern Slavs is obvious, while the task of the Italian General Staff would be enormously lightened by the knowledge that the forces which a united Southern Slavdom could put in the field would be found arrayed on their side and would not have to be regarded as potential foes. There are some Italians who already see the advantage of cultivating good relations with the Southern Slavs. "The truth . . . is", says Professor Salvemini, "that the establishment of a great Serbia can in no case, that is to say even on the hypothesis of a very great aggrandizement of Serbia, represent a loss for us ". J He concludes his remarks on the subject of Italy and Serbia by saying [his Italics] : " In fine even on the supposition that Serbia should acquire all the Austrian Adriatic provinces and that Italy should remain within its present boundaries, Italy in this conjuncture has nothing to lose and much to gain".2 Signor Bissolati, the Reformist Socialist, is another who has pleaded, and still pleads, the cause of good relations between the two peoples, while the attitude of Signor Prezzolini has been abundantly illustrated above. The last-named perhaps lays his finger on the root of the mistrust when he says that "We are ignorant of Serbia ". The Southern Slavs on their side have given frequent expression to their feeling of friendship, a notable example of a plea for good feeling being the speech of M. PaSic in the SkupStina on April 28, 1915. An attitude on the part of Italy which would indicate a policy of Mediterranean imperialism would not be without interest for other States. In any case it is no mere question of an outlet for Serbia or of " compensations ", it is a question of national unity pure and simple. 1 G. Salvemini, Querra o Neutralita t p. 16. ' Ibid. p. 18. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 161 VI To a certain extent it might seem that some of the foregoing remarks are of somewhat academic interest in view of the conclusion of the " Adriatic " or " Dalmatian " agreement between Italy and the Triple Entente; but not only is it necessary to examine the whole of the questions involved on their merits if an adequate appreciation of that agreement is sought, but the affectation of secrecy maintained on the subject since its conclusion invites this course. The Treaty was concluded on April 27, 1915, but the secret of it had been so ill kept that it was not long before its existence and the general tenor of its terms were pretty generally known. I myself was made cognizant of it in May, * a few days after Sir Arthur Evans, in his letter of May 10 to the Manchester Guardian, had given an outline of the Italian demands, of which I also gave a sketch in one of the Reviews in September. The in- formation then received has proved to be substantially accurate, requiring modification chiefly in the matter of the southern islands. Some of the terms of the agreement have been given by Dr. Seton-Watson in the English Review for February 1916. 2 Italy receives by its provisions the Trentino, Gorica, and Trieste, and the whole of Istria and its islands, the continental boundary in this area starting from the neighbourhood of Rijeka (Fiume) and running along the line of the Julian Alps. Italy further receives the whole of northern Dalmatia and its islands to a line drawn between Trogir and Spljet and thence to the Dinaric Alps in the neighbourhood of the ArZano Pass, and also the islands of Vis, Hvar, and KorSula, 1 In giving a short account of it in the British Review for September 1915, I inadvertently gave the month of signature as May instead of April. It was on May 28 that I received information of the agreement. " R. W. Seton-Watson, The Failure of Sir Edward Grey. English Review, February 1916, p. 148. 11 162 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS etc. This Treaty was not only concluded without any consultation with the Serb Government, but without that Government being informed that any such project was entertained, its only information being derived from common rumour. The whole manner of its conclusion was in the highest degree injurious to our ally, and in the plainest contradiction of those rights which our statesmen have so often proclaimed. The Dalmatians are of the same nationality of the Serbs, Serbia was an ally who for months had been detaining and defeating large Austrian armies, it was under the cover of the Serb army as a flanking guard that we were engaged on the Gallipoli expedition, and we had proclaimed ourselves the champions of small nations and of the rights of nationalities, yet on practically the first occasion on which our principles were put to the test they were betrayed. Our ally in a matter deeply affecting her interests in the war was ignored and kept in the dark, in fact she was not given the status of an independent ally at all, while the rights of nationalities were bartered away by the Great Powers concerned in Metternichian fashion. It is noteworthy that while Belgium has received * an assurance that she will be called upon to take part in the peace negotiations (i.e. that she will take her place as a sovereign contracting State and not merely be admitted to be heard in the anteroom) no such assurance has ever been given to Serbia, which has throughout been treated as a dependent until the Paris conference in March 1916 to which she was admitted. This attitude was deliberate and evidently due to the knowlege that Serbia would not have given her consent to the concessions made. At the same time the Italian Press indulged in a campaign of falsification, with the obvious desire to throw dust into the eyes of the public at home and abroad, and English correspondents were telegraphing to their newspapers extracts from Italian papers dealing with alleged Serbo-Italian negotiations and a complete agreement between the two States for days 1 On February 14, 1916. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 163 after even the present writer was aware on the best authority that no such negotiations were taking place. Evidently there was a feeling that the clandestine method of procedure would not meet with general acceptance. It is perhaps significant that up to the moment of writing the English Press has consistently ignored the treaty, while the majority of our publicists at the most have made an occasional vague allusion to some " alleged agreement", an attitude which is obviously assumed in view of the disclosures made. On the ethical side, then, the agreement connotes an abandonment pro tanto of the moral basis of the war and a return to the ideas of the Congress of Vienna, while on its material side it lies open to the objections which have already been made to proposals of the nature contained in the agreement. It can in no sense be reconciled with the doctrine of nationality, for by its terms nearly one million Southern Slavs will be included in the Italian Kingdom, namely some 450,000 of the population of Dalmatia, and the Slav inhabitants of Trieste, 60,000 ;x Istria, 224,000; Gorica 155,000; and some 100,000 of the population of Kranjska. As regards the latter regions a more detailed examination of the figures and the deductions to be drawn from them will be given in the next chapter. It is suffi- cient to say here that though in any case an appreciable number of Slavs would have to be included in the new boundaries of Italy the necessity falls considerably short of what is here conceded, for the boundary between Slavs and Italians is in a general way fairly definite and does not depart largely from the natural boundaries indicated by the geographical features of the country. In the case of Dalmatia the violation of the national rights of the Southern Slavs is flagrant and incontestable, and, as has been seen in the section devoted to the strategical aspect of the problem, quite unnecessary from the point of view of the legitimate requirements of Italy. The whole of the 1 Census figures, in round numbers, of 1910. The figures in detail will be found in the following chapter. 164 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Dalmatian element in the above figures has been sacrificed without any valid necessity. While the incorporation of the province in a Southern Slav State would have affected only 18,000 Italians in a population of 630,000, the annexa- tion of a large area of the Dalmatian mainland and of the islands affects some 450,000 Slavs on a strictly moderate and reasonable estimate. The occupation of almost all the islands with the excep- tion of a few of the Ragusan group very effectually serves the purpose of rendering as " useless " as possible the coast line which is left to the Slavs, as a glance at the map will show. The islands in the Quarnero will enable the Italians to dominate absolutely all traffic to and from Rijeka, and moreover will cut off that port from the southern Dalma- tian coast left to the Serbs. Passing to the southern boundary of the new Italian Dalmatia it will be seen that it passes close to Spljet (Spalato), the opposite side of the bay being in fact in Italian hands, while the islands of Solta and Brae (Brazza) perform for the Italians here the function of the Quarnero islands in the north. It is diffi- cult to see how the Serbs can in the circumstances make any use of Spljet. Indeed it would be an act of supreme folly if they should endeavour to make it the terminus of a line to the interior and the outlet of a great part of their trade. The whole harbour and town can be commanded absolutely by batteries placed on the opposite Italian shore, so that within half an hour of the opening of hostilities every ship in the port could be sunk, the wharves, cranes, and warehouses destroyed, and the port rendered useless, nor could such a consummation be prevented by the forti- fication of the Slav shore except on the impossible assump- tion that the latter batteries were so immeasurably superior that the Italians would be almost instantaneously over- whelmed before they could do any damage. Without a doubt under the circumstances the Serbs will have to concentrate their attention on Dubrovnik in spite of the fact that its position makes it unsuited to be the trade outlet of a great deal of Bosnia. The development of Spljet, THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 165 if the present arrangements hold good, would be nothing less than a sign of incapacity on the part of the Serbs, and if this language be thought an exaggeration, the map again will prove a corrective. Below the delta of the Narenta the coast-line is broken by the long projection of the peninsula of Peljesac or Sabioncello, off which lies the island of Korcula, and farther off Vis. These islands will be in Italian hands, and as the Quarnero islands isolate Rijeka, so these southern Dalmatian islands, besides giving the command of the Spljet-Narenta coast line to Italy, will cut off that stretch of shore from southernmost Dalmatia. The two strips of coast left to the Slavs will thus be divided into three portions by the islands held by the Italians, who will be in a position to cut them off from communication with each other by sea. Only when we come to the extreme south, to Dubrovnik and Kotor, do we find a coast where the Serbs will be masters in their own house. Even here a certain calculation has been probably made, but destined, as I believe, to be defeated. Imagine the inner as well as the outer Hebrides in the hands of a foreign Power possessed also of a block of the mainland, say of Argyll, and we have an adequate comparison of the situa- tion to be established on the eastern Adriatic. In Article VIII of their reply to President Wilson the Allies spoke of a " reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable rSgime and based at once on a respect for nationalities . . . and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack ". These principles should be applied to the Adriatic, and such guarantees afforded to the future Southern Slav kingdom. The conclusion of this treaty has created a most painful effect on the Southern Slavs, and has aroused a feeling of keen resentment and profound disillusionment. They feel that for them the European struggle has largely altered its character, and that immense sacrifices have been and are being undergone by them in order that hundreds of thousands of their fellow-countrymen may exchange an 166 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Austrian for an Italian dominion, sacrificed in the cause of " sacred egoism ". The result is noticeable enough though undisclosed by a discreet Press. There is no longer the same enthusiasm among the Serbo-Croats of former Habs- burg allegiance, the joyous hope of independence and national unity has largely deserted them, while the Serbs of the Kingdom are left in doubt as to whether even now they may not be forced to pay blackmail to Bulgaria. East and west the Southern Slavs see their interests sacrificed or menaced and their national heritage turned into a common fund out of which large bribes are to be given — by their Allies — with which now this State now that may be gained over. The House of Habsburg, quick to see its advantage, has sent large numbers of Southern Slav troops to its Italian frontier, where they are taking a valiant part in the defence. These results were easily to be foreseen except by those who, unwilling to face realities, prefer to take their fancies for facts, and their hopes for accomplishments, but the expression of this opinion has largely been denied publicity.1 Unfortunately a "delicate situation" does not cease to be delicate because the difficulties of it are shirked. The situation has to be dealt with at some time, and the sooner all the facts are realized the sooner will people be able to arrive at a correct appreciation of the position. Writing in the early part of 1915 Professor Denis gave utterance to a warning which has fallen upon deaf ears. He said : " La question de la cote orientale de l'Adriatique n'interesse pas seulement l'ltalie et la Serbie. C'est une question d'ordre universel, et il n'y a aucune exageration a dire que l'avenir du monde peut dans une large mesure en dependre. Car, enfin, si une puissance se regie uniquement sur ses convenances momentanees, il est absurde d'exiger des autres un renoncement qui, au milieu de i'egoisme universel, ne serait plus qu'une niaiserie. . . . 1 Letters to the Press forecasting the untoward effects of possible Italian action of the nature indicated were refused publication in November 1914. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 167 Partir en guerre pour supprimer la guerre et preparer de nouveaux conflits ; inscrire sur son drapeau le respect des nationalities et la liberty des peuples, et aboutir a un nouveau congres de Vienne ; 6tre les heritiers legitimes des humanistes du XVIe siecle et des nationalistes du XVIII ■ pour chausser les bottes de Metternich et de Guillaume II, quelle decheance et quelle banqueroute ! " x That which he posed as supposition is now fact. Nothing that has here been written has been written in in any spirit of hostility to Italy. The writer was brought up to believe, and still believes, that the accomplishment of Italian unity was one of the finest and grandest things that happened in the nineteenth century, nor was the name of any foreigner so familiar to him in childhood, not by contemporary knowledge but in political conversation of the past, as that of Garibaldi, who became to him an almost " legendary " hero. What has made the attitude of Italian politicians so painful to those who remember her past, and the generous enthusiasms which it evoked, is that their attitude in Southern Slav affairs is a flat negation of the whole historical and ethical basis of the Italian Kingdom. They would seem to have turned their backs on the generous ideals of nationality to which Italy owes her existence in the pursuit of an imperialist policy. That Italy, the product of those ideals, the result of the union of a formerly disunited people, compounded of several States, some independent, some enslaved, which had the House of Habsburg for her hereditary enemy, which made her appeal to liberal Europe, should place herself in opposi- tion to the Southern Slavs whose present position is a picture of her own past, as her present position is the goal °t which they aim, inspired like her by the teaching of Mazzini, the exploits of Garibaldi, is one of the saddest things possible for those who still retain any hopes of national idealism. Surely the Italian people must be nobler and more generous than those who speak in its name. Let that people hear the words of Signor Tittoni, a 1 E. Denis, La Grande Serbie, p. 320. 168 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS former Foreign Minister and lately Ambassador in Paris, uttered in a speech delivered on December 18, 1906, which as I have them only in a French rendering I will not submit to a further process of translation. His reasoning applies with equal force to the present situation. " Je repousse done le conseil qui m'est attribu6, de proposer a l'Autriche-Hongrie des partages de territoires ou de pousser a des occupations que ne prevoit pas le traite de Berlin, afin d'exiger ensuite pour nous des compensations territoriales. Un semblable procede serait en contradiction avec les principles sur lesquels est basee l'unite de l'ltalie ; il ne serait pas compatible avec les principes qui nous ont diriges jusqu'ici ; il nous jetterait dans les perils, parce qu'il serait un precedent qui, a l'avenir, nous serait souvent oppose. En un mot, il obscurerait les buts evidents de notre politique en 1' Orient". CHAPTER V PROPOSED FRONTIERS The actual area of the national territory of the Southern Slavs which can be included in the future State depends naturally upon the extent of the Allied victory and the terms which the Allies can therefore enforce upon the vanquished, and in particular upon the continued existence or disappearance of Austria-Hungary. As the extent of the victory cannot be foretold, and because in any event it is necessary to have in mind an ideal solution of the question which should be aimed at in proportion to our success in the field, it is necessary and in any case best to assume that such an ideal solution will lie within our grasp, and to examine the problem on the basis of that assumption. The Dalmatian question having been treated of, the next and cognate element that calls for consideration is the future status of the lands at the head of the Adriatic, that is to say, Istria, Trieste, the county of Gorica-GradiSka, Kranjska (Carniola), Carinthia, and the southern portion of Styria. The following table gives the population of these countries according to the last Austrian census of 1910. Slavs. Italians. Germans. Total population. Istria Trieste Gorica-Gradiska Eranjska ... 224,400 59,974 155,039 492,043 147,417 118,959 90,119 369 12,735 11,856 4,486 27,915 386,463 190,913 249,893 520,327 In Carinthia there are some 120,000 Slavs and 300,000 Germans, and in southern Styria some 400,000 Slavs. Of 169 170 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the Slav population that of Istria is divided between the Croats, 168,184, and Slovenes, 55,134, the remaining Slavs in these regions are chiefly Slovenes. In Istria the Italians are found in a majority in the western portion of the peninsula, while the central and eastern parts are predominantly Slav. In the county of Gorica the Italians inhabit the country to the west of the lower Isonzo, while they form also the majority in the district of Monfalcone and in the town of Gorica. To the north of that town the ethnographical boundary crosses the existing frontier of Italy, which here already includes in its dominions a Slovene population. From the neighbourhood of the Pon- tebba Pass the racial line dividing Slovenes from Germans runs roughly to the river Drave above Villach, thence it follows the course of the river to the boundary of Styria. From this point it runs north of the river to the town of Radkersburg or Radbona on the Mur. Immediately to the east of Radkersburg a wedge of Slovene country runs north as far as S. Gotthard on the Raab in Hungary, the boundary returning south to the Mur, and thence the frontier between Slovenes and Croats follows the boundary of Croatia and Kranjska. In parts of this region the interests of Italy are great and incontestable. Western Istria with Pola are of prime importance to her naval position, and as has been seen are predominantly Italian in population. Venice is no longer, in view of modern requirements and the increased size of shipping, the naval base that it was in past years, and the Italians have not in recent years based, I believe, their eastern squadrons on the aforetime mistress of the Adriatic, preferring for the purpose Taranto, which is out- side that sea. With Pola in her hands the position would be fundamentally altered in her favour ; she would have in these northern waters the base which she requires, connected by rail with the peninsular railways, well sheltered, and naturally strong. In the previous chapter it has been sug- gested that Loslnj (Lussin) should also be assigned to Italy if she desires it, thus assuring her the mastery of these waters. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 171 Trieste occupies both historically and commercially a peculiar position. For over five centuries it has been a possession of the House of Habsburg ; it is the port of entry and egress for a vast backland inhabited by various races, and, as the Germans have frequently pointed out, is only two hundred miles from the Bavarian frontier. Racially, in spite of the recent growth of the Slovene element, it is predominantly Italian, even if the contention of the Slovenes be true that their element is under- estimated in the census by some 20,000 persons. The municipality is in the hands of the Italians, and it seems to be substantiated that the scholastic needs of the Slovenes have been purposely neglected, the Italians, perhaps not unnaturally, having been greatly alarmed at the height reached by the flowing tide of Slavs, so that the town has become one of the focus points of racial strife and propaganda. Despite, however, the contentions of the more extreme propagandists, there can be no hesitation in assigning Trieste to the Italians, who on the ground of nationality have an incontestable claim, while the culture of the town has always been Italian. It is true that Trieste is the port of a great deal of the Slovene backland, but it is the port likewise of the German backland, and it is unwise to advance an argument that elsewhere might be turned against its authors. The commercial position of Trieste undoubtedly complicates matters. If the port were included in the Italian customs area, then part of the Slovene country would be deprived of its natural outlet, as also the whole of German Austria, and beyond that the Bohemian country (Bohemia and Moravia). It is by this trade that Trieste lives, and if it were diverted the result would be commercial ruin for the port and a grievance for the interior. The difficulty is by no means insuperable, and could be overcome by the suggestion of Dr. Seton- Watson that it should be made a free port. Traffic then from the interior would pass through its harbour as at present, without imposition of a customs tariff, only goods destined for consumption in Italy being 172 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS subject to the Italian tariff. The duty-free trade could be carried in what may be called " bonded " trains through Italian territory to its destination. Such a proposal is not less in the interests of Italy than of the port and of the interior, and would not in any way derogate from Italian sovereignty over the town and harbour. In the county of Gorica-Gradi§ka it is inevitable that a certain Slovene population should pass under Italian rule. The Italians in no case would be now satisfied with the line of the Isonzo, and would require in the south a good connection between their peninsular territory and Istria. The heights to the east of the river would form a natural and defensible frontier, and would give to Italy the positions for which she is now fighting. Monfalcone would be hers, GradiSka, Gorica, the positions of Doberdo, Plava, Podgora (all three Slav names), and more to the northward Tolmino, Plezzo, and the Predil Pass, beyond which (Malborghetto, etc.) the future frontier of Italy does not concern the Southern Slavs. Entrenched on this line, with lateral communication behind along the valley of the Isonzo, Italy could contemplate with assurance the defence of this portion of her frontier against even the strongest assailant. In effect, Italy would thus secure more than half the area of the province, and probably would take under her rule not less than 75,000 Slovenes, as well as all the Italians, so that the suggestion can hardly be described as niggardly, or as characterized by lack of appreciation for her strategical necessities, going as it does far beyond her pre-war aspirations. The frontier, more- over, would be a natural one. The suggested land frontier then would start at the estuary of the Arsa, and gain the mountain backbone of the Istrian peninsula which traverses the country nearer to the eastern than the western shore, and to the east of the railway which connects Pola with Trieste. It would follow the course of this range northward, and eventually strike the boundary of Kranjska at the point in the lati- tude of Trieste where the boundaries of Istria, Kranjska, PROPOSED FRONTIERS 173 and the district of Gorica-Gradi&ka meet. Thence it would coincide with the boundary of Kranjska to the point where the latter turns northward not far from S. Daniel, from which point the line would continue its north-westward course in the direction of the town of Gorica, leaving the inland railway Gorica-Trieste in Italian hands as well as the coast route, until it struck the mountains which border the east bank of the Isonzo, and so along the range which forms its watershed to the north to the Predil Pass and Tarvis. As already stated, this would leave in Italian hands all the strong positions for which they are fighting at the time of writing — the positions round Gorica, Tolmino, the Kern heights, the Cal Pass and Plezzo, the Predil Pass and Tarvis. In addition to some 75,000 Slovenes in Gorica-GradiSka, the territory would include the 60,000 Slavs of Trieste and approxi- mately 100,000 of the Slovenes and Croats of Istria, a total of about 235,000, together with practically the whole Italian population, some 350,000, of these provinces. The suggested frontier would not altogether meet the wishes of the Southern Slavs, but I have reason to believe that if their claim to Dalmatia were met no serious opposition would be manifested towards it. The secret treaty with Italy gives the latter considerably more than the above territories. The boundary starts a little to the west of Rijeka, and follows approximately the frontier between Croatia and Istria, then entering Kranjska follows the Julian Alps, cutting off the south-western portion of that homogeneous province, the centre of Slovene nationality, till it reaches the boundary of Gorica in the northern part of that county. This trace in- cidentally severs the direct railway line from Ljubljana (Laibach) to Rijeka, and the former town would thus be reduced for communication with the port to the roundabout route via Karlovac. All Istria therefore goes to Italy with its 224,000 Slavs, all Gorica with 155,000, Trieste with 60,000, and a slice of Kranjska with about 100,000 Slovenes. The population of the ceded area will therefore 174 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS comprise some 539,000 Southern Slavs and 357,000 Italians, as a reference to the table previously given will show. The whole future of this region is naturally dependent upon the extent of the Allied victory and the demands which can be made upon Austria, for while the Monarchy could lose Galicia, Transylvania, Croatia, and Dalmatia, without ceasing to exist as a considerable State with its own seaboard, the loss of the territories now under con- sideration would connote the disappearance of the Habsburg realm as a distinct entity. To put it in another form, if the Allies should be in a position to force the House of Habsburg to cede these territories in addition to the others mentioned, they would in the nature of things be equally in a position also to enforce the complete dis- memberment of the Monarchy. In an article contributed to the British Review for April 1915 I said that the more desirable event would be the formation of a Habsburg federal State, consisting of a Cech-Slovak kingdom, a purely Magyar Hungary, an Austrian German State, and a Slovene State, the latter of which would of necessity include Istria and Trieste. The formation of such a Habsburg Monarchy would incidentally limit Italian accession of territory in the northern Adriatic to the actual line of the Isonzo river, and the future Southern Slav territory w7ould in a similar manner be limited in this direction by the western frontier of Croatia. The argument that weighed with the writer was that the alternative would entail the absorption of the old Austrian German duchies into the German Empire, and the conse- quent near approach of the latter to the Adriatic. Further consideration, however, and the increased subserviency of Austria-Hungary to Germany, which has marked the pro- gress of the war and will evidently characterize the ensuing peace, have led me to reject the opinion expressed in that article. It is now evident that such a State would become politically, economically, and in military matters, a mere satellite of Germany, for the Oechs and Slovenes would be outnumbered by the Germans and Magyars and forced to PROPOSED FRONTIERS 175 follow in their wake. The effective strength of Germany would consequently be increased by the resources of a monarchy numbering some 35,000,000 inhabitants. The more the problem is considered the more funda- mentally erroneous appears the view to which expression was given in the article mentioned. If Germany has been able to maintain herself in arms against the greater part of Europe, it has been owing to her control of the resources of Austria-Hungary — that is to say, of a State which is predominantly non-German and non-Magyar. Southern Slav, Italian, Roumanian, Cech, Pole, Ruthene, all have provided cannon fodder for the German High Command, and without these supplies Germany would have been lost long ago. Any future Habsburg monarchy will inevitably gravitate within the German orbit and bring its resources to the aid of Prussianism, and hence the absolute necessity of shearing off from the Habsburg dominions all that is not German or Magyar. In practice that would mean the creation of an independent Bohemia, to include all the Cechs and Slovaks, the creation of a purely Magyar Hun- gary, and almost certainly the incorporation of the Austrian Germans in the German Empire. It is the latter fact that causes hesitation with some people, but evidently with very little cause. The Austrians would bring to Germany an accretion of some 8,000,000 of population, but such an accretion is greatly less than the 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 of a reduced Austria which would equally be at the service of Germany ; it would, in short, represent the lesser evil of the two. Such a Germany, deprived of all other means of support, could never make head again in face of the Grand Alliance, or even of Russia and France, sup- ported as these would be by Bohemia and the Southern Slav kingdom. To some it is repugnant to think of the final prostration of the Habsburgs before the Hohenzollerns, but that sentiment rests on no solid basis. The Habsburgs have always been disloyal, intolerant, perfidious, and reac- tionary ; and Gladstone was right in saying that nowhere had Austria (i.e. the House of Habsburg) done good. There 176 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS are few things more curious in history that the glamour which this House has managed to cast over all sorts of men in various countries, but now at last it is open to all to see it in its true colours. That some who call themselves Liberals should come forward as the champions of Austria is something truly astonishing, and can only be due to that kink which causes some men always to be apparently, and in good faith, on the side of their country's enemies. Far truer was the teaching of Gladstone and of Professor Free- man, to the latter of whom so deep a debt is due for his clear teaching on this subject. If the writer of this in the article quoted spoke in favour of a reduced Austria, it was not for love of the Habsburgs or of Austria, for the burning words of the great Professor had left their mark years before, but for the reason assigned in the text, a reason now clearly seen to be superficial. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the question of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is the question of whether we want to win the war or lose it, or more correctly of whether, having won the war, we wish to win the peace. It is noteworthy that French opinion, which at the beginning of the war showed some tenderness to Austria, shows signs of hardening in the opposite direction. While M. Bainville considered the destruction of Austria as a European disaster (in which case it is curious that he should have made it an accusation against the Jugoslav Committee that it was, according to him, subsidized by Austria), M. Herbette looked to a group- ing of the Austrian s proper with the Southern Germans. This latter idea is not incompatible with the destruction of Austria-Hungary as at present existing, but is based upon a misconception of German feeling. Readers of the Hohen- lohe Memoirs will remember that the great impulse towards unity came precisely from the South Germans, and that their particularism is directed also against each other. On the other hand M. Cheradame is explicitly for dismemberment. Thus he wrote: "All who have studied on the spot the problem of Central Europe are unanimous in declaring that the liquidation of Austria-Hungary is an absolute neces- PROPOSED FRONTIERS 177 sity "-1 M. Dubosc has stated the reasons with admirable precision and conciseness: "In short, if we are of 'those who speak of demolishing Austria and do not speak of demolishing Germany ', it is because (1) the demolition of the one appears to us definitive, while that of the second appears ephemeral ; (2) because the demolition of Germany seems to us superfluous on the day when Prussia will be cast down ; (3) because the demolition of Austria will be the ruin of the bloc of Central Europe, which was hostile to us, and in particular of the mutual aid of German and Hungarian assured by the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 ".2 The Temps and Matin in leading articles, and other writers such as M. Gauvain, have adopted the same line of reasoning, and have pointed also to the doctrine of nationality as necessitating a final liquidation of the Danu- bian Monarchy. The Allies' note to Mr. "Wilson, and Mr. Balfour's letter, if words mean anything, have endorsed the policy as being the aim of the Grand Alliance. Henceforth the matter should be chose jugee, unless we are to go back upon our word, upon our moral obligations to our Allies, upon the definite treaties with some of them and upon our own interests. Austria delenda est. . The complete disruption of the Monarchy would be attended by the cession to the Southern Slavs and to Italy of the territory which has just been considered, and the formation of independent kingdoms of Bohemia, including Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and the Slovak districts of Hun- gary, and of Magyar Hungary. The German Austrian provinces would then inevitably enter the German Empire, which in their 8,000,000 inhabitants would find some com- pensation for its losses elsewhere. The accession of strength would nevertheless be considerably less than that which would fall to her lot in the alternative considered above. Even if an independent Hungary gravitated towards Ger- many, and such a course is perhaps less likely in an inde- pendent Hungary than in a Hungary tied to German ■ Bappel, July 10, 1916. ■ Paris-Midi, July 15, 1916. 12 178 THE FUTURE OP THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Austria,1 there would be a counterbalance in a Cech-Slovak Bohemia of some 10,000,000 inhabitants, while the Slovene and Italian country would also be lost. If, then, the Allies should be in a position to demand the cession of the Slovene and Italian Adriatic lands, that demand should be main- tained, with the consequent disruption of the Monarchy into its constituent elements, the latter event being, as said above, a necessary result of the former in political conse- quence, as it would ex hypothesi lie equally within the power of the Allies to enforce. The less complete the victory of the Allies, the less, obviously, shall we be in a position to demand, but it must be remembered that these cessions of territory alone will give an adequate and permanent solution to the Southern Slav and Italian questions. It is not a mere question of a province more or less, as in the case of the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century on the Continent, but of utilizing a unique opportunity of recasting the map of Europe on national and rational lines. As regards the northern boundary of the Southern Slavs in this region it could be drawn along the river Drave, following the ethnographic line of cleavage from the neighbourhood of Villach to the Styrian frontier, thence in a more or less direct line to Radkersburg on the Mur. There is, as stated above, a northerly wedge of Slovene territory running from this point to S. Gotthard on the Raab containing some 100,000 inhabi- tants, but I do not think that this wedge could be included in the Southern Slav State. It is impossible to make the political boundary follow in every detail the linguistic or ethnographic, as the result of such an attempt would lead to many inconveniences and anomalies. The principle should be the natural or geographical boundary — if such exists — which coincides most nearly with the racial, pro- vided that the application of this principle does not exclude 1 Such a complete disruption would probably bring in its train a considerable modification in the internal condition of Hungary in the direction of the loss of their power by the Magyar magnates. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 179 large racial areas from their co-national State. In general, also, in estimating what should fall within a racial area regard should be paid to the manner in which the races are juxtaposed. Small racial "islands" in a surrounding sea of another race must be lost to the racial stock. This last consideration does not apply to the Slovenes in question, as the area adjoins the main block of Slovene and Croat territory, still its inclusion would make an awkward boundary. The frontier from Radkersburg should run along the Mur to its junction with the Drave. Croatia would thus receive again the little territory of the Medju- murje of some 735 square kilometres, which lies here between the two rivers. Of its population of 90,357 82,829 are Croats. The territory belonged to Croatia till 1861, when it was niched by Hungary, and its possession has always been claimed by its former owners. It was the seat of the great family of the Zrinjski. The future of Croatia has been much canvassed and various rumours have at different times been in circulation on the subject, and even now, as has been seen in the previous chapter, some Italian papers are not yet reconciled to the idea of Serbo-Croat unity.1 The secret treaty with Italy lays it down that the future status of the country shall be declared by the Croatians themselves. The result of any plebiscite is a foregone conclusion — the Croats will declare for union in some form or another with the Serbs and the formation of a united Southern Slav State. Owing to the presence among the Allies of many Southern Slav refugees drawn from each province inhabitated by the race we have had abundant opportunities of learning the sentiments of the people, the more so as these refugees are thoroughly representative of the political and economic life of their people. They include members of the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, and of the Dalmatian, Croatian, and Bosnian Sabors (Diets), town 1 That unity is recognized in the official Austrian census statistics, which speak always of Serbo-Croats. The Austrian census is by language. 180 THE FUTURE OP THE SOUTHERN SLAVS councillors, priests, lawyers, bankers, journalists, and men of letters. The testimony they give is unambiguous and decisive. The Serbo-Croats in America at the congress held at Chicago endorsed the national programme of unity, and they also published in a Southern Slav news- paper of New York a violent manifesto in reply to the Austrian consul's request that Austrian Southern Slav emigrants should return to Europe for military duty. The Croatian Committee in Rome has stated : " The official acts of the Croatian Diet at Zagreb testify, in fact, to the will of the Croatian people to consider itself as forming a single nation with the Serb people, to which it is united by the sacred ties of the soil, of blood, and of language". In May 1915 M. Trumbic, a member of the Dalmatian Sabor and a former mayor of Spljet, said to M. Delcasse when presenting his collea- gues : " As the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes form one [la meme] Jugoslav [Southern Slav] nation we desire the liberation of all our co-nationals now under the Austro- Hungarian yoke and their union with our Serb brothers of Serbia and Montenegro in a single State. ... In order that the Jugoslav nation may be able henceforth to accomplish its noble national and civilizing task, it is indispensable that all its members should be joined together in a compact and united State ".* " The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its territories in a single independent State", says the Jugoslav Committee in its appeal to the British nation and parliament. In a conversation on this subject which I had with Dr. Hinko Hinkovic, the well-known advocate of the accused in the Agram High Treason Trial and one of the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, he said that the old bitter Catholic-Croat anti-Serb feeling was dead in Croatia except among a few politicians and their followers of the older school, the younger generation would have nothing to do with such ideas. Nor was there, in his opinion, he remarked in answer to a specific question, any danger of a 1 Cit. C. Vellay, La Question de VAdriatique, p. 75 note. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 181 revulsion of sentiment after the war when Magyar oppres- sion would be a thing of the past. The feeling of solidarity was not a mere reaction to alien tyranny, however powerful an agent that had been in awakening national self-con- sciousness. The Croats, it must be remembered, though Catholic, were by no means ultramontane, following in this the example of the great Strossmayer. This latter point was confirmed from another source, the Serb monk, Father Nicholas Velimirovic, to whose reputation in his own country has been added the consideration he has gained for himself in England. Discussing the future relations of Croats and Serbs he bade me remember that the Croats are not particularly fond of " the Vatican ". In his pamphlet on Religion and Nationality in Serbia he has borne testimony to the great part played in the furtherance of the programme of Southern Slav unity by the Catholic priests, many of whom have suffered, and are suffering, for their racial patriotism. Some, as also Orthodox priests, have given their lives to the cause. The point is of extreme importance when it is remembered how in the Near East religion has proved a solvent of nationality, and in the past hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the case of the Southern Slavs. " It may be objected that this may be so in the day of trouble, but that all may be different to-morrow, with the return of peace. . . . On this point I venture to say that history will not repeat itself; what has been will never be again. . . . All we Jugoslavs are sure that there will be harmony and unanimity between the two priesthoods, the two confessions, and the two Churches in the future Serbian State ".' This feeling of solidarity has been a long time in coming, and perhaps will be all the more enduring and surely based because the lesson has been learned in the hard school of adversity, of frustrated hopes, of spurned loyalty, and of common suffering, and it has completely altered the terms of the problem as it formerly existed. There can be no doubt * Father Nicholas VelimirovitS, Beligion and Nationality in Serbia, pp. 19, 22. 182 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS as to the result of a consultation of the Croat people as to its future : they will elect to stand with their Serb brothers. The position of Rijeka is a close counterpart commer- cially of that of Trieste in that it serves a large backland of various national elements. The loss of Croatia would cut off Hungary from the sea, and, though there might be some poetic justice in that in view of her action towards Serbia, she would be entitled to a guarantee of the right of free exportation and importation through Rijeka and a fair railway tariff to the port. Croats and Serbs occupy a considerable area in southern Hungary in the districts of Baranja, Backa, and the Banat of Temesvar, the two latter corresponding roughly to the former Serb Vojvodina (Duchy), and it is necessary to examine Southern Slav claims in these regions and to arrive at an estimate of what may rightly be included in the future Southern Slav State. Baranja is one of the southerly counties of Hungary, bounded on the south by the Drave and on the east by the Danube, with an area of 5,105 square kilometres. The number of Serbo-Croats in the county according to the census of 1910 is 36,000. The figure is disputed by the representatives of the race, who assert that the returns have been falsified by the Magyar authorities, and the real number of Southern Slavs is 70,000. Apart, however, from the Magyar population the number of German settlers amount to 103,000, so that the Serbo-Croats do not form the most numerous section of the population. Unfortunately the local distribution of the racial elements is thoroughly mixed, and it would be difficult to carve out of the country any considerable area of homogeneous character. While some Serbo-Croat colonies are to be found in the northern portion even to the south and east of Pecuh (Pecs), where the bulk of the Slavs live, they are mingled with large German and Magyar elements. Under the circumstances it seems hardly prac- ticable, and in the interest of the Southern Slavs them- selves undesirable, that the future State should here cross the natural boundary of the Drave, even though the PROPOSED FRONTIERS 183 reluctance to leave any portion of the race under Magyar misrule is natural enough in view of all that it has suffered at the hands of Magyar chauvinism. There are certain considerations affecting the distribu- tion of territory in southern Hungary which should, I think influence the result of any concrete inquiry and proposals, which apply not only to Baranija, but also to the Backa, and the Banat, which may be stated at this point. It would be a bad thing for the Southern Slav kingdom if it sacrificed its intension for the sake of extension. Serbia has owed a great deal to its homogeneity, and the consequent concentration of its political aims and national feeling ; it has been her intension which has given her her relatively great strength, and the same considerations would apply to a wider Southern Slav State. Nor is it at all desirable in the interests of the Southern Slavs themselves that the territorial frontiers of their kingdom should be so extended as to make its borderlands a miniature Austria- Hungary in the variety of its ethnical elements ; it would lose, not gain, by having for its frontier provinces a sort of ethnological museum. The guiding principle should, therefore, be to include all the compact masses of the race, but to eschew annexations which would bring with them the complications of an alien population. Such complica- tions cannot altogether be avoided, but they should be reduced within the narrowest possible limits. Especially should Southern Slavdom avoid the needless inclusion of German elements. The Germans, as the war has shown, are extremely indigestible ; even in the United States, that great melting-pot of nationality, we have seen — in some ways more markedly than elsewhere — how the German has placed the interests of his country of origin altogether above the interests of his adopted country and his own duties as a citizen. Political, financial, commercial, and journalistic action have not exhausted his activities, but arson, murder — as witness the loss of life in the various dynamiting outrages — and outrage have also been called into service. Doubtless the German inhabitants of southern 184 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Hungary are compacted of milder stuff r and are relatively less numerous, still the Southern Slavs would be better without them. As regards some of the German colonies, which necessarily will be included in the new State, I have not hesitated in a later chapter to suggest some drastic steps. Without anticipating what will be suggested later, it may be pointed out here, that not only will the Serbs be well within their rights in repatriating the strategic colonies which have been deliberately planted in certain parts of Bosnia and Srem (Syrmia), but that somewhat similar steps may have to be taken in regard to other Germans. Any rearrangement of frontiers will probably lead of itself to a certain amount of cross migration, and that process will be all to the good even if not unattended by a certain hardship. Such hardship will add but little to the vast sum of human misery caused by the war, while the results of the process will make for peace in the future and a more settled condition of affairs in the various racial frontier regions. So far, however, as any governmental suasion is to be employed, that will only be legitimate if the frontiers are so drawn as to include the minimum of alien elements. If the frontiers are so traced as to include only compact blocks of Serbo-Croat nationality, with no more than islands of foreign elements, then some such measures as suggested may justifiably be employed, — I am speaking only of the Germans. If, however, the frontiers are traced in such a manner as to include all the Serbo-Croats, even where it is they them- selves that are islands in an alien sea, then any such measures would be in the highest degree without justifica- tion, for the Serbo-Croats could not claim to include solid blocks of aliens and then to treat them as intruders, nor is there the slightest reason to suppose that any such unjust course would suggest itself to them. In fine, a studious moderation in the trace of the frontiers in the 1 According to Budapest reports, however, they have shown a marked pan-German feeling during the passage of German troops in the campaign against Serbia which has given concern to the Magyars. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 185 manner indicated would carry with it a certain latitude of conduct towards the engulphed Germans, while e con- verso the Serbs would be estopped from such a course by needless territorial extension. Finally, the place of the rejected elements could be taken by immigrants of their own nationality. For these reasons I do not think that a good case can be made out for the annexation of Baranja or even for any considerable portion of it, and the wiser course would be to rest content with the Drave frontier. The adjacent region is the BaSka, which is bounded on the east by the Theiss and on the south and west by the Danube, which makes a right-angled turn below its confluence with the Drave ; it corresponds to the Hungarian county of Bacs-Bodrog. The population of the county is composed chiefly of Serbo-Croats, Magyars, and Germans, with a few thousand Slovenes and Ruthenes. The statistics of the Hungarian census are disputed, and it is probable that they underrate the number of Serbo- Croats and exaggerate those of the Magyars, for the latter, unlike the government of Vienna, have a direct interest in the manipulation of the nationality returns. Unfor- tunately, not only is the population mixed, considered as a whole, but the different elements are commingled in an inextricable manner. The eastern part is predomi- nantly Serbo-Croat beyond a line drawn roughly north and south from Novisad (Neusatz) on the Danube to SentomaS on the Backi canal, which runs in an easterly direction from the Danube to the Theiss. The former of these towns is an old Serb centre, in fact before the resurrection of independent Serbia it, together with its near neighbour Karlovci, was the cultural centre of the Serb stock, and most of the educated Serbs of the early days of the Principality owed their education directly or indirectly to Novisad, many too of the Serbs of this southern region of Hungary, Backa, and the Banat, emi- grated to the Principality when it gained its autonomy, and this applies especially to the educated element. 186 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Obradovi6, who made spoken Serb the literary language, also was a native of southern Hungary, and in more recent times the father of the Vojvoda (Field-Marshal) Putnik was an immigrant from the same region. Of late years Novisad has been forced to yield its place as the Serb cultural centre to Belgrade, while that of the Croats is at Agram, and the Germans have made considerable progress in the town. Another considerable block of Serb inhabited territory is to be found in the neighbourhood of Subotica (Maria Theresiopol). The intervening areas along the Danube to the west of the line Novisad-SentomaS, and to the north of the Badki canal are inhabited by a confused medley of Serbo-Croats, Magyars, and Germans, interspersed with each other in a manner which forbids the drawing of a frontier which should correspond closely with the lines of racial demarcation. Thus the Serbo-Croats of the Subotica region, and those also of Sombor, are separated from the fairly homogeneous south-eastern BaSka by these polyglot areas. As the Serbs are probably the most numerous nationality it is natural that the whole of the Ba5ka should be claimed for the new Southern Slavdom. Here again, however, the considerations to which I have adverted above call for examination. It is doubtful, as already stated, whether it would be in the interest of the Southern Slavs to burden themselves with an area of such diverse ethnic elements. It would add enormously to the tasks of the administration and might easily be a source of trouble and international complications. It has always to be remembered also by the Southern Slav leaders that it is far easier to deal by way of legislation with the foreigner, to circumscribe his commercial activities and exploiting proclivities, to curtail the extent of his banking operations and so forth, than to deal with the man of alien race who is a native-born [subject, as these Germans and Magyars would become, unless they were given, and exercised, permission to opt for Hungarian nationality, in which case the confusion would be worse confounded. Hard as it might be to the Southern Slavs to renounce PROPOSED FRONTIERS 187 claims to a region rich in historic memories of national struggle, I think (and those Serbs who know me know that it is the thought of a sincere friend) that it would be wiser, if they have the choice, to exercise a severe modera- tion. The south-easterly corner within the limits already defined — south of the Backi canal and east of the line Novisad-Sentomas" — might perhaps be claimed for the Southern Slav State, and the claim might include Novisad itself for historical reasons and for the practical reason that to it crosses the railway bridge over the Danube from Petrovaradin, but beyond that in their own larger interests I think that they would do well not to press tneir claims.1 The last region of southern Hungary with which we are concerned is the Banat of Temesvar, which includes the greater part of the former Serb Vojvodina and comprises the counties of Torontal, Temes, and Rrasso Szoreny (Serb, Krasovo-Severin). The southern boundary is the Danube, and it extends east and west from the borders of Roumania and Transylvania to the Theiss, while on the north it reaches to the Maros. The Banat also is a country of mixed nationality, its population comprising Serbs, Roumanians, Magyars, and Germans, while other races are represented, particularly the Slovaks. The western portion, including the major part of the county of Torontal and part of Temes, is predominantly Serb. This portion includes the towns of Velika Kikinda and Veliki BeSkerek, and extends some distance eastward in the southern part to Vrsac, Bela Crkva (Weisskirchen, Fehertemplon) , and BazjaS. The population even here is by no means homo- geneous, but includes large bodies of Roumanians in the neighbourhood of Alibunar and of Germans and Magyars in that of Pan6evo. The eastern portion of the Banat, * If in pursuance with the remarks made above a scheme of cross- migration, directed chiefly with a view to the Germans and possibly to Magyar " islets," be adopted (of which more is said in Chapter IX), then the south-west of the Backa should be attributed to Serbia as well as the south-east. This would give the whole line of the Backi canal as the northern boundary. In any case tens of thousands of Serbs will be excluded. 188 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS comprising the county of Krasso and part of Temes to the east of the line Temesvar-VrSac is predominantly Roumanian. Besides Germans and Magyars this portion includes numerous Serb islands as in the neighbourhood of Temesvar and Pardany. In former days the Serbs occupied a more important position than they do now, as they have lost a lot of ground to the Roumanians in the east. Here many Serb districts remain only as islands in a Roumanian sea, and Serb ecclesiastical foundations, far removed from Serb settlements of the present day, have passed into Roumanian hands. The northern portion of the Banat is very mixed in population, and a wedge of German and Magyar colonies with a Serb and Roumanian admixture is thrust southward to Veliki Beckerek between the main masses of Serbs and Roumanians. The detailed study of this region carried out by Dr. Se ton- Watson in his book Boumania and the Great War,1 as part of the study of all the Roumanian districts of Hungary, enables one to arrive at a fair conclusion as to the future lines of demarcation. The eastern county of Krass6 Szoreny is so far Roumanian as to lie outside the purview of legitimate Serb aspirations, which can only be concerned with the counties of Torontal and Temes. In the county of Torontal the districts of Torok Kanizsa and Nagy Szent-Mikl6s in the north-west are Magyar though the former contains a large Serb population, while the district of Perjamos in the north centre is mainly German, the Roumanian being the next most numerous element, the Serbs being in very small minority. Dr. Seton-Watson assigns seven districts to the Serbs : Velika Kikinda, Torok- BeSse, Veliki Beckerek, Zsombolya, PanSevo, and Pancevo Town. The total population of these districts is 298,823, 1 This book contains an invaluable series of appendices, chiefly of statistical tables showing the population of Transylvania and eastern Hungary in great detail, to which I am deeply indebted throughout this particular section. See especially for my purpose pp. 81, 82, 86, and 87. I do not quite follow portions of his summary on page 89, but this does not affect the matters with which I deal. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 189 and it includes 114,595 Serbs, 32,170 Roumanians, 54,502 Magyars, and 77,855 Germans. The details of the districts disclose the fact that in the district of Zsombolya the Serbs form a very small minority — 3,687 Serbs, 4,643 Roumanians, 12,026 Magyars, and 25,552 Germans. For the reasons more than once given, I think that were I a Serb states- man I should willingly renounce any claim to this district. The Roumanians advance considerable claims in the Banat (the necessity of harmonizing Serb and Roumanian pre- tensions is the reason for the detailed consideration here given to this region), and apparently are not afflicted by any doubts as to the number of aliens who may be in- cluded in the Roumanian Kingdom — some Roumanians have gone so far as to claim the line of the Theiss, i.e. all the Banat and much else. This perhaps is due to the fact that the satisfaction of their legitimate claims will necessarily result in the inclusion of the large Saxon and Szekel islands (234,085, and 501,930) which are situated near to the Roumanian frontier, so that a few thousands more or less of Germans and Magyars will not greatly affect them. The Serbs are in a happier position and should take advantage of it. The district of Zsombolya, then, should be renounced by them to the Roumanians, the more so as its cession will not materially break the continuity of Serb territory though making its northern portion rather a narrow tongue of land. If this be done the population of the remaining districts ■ under considera- tion will work out as follows : Serbs 110,908, Roumanians 27,527, Magyars 42,476, Germans 52,303. It will be observed that the result is greatly to increase the ratio of Serbs to both Magyars and Germans. The process could be carried a step further. A solid block of German and Magyar territory extends right up to Veliki BeCkerek, and if the new boundary were taken close to the east of that town, but so as to leave the Beckerek-PanSevo railway in Serb hands, the number of Germans and Magyars would be still further reduced. 1 Of the county of Torontal. 190 THE FUTURE OP THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Mixed Serbo-Roumanian districts are Csene, Pardany, Modos, Banlak, and Alibunar extending roughly in a crescent with horns pointing west with the centre to the south-east of Veliki BeSkerek. Of these the first is mainly German, and should share the lot of Zsombolya, in fact if the latter (and the region last mentioned) be assigned to Roumania, Csene would of necessity from its position go also. In Pardany the Serbs are the most numerous element closely followed by the Germans who in Modos and Banlak take first place while in the latter Magyars and Roumanians are more numerous than the Serbs. In these districts it is possible to work out a redistribution by communes by which the Serb and Roumanian ele- ments will be disentangled, but the result leaves the Serb districts with a large leaven of Magyars and Germans.1 Here also the Serbs would be wise to resign to the Roumanians all but a few communes in the west which are mainly Serb and adjoin the main block of Serb territory. The district of Alibunar stands in a different case. It is possible so to disentangle the com- munes as to give two regions, one predominantly Roumanian and the other predominantly Serb with only small minorities of other nations. The difficulty, however, is that Alibunar projects deeply into Serb country, and unless the boundary is to be extremely in and out the whole district should go to the Serbs. This is the less important because not only does the distribution outlined above give large Serb islands to the Roumanians, but the two races are remarkable among Balkan peoples in that their rela- tions are generally characterized by mutual liking instead of mutual hatred : they are noted for getting on well together. In the county of Temes the Serbs are in a small minority in most of the districts though their number in these districts amounts to 30,129, but that is out of a total population of 416,998. In Vrsac Town they are numerous * Vide R. W. Seton-Watson, cp. cit. p. 87. In Pardany, after sub- tracting Roumanian districts, 9,196 Serbs are left in a population of 26,029 ; in Modos 6,899 out of 23,468 ; in Banlak 3,658 out of 19,777. PROPOSED FRONTIERS 191 (8,602 out of 27,370, but 13,556 Germans), but the town must follow the fortunes of the district in which the Serbs only number 5,531 out of 36,978 (18,174 Roumanians, 8,605 Germans). Kevevara is Serb, and so is Bela Crkva with the exception of three communes. The boundary, then, of Serb territory in the Banat might be traced roughly as follows * : Leaving the river Theiss somewhat to the north of [Zenta it would run eastward to a point between Mako on the Maros and Velika Kikinda, then it would run southward slightly to the east of Velika Kikinda and continue its course to a point slightly east of Veliki Be6kerek, leaving, as said, the railway V. BeSkerek- Pancevo in Serb hands. Thence with a slight southward bulge it would run to the river Temes north of Botos and continue up the river to above Srpska-Boka. It would then run with a northward bend to the Brzava canal between Partos and Kanak and follow the canal south- westerly to the junction with the Theresien canal. From this point it would run south to the neighbourhood of the railway between Szamos and Ilanesa, and follow the railway — a little to the east of it — till just east of Alibunar it would cross the railway Alibunar-Vrsac. This railway it would follow — slightly to the south of it — to a point between Ulma and Vrsac, whence it would take a south- easterly course to Bela Crkva and Bazjas" on the Danube. The island of Moldova on the Danube below Bazjas" would also go to the Serbs. If this trace were followed the result would be represented in the following table : — Serbs. Roumanians. Magyars. Germans. Total. Torontal (district of V. Kikinda, T. Becse, V. Beikerek, Autafalva, 1'ancevo) Alibunar district Temes, Kevevara district Bela Crkva district 110,908 11,743 16,795 20,863 27,257 14,982 5,705 1,160 42,476 588 5,355 circa 700 62,303 755 6,687 circa 4,600 251,949 29,292 B6.481 29,227 160,309 49,374 49,119 64,225 345,950 Stieler's Atlas will enable the line to be followed easily. 192 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS From these figures an appreciable reduction must be made in respect of the Germans and Magyars inhabiting the excluded portion of Veliki Beckerek and a slight addition to the number of Serbs in respect of the communes alluded to above of Modos, Pardany, and Banlak districts. If three Roumanian communes of Alibunar were excluded there would remain in that district 9,938 Serbs and only 126 Roumanians, out of a total of 12,193 inhabitants, but these communes could hardly be excluded for geographical reasons. These figures could, and probably would, be modified considerably by cross-migration after a resettle- ment of frontiers. Some 90,000 Serbs would, upon the above distribution, be left in Roumanian territory, accept- ing the total figures of the Hungarian census of the counties of Torontal and Temes which exceed by several thousands the sum of the detailed figures of the districts. Many of these would doubtless be willing to emigrate into the new Serb territory to take the place of Roumanians equally desirous of emigrating. Any such movement should be encouraged but not in any way forced, for the employ- ment of pressure would create a grievance which would react on the political relations of two States whose interests are identical and will remain so and whose people are mutually sympathetic. The same remarks apply to the Magyars also, many of whom would be likely to refuse to pass under the government of the despised "nationalities". The case of the Germans is considered in Chapter IX. If the boundary here suggested be compared with that proposed by Dr. Seton- Watson in his book already cited it will be seen that the chief difference is to be found in the exclusion of Zsombolya from the Serb area. The line here given, roughly speaking, leaves Dr. Seton- Watson's line near Velika Kikinda and rejoins it in the neighbourhood of Vr§ac. Though it gives to the Serbs slightly less in area yet it has the advantage, which is very considerable, of including far fewer Germans and Magyars while the number of Serbs it excludes is comparatively small. Discussing the question of the PROPOSED FRONTIERS 193 Banat, a well-known Serb geographer and publicist traced roughly for me on a map a line with which he said he had reason to believe the Roumanian Government would be satisfied. That line — I have kept the map — corresponds generally with Dr. Seton-Watson's line, though drawn slightly to the east of it. I gathered that the Serbs also would not be dissatisfied with the line given to me, and I trust, therefore, that the trace which I have suggested would meet with no insuperable objections from them while, by giving a slightly increased area to Roumania, it might be acceptable there also. The future of Macedonia at the time of writing is still uncertain, though loyalty to an ally and the necessities of plain honesty should have deprived the situation in that region of all ambiguity in the event of victory for the Allies. I assume here for my immediate purpose that King Ferdinand and the Bulgars will at the end play the Germans false as they have previously played us false : that an appeal will be made to England, whose infatuation for Bulgaria has already cost us so dear in the Balkans ; that an immediate response will be evoked, and that at least a portion of Macedonia will be demanded for our enemies to console them for their non-success against us. I am bound also to assume that even such modified treason to our ally will be repudiated, in spite of powerful pro- Bulgar influences.1 Without a doubt some sort of union will eventually be achieved between Montenegro and the remainder of Southern Slavdom, though the exact nature of that union and even the hour of its accomplishment is in doubt, and will depend in part on how far the Powers show them- 1 A discussion of the Macedonian problem and of the nature of the settlement which should be made with Bulgaria will be found in the two following chapters. The district of Strumica should be included in Serbia which, in view of Greece's attitude, should receiv* also the Fiorina district which has a Slav population. The latter cession would give her a mountain frontier instead of an arbitrary line across the Pelagonian plain. The chain runs south from Kajmakcalan west of Lake Ostrovo. 13 194 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS selves capable of taking long national views to the exclusion of immediate dynastic and diplomatic matters. Just before the outbreak of war negotiations were in progress with a good hope of success for a union between Serbia and Montenegro in matters of common concern. The proposal was for a single army, a single Foreign Office, and a customs union. In former years King Nicholas was an ardent advocate of Serb union, and even wrote that he would be content to be the sentinel before the King of Serbia's tent, and it has been asserted that in the days of Prince Michael of Serbia there was an actual agreement that in the event of the two States becoming coterminous there should be a sort of federal union between them, Montenegro becoming a principality within the Kingdom. How far there has been an alteration in the old King's personal sentiments it is difficult to know, but the brilliant marriages of his daughters and the union of the Crown Prince to a German princess have greatly increased the dynastic feeling of the family and exalted its notions of its courtly position — from being the household of a tribal chief it has become a recognized Royal family. It was asserted — though I do not know with what truth — that King Nicholas himself was averse to taking the title of King, and that it was urged upon him by his family, and even more significantly by the Austrian Emperor, who wished thus to effect a breach between Serbia and Montenegro since it would be more difficult for a King to concede what would be comparatively easy for a Prince. A great deal of mystery surrounds the alleged surrender of the Montenegrin government to Austria at the time of the loss of Lovcen. It seems perhaps not improbable, though the suggestion is offered with diffidence, that the court camarilla which, as has been said, paid of recent years greater heed to dynastic than Southern Slav national considerations, and which is stated to be headed by the Princess Vera, did induce the King to offer a surrender, but that the latter was met with a refusal by the army (it is important to remember that, PROPOSED FRONTIERS 195 as I was pointedly informed, the Montenegrin General Staff was composed of Serb officers) and that the King thereupon reversed his decision. The position of the dynasty was weakened by the events of the Balkan wars. The Montenegrins were dissatisfied with the conduct of the princes who do not seem to have shared the hardships of the soldiers, while the latter contrasted the results achieved with those obtained by the Serbs. When in the second Balkan war Montenegrins and Serbs fought side by side the contrast in resources was further brought home to the former who saw that Montenegro was too small and too poor even to organize efficiently the resources they possessed. There was consequently a general feeling both among Serbs and Montenegrins that, while no great change might take place in the lifetime of old King Nicholas who has played a great and noble part for his country, after his decease there should be a union of the two States the Montenegrin princes receiving appanages from the civil list. During the lifetime of King Nicholas there should be at any rate a federal union which would have the incidental advantage of placing beyond doubt the consummation of complete union in the future and of eliminating the danger of any intrigue directed against that consummation. During the war rumour has been busy with the subject of Montenegro and its ruling House, and with intrigues real or alleged in which the little country has figured, and there can be little doubt apart from details that there has been substantial basis for some at least of these rumours. In the spring of 1915 I was told the story of an intrigue which has not hitherto been published whose authenticity was accepted in Southern Slav circles. It is asserted that at that time — April-May 1915 — a certain Power had urged Montenegro to stipulate from the Entente for the cession to her of all the Hercegovina to the south of the Narenta, an area which would include Dubrovnik (Ragusa). The result would be twofold. In the first place, such a cession would reduce the future outlet of 196 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Serbia proper on the Adriatic to the very narrowest proportions. The second result would be to make less likely the union of Serbia and Montenegro. The acquisi- tion of such an area including Dubrovnik would further exalt the dynastic pride of the ruling House, while the Montenegrin people also, in view of the increase of its resources, might change its opinion that the country was too small and too poor to stand alone and should join its larger neighbour. The comment on this subtle idea made to me by a Southern Slav was emphatic: "We wish no harm to old King Nicholas who used to be a great patriot, but if he intrigues wdth against Southern Slav unity he will have to go." No one can feel anything but compassion for the old chieftain of the Black Mountain forced in these dark days to leave his home and the little country which he has so dearly loved, and every one must hope that his life may be spared to see the dawn of a happier day not only for Montenegro but for all that Southern Slav race whose union inspired all his policy in former years and formed the theme of his play Carica Balkanska (the Empress of the Balkans). There can, however, be not the slightest doubt as to what should be the future of his country. Whatever provisional arrangements may be made for the lifetime of King Nicholas, Montenegro after his death should be completely fused with Serbia. His family does not command the respect and allegiance which belong to the old King, and its attitude of recent years has made it suspect of being lukewarm in the cause of national unity — that unity which more than ever, as stern events point to its absolute necessity if the race is to have a future, is the goal for which every Southern Slav passionately strives, treachery to which is the one sin that has no forgiveness. That union is equally in the interest of the Montenegrins ; their country is small and it is poor, even the great forests of the Brda cannot be exploited by its own resources, and fusion with the rest of the race would enable it to enter into a larger life, would dispense with the expense PROPOSED FRONTIERS 197 of a separate administration, and would enable it to share in the resources of the whole country, and to obtain subventions for educational and other purposes which it cannot supply itself. It is to be hoped that such a con- summation will not be hindered by the dynastic ties which unite other ruling families to the House of Petrovic. The position of the latter would be no worse than that of many German and Italian Houses which had to yield place in the cause of national unity, and the statesmen of the Allies should see the matter from the broad view of inter- national policy and the national desires of the Southern Slavs rather than from that of the editor of the Almanack de Gotha, or of those who forget that if there is a King of Italy it is because one king and several lesser potentates, not to mention the Pope, have had to make way for him. It must be remembered that the not too popular heir- apparent is married to a German princess and has no children, and that the next heir is Prince Mirko, whose role in recent events has been more than equivocal. He remained behind in the country after the great retreat, and is now in Austria, where rumour has been busy with his name as a possible " tame " sub-king of an Austrian Jugoslavia. There can be but little doubt of the fusion of Montenegro with the rest of the Southern Slavs whatever arrangements may be made at the peace. If they are for a time separated it will only mean a revolution the more, similar to that which chased from their thrones the King of Naples and the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, etc., and with a similar result, for no Holy Alliance is likely to attempt to stay the progress of events and there are limits to the extent to which any single State can flout public opinion. Political wisdom, however, endeavours to obviate the necessity for revolutions. There are two or three slight rectifications which should be effected in the Serbo-Albanian frontier, though the amount of territory affected is small. The first of these is that the line of the Bojana should be secured, the present frontier leaving the river just below Gorica and 198 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS passing north-west to the lake of Skodra. A small river is not usually a good frontier except on the map, but in this case the character of the two banks is different and the line of the Bojana is in reality the line of the hills which come down to its western bank. In the neighbour- hood of Gusinje the present frontier cuts across the upper valley of the Lim part of the valley — both sides — being Montenegrin and part Albanian. The difficulty here is that the upper part of the valley is inhabited by an offshoot of the Klementi tribe from over the mountains, but at any rate the boundary could be so modified as to include in Montenegrin territory the headwaters of the affluent which joins the Lim at Andrijevica, which would give a continuous mountain frontier in this neighbourhood. The new boundary would follow the hills which divide the headwaters of the Andrijevica tributary from those of the Lim. The total area involved would not be more than some fifty square miles, but the result would be a natural frontier. A more important rectification is necessary between Djakovica and Prizren. The present frontier leaves the mountains to the south of Djakovica and strikes north-east to the junction of the Erenik with the White Drin and then follows the course of the latter to the west of Prizren. As a consequence, in this portion of its course the valley of the river is divided between Serbia and Albania. As has just been remarked, a small river is not a good frontier, for the reason that the social and economic life of its banks is the same. Moreover, in this case the strip of Albanian land is cut off from the rest of Albania by the mountains which bound the western side of the valley. A modification of the frontier would be expedient by which the new line should follow the mountains just mentioned to the narrow gorges west of Prizren in the neighbourhood of Vranica where it would cross the river where the valley is confined and thence rejoin the present frontier to the south of Prizren. Here also the result would be a practically continuous mountain frontier. To the south of Prizren at the point last PROPOSED FRONTIERS 199 mentioned, the present frontier makes a loop eastward of almost three-quarters of a circle pointing in the direc- tion of Tetovo, and abandoning the main line of the southern extension of the &ar Mountains. The new line should follow the main chain and thus cut the neck of the loop, giving once more -a natural frontier. The sum total of these last two losses to Albania would not be above some three or four hundred square miles at the outside. In the event of Albania being re-established in a real independence, i.e. without any right of occupation, administration, protectorate, or tutelage being granted to any single Power, she could be amply compensated by the valley of the Radika, at present Serb, and even by the town of Debar itself, which would be worth much more to her than the areas relinquished to Serbia. In the event of any other future being marked out for Albania, then an entirely new set of circumstances would arise which it would be useless to discuss here. The failure of the late experiment in Albania lay in the circumstances in which it was conceived, the agents by whom it was worked, and the jealousies which strove to wreck it. This virile people should not be despaired of. Progress will be slow — the Highlands were not tamed in a day — but there seems no reason why a really honest attempt, made without arriere pensee, to found an independent Albania should not succeed. If an administrator of the calibre of, e.g., Lord Milner x were to be sent out for ten years, the way would then be clear for a princely government. A " Constitution " would of course be the last work, not the first. 1 Written before party politicians had re-discovered him. Presumably we shall henceforth use his talents for ourselves. CHAPTER VI MACEDONIA: THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY OF 1912 It is necessary that some reference should be made in a book dealing with the future of the Southern Slavs to the Macedonian question, however great may be the impatience of many Englishmen at the mention of that, to them, wearisome topic. It might have been thought that the question of the future of Macedonia has been settled by the course of events : Serbia has been our faithful ally, which has repulsed all overtures for the negotiation of a separate peace when such were made to her, while Bul- garia has been to us as well as to Serbia a treacherous enemy, so that to those unacquainted with the methods of modern British diplomacy it might seem that no other course could, or would be, followed save that of restoring the province to our ally in the event of victory. The facts, however, are otherwise, and consequently the main outlines of the problem must be restated in the barest possible form. There are one or two common misconceptions, widely held in England and fostered by the ever-active Bulgarian pro- pagandists, which require at any rate passing notice. Reference has been made more than once to the frequency with which historical claims dating from the Middle Ages are advanced to various Near Eastern lands and provinces, and Macedonia in particular has been the object of such claims based upon the conquests made by the contending 200 MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 201 parties in medieval times. Professor Cviji6, the Kector of the University of Belgrade, has pointed out in his mono- graph on the Nationality of the Macedonian Slavs that if historical arguments were to have full sway, the entire map of Europe would have to be recast with most unsatis- factory results, and it must be remembered that these "historical" claims are frequently in plainest contradiction to arguments, such as the ethnological, to which much greater deference should be paid. The fact, however, that these arguments are frequently advanced and have had undoubtedly so large an influence entails a brief glance at the history of Macedonia subsequent to the irruption of the Slavs. A very common misconception in England is that during the greater part of the Middle Ages Macedonia was almost continuously a Bulgarian province, which fell into the hands of the Serbs for a short time during the reign of Stephen Dusan,1 before passing under the rule of the Turks. This is an entire mistake as will be seen, however little bearing the historical question has upon the racial character of the inhabitants or their political desires, if they possess any desires beyond the wish to be allowed to cultivate their lands in peace and quietness. Unimportant in itself, a sketch of Macedonian history becomes necessary when the alleged facts of this history are seriously advanced as a contribution to the present political solution of the problem of Macedonia's destinies. Another common misconception is a confusion between the great importance of the Archi- episcopal see of Ochrida, whose occupant bore the title of Primate of Justiniana Prima and Bulgaria, in the ecclesi- astical history of the Orthodox Church and its ephemeral importance as the capital for a few years of a Bulgarian Empire. The two things have been consistently confounded by those whose object was to make political profit out of the confusion. With this latter [matter it is not my intention to deal, as the facts can be found elsewhere in ' See for example an article on The Macedonian Problem, by Mr. Ledward in the Fortnightly Review, August 1915. 202 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS greater detail than is warranted by the purpose of this volume.1 The "first Bulgarian Empire" was founded by Simeon, 893-927, who proclaimed himself Tsar, and held Macedonia, Albania, and part of Serbia, including Ni£ and Belgrade. Subsequently the empire split into two portions, of which the eastern fell before the Greek Emperor Zimisces, in 972. The western empire was founded in 963 by Si&man of Trnovo, who held Macedonia and Albania. His son, Stephen Samuel also held Macedonia, Albania, Nig, and Belgrade. His troops suffered a disastrous defeat at BelaSica at the hands of Basil II, the "Bulgar Slayer," in 1014, which he did not long survive. A short period of anarchy and internecine strife was followed by the extinction of the Western Bulgarian Empire in 1018, and the whole territory, though the ecclesiastical organization survived, was incor- porated into the Eastern Empire and parcelled out into governorships. It so remained for a period of 160 years, from 1018 to 1186.2 In 1186 a revival of Bulgarian power took place under John Asen, who, it is to be noted, was a Vlach and whose dominion is frequently described as Vlacho-Bulgarian. John Asen II prided himself in a document addressed to the Pope on being a Roman. This revival had its origin in northern Bulgaria, Macedonia at the time being under an independent ruler named Strez, variously described as a Serb and a Bulgar. Tsar Kalojan, son of Asen, 1197-1207, took posses- sion of northern Macedonia, and the revived empire had its greatest extension under John Asen II, 1218-1241, whose dominions touched the Black Sea, the iEgean, and the Adriatic, including Albania up to Durazzo. Macedonia and 1 Vide a sketch of Macedonian history by Professor P. Popovi6 in the Near East for September 10, 1915, which has since been republished as a pamphlet, for some interesting information on the subject on the see of Ochrida. * It is maintained by Professor Popovid, ut supra, that the " "Western Bulgarian Empire" should be regarded as a separate "Macedonian" State of non-Bulgarian character. He cites Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben, as now adhering to this view. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 203 Thrace were lost by Koloman, son of John Asen II, the date of the loss being given as 1254-1257, during the last years of his reign,1 while Constantine Asen, or Ti6, a Serb by race, 1258-1277, was the last Tsar who occupied upper Macedonia, and then only for a short time.2 The second period of Bulgarian possession, then, lasted only some fifty years, on the most generous estimate, if we compute the time from the occupation of upper Macedonia by Kalojan. The Greeks had immediately to defend it against the Serbs, who, under Stephen Milutin, 1281-1321, penetrated to the Struma and the Lakes, and maintained his hold on northern Macedonia. Under his grandson, Stephen Dusan, all Macedonia and much else fell to the Serbs as a capture, not from the Bulgars but from the Greeks. On his death in 1356 Macedonia fell to one of his nobles Vukasm, and subsequently became the principality of the famous Marko Kraljevic. It continued under Serb rulers till the Turkish definite conquest in 1396, having acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty since the battle of the Marica in 1371. It will be seen, then, that there was nothing like a con- tinuous Bulgarian occupation in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, after the fall of the first Bulgarian Empire, which had held Macedonia for 160 years, including the duration of the " Western Bulgarian Empire," during the 370 years from 1088-1396 the Bulgars only held the province for some fifty years, the Serbs holding it in sovereignty or under suzerainty for about a century at the close of the period, and the Greeks for periods of some 160 years and fifty years. Another point which becomes evident is that no revival of Bulgarian power had its origin in Macedonia, in spite of the difficult nature of the country; the province fell to Bulgaria as a result of later conquest, and at times had its own princes of Bulgar or Serb race. I lay no great stress on this confused medieval 1 Cit. Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire Oinirale, Tome iii, p. 909. Professor Popovid gives the date of acquisition as 1230 (this would refer to all Macedonia), and of its loss as 1246. * Cit. William Miller, Travel and Politic* in the Near East, p. 874. 204 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS history, but if it be cited it should be cited correctly, which is rarely the case with the Bulgar propagandists, native or foreign. Historically the Serbs have a good claim, and M. Vesnic, the Minister of Serbia in Paris, has told me that such public works as remain from the medieval period date from the years of Serb supremacy. In our own days Serb influence was paramount during the nineteenth century till 1878, when it waned as the result of various causes — the abortive Treaty of San Stefano, the operations of the Bulgarian Exarchate, Turkish fear of Serb nationalism which led to the suppression of the Serb schools, and the operations of the " Macedonian Com- mittee " which seems to have killed considerably more Macedonians than Turks. As for the ethnology of the Macedonian Slavs the best opinion is that it is not unlike what we might expect from this previous history. The original Slavs must have been of the same general stock as their Serb neighbours and the original Slav inhabitants of Bulgaria, and that original stock has at different times received an infiltration of Bulgarians. East of the middle Vardar valley they may be described as Bulgarians, and north of the line Stip- Gostivar as Serbs, the remainder living in the Slav portions of the former vilayet of Monastir are neither pure Serb nor pure Bulgar. I may cite two English authorities, the quotations forming part of the discussion of the subject by the authors cited. Sir Charles Eliot says : — The result of this investigation, then, is that it is not easy to dis- tinguish Servians and Bulgarians beyond the boundaries of their respective countries. We have in reality three categories : pure Slavs, Slavised Bulgarians (the original un-Slavised Bulgarians having long ago disappeared), and pure Slavs who have been influenced by Slavised Bulgarians. ... Of the remaining Slavs [i.e. between the Struma and the Sar Mountains] an impartial observer can only say that they are intermediate between the Serbs and Bulgarians ; but I think that traces of Mongolian — that is, Bulgarian — physiognomy can be seen as far west as Ochrida. The practical conclusion is that neither Greeks, Servians, nor Bulgarians have a right to claim central Macedonia.1 Sir Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe, pp. 337, 338. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 205 Mr. Brailsford, whose Bulgarophil sentiments are well known, writes : — Are the Macedonians Serbs or Bulgars? . . . The lesson of history obviously is that there is no answer at all. They are not Serbs for their blood can hardly be pure Slavonic. . . . On the other hand, they can hardly be Bulgarians, for quite clearly the Servian immigrations and conquests must have left much Servian blood in their veins and the admixture of non- Aryan blood can scarcely be so considerable as it is in Bulgaria. They are probably very much what they were before either a Bulgarian or a Servian Empire existed — a Slav people derived from rather various stocks who invaded the peninsula at different periods. But they had originally no clear consciousness of race, and any strong Slavonic Power was able to impose itself upon them. One may safely say that for historical reasons the people of Kossovo and the North- West are definitely Serb, while the people of Ochrida are clearly Bulgarians. The affinities of the rest are decided on purely political grounds. Language teaches us very little. The differences between literary Servian and Bulgarian are not considerable but they are very definite. The Macedonian dialect is neither one nor the other, but in certain structural features it agrees rather with Bulgarian than with Servian. This, however, means little ; for modern Servian is not the language of Dushan, but the dialect of Belgrade. A southern Mace- donian finds no difficulty in making himself understood in Dushan' a country (Uskub and Prizrend) though he will feel a foreigner in Belgrade. One must also discount the effect of propaganda. A priest or teacher from Sofia or Belgrade who settles in a village, will modify its dialect considerably in the course of a generation. . . . The Servians have a respectable historical and ethnographical claim to be reckoned a Macedonian race.1 It is true that he claims them very definitely for the Bulgarians and decisively rejects Serb claims, but it is on grounds of political affinity. M. Berard, in his book on Macedonia, differs with regard to the inhabitants of the Ochrida region : " Les Slaves des Dibres et des Lacs se disaient volontiers Serbes." Professor Cvijic is also of opinion that they are of intermediate type, but considers that the central Macedonians as far east as the Vardar- Struma waterparting have Serb characteristics in their customs, songs, and some of the elements of the language. It is curious that the Bulgars and their backers insist so 1 H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia, pp. 101, 105. 206 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS strongly on their alleged ethnographical claims to Mace- donia while claiming in Thrace a large area which is Greco-Turkish by race, as well as Kavala, etc., which is undoubtedly Greek. The geographical, commercial, and strategic reasons which they advance in these latter cases are equally operative for the Serbs in Macedonia. Mr. Brailsford found no native traditions of the old Bulgarian Empire, such traditions as the people possess being rather of the days of Serb rule. Bulgarians them- selves have admitted it. It is this indeterminate character of the population that has so embittered the Serbo-Bulgarian struggle for Macedonia. The Macedonian speaks a patois which is identical with the literary language of neither Serb nor Bulgar, but is mutually intelligible with both. "When he is educated he learns either the one or the other literary language, and becomes, as the case may be, Serb or Bulgar. If the Bulgars have made great progress in the past, that is due largely to political causes and the methods of the Macedonian Committee, and whichever State could hold Macedonia for a generation would succeed in convert- ing its inhabitants to its own nationality. Neither side could rest secure in the belief that eventually the people would remain in its fold in spite of a passing foreign domination. It is a testimony to the correctness of this view that most ethnologists are agreed that prior to 1878 the population of the country between Ni§ and Sofia was of the same intermediate character, and it is a fact that villages on what is now the Bulgarian side of the line asked to be included in Serbia. Yet at the present day the political boundary has become a genuinely national one. At one time, if the Bulgars claimed Ni§, the Serbs claimed Sofia. All this explains, if it does not excuse, the bitter struggles for the Macedonian heritage. In reply to Bulgarian efforts the Serbs in later years pushed a vigorous propaganda in Macedonia not only in ecclesias- tical matters, which, as we shall see, were themselves political, but by the foundation of schools, etc. A note must be made of the great influence of the MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 207 Exarchist Church in promoting Bulgarian influence. Up to 1870 the Orthodox inhabitants of European Turkey were forced to submit to the ministrations of priests who were Greek by race, and a general confusion was made between Greeks (Hellenes) and "Greeks" by religion. The Slavs demanded priests of their own ; the Patriarch refused the request. Then in 1870 was formed the Exarchist Church by an act of formal, though not material, schism, rendered necessary by that refusal. The Serbs, it must be remem- bered, took an active part at Constantinople in forwarding the movement and even brought diplomatic pressure to bear at the Porte in its favour. The original sphere of the operations of this body, which, it must be remembered always, differs in no matter of doctrine, ritual, or religious observance from the Patriarchist Church, was in Bulgaria proper. Its operations were gradually extended to Mace- donia, where it became a Bulgarizing agency. The Serbs of the Principality had their own autocephalous Church in communion with the Patriarch, and this body was unable to send a mission into Macedonia without com- mitting an act of schism. The result was that the Exarchist Church had matters all its own way, since the only method by which the Slavs could obtain the services of a Slav clergy was by adhesion to the Exarchist body. It was not till 1897 that the Serbs were able to obtain the appointment of one of their own race as Patriarchist Metropolitan of Skoplje, and only in 1900 that the Serbs of Turkey were recognized as a separate millet or politico- religious community. From the Serb point of view, therefore, action against the Exarchist clergy is purely political, since an Exarchist Church in Serb territory can have only, in present circumstances, a political raison d'etre ; namely, to teach the inhabitants of Macedonia that they are Bulgars, and therefore, if they want a Slav clergy, should have Bulgar and not Serb priests. That in spite of its terrorist methods the Macedonian Committee did not obtain so large a hold over the Slav Macedonian population as is often supposed is shown by 208 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the fiasco of the much-advertised "great rising" of 1903. During that rising, according to Mr. Brailsford, no more than 4,800 insurgents were under arms, a number which is very small if comparison be made with the total popula- tion of the districts affected and in great contrast to the great popular insurrections which at different times have had their origin in the Balkans. Even when allowance be made for lack of arms and for the discouraging effects of previous abortive rebellions the number seems inadequate to sustain the contention that it was a genuine popular revolt of the central Macedonian people. Moreover, the very methods to which the Bulgarian Committee had recourse, the frequent assassinations, the raiding of villages for supplies not willingly afforded, the taking of hostages, the terrorism exercised not less upon the villagers than upon the Turkish officials, argue an inherent weakness in the cause it sustained. Not thus was it with the frequent Greek and Serb insurrections of earlier days, when supplies were willingly accorded and there was no need for the insurgents to take measures against those upon whose behalf they were fighting, since these latter recognized their mission and assisted the hajduks or klephts to the best of their ability. The Committee throughout the history of its operations was always compelled to take the severest measures against the peasantry, not only Greek or Vlach but also Slav, which argues that at least a large proportion of the villagers had but little sympathy with their self-styled champions ; indeed it was frequently only by force that villages could be induced to enrol themselves in the cause of the Committee. Everything then points to the same conclusion of a peasantry Slav by race, but in the mass largely untouched by nationalist propaganda, probably confining their conscious desires to security for life and freedom from extortion and excessive taxation, and capable of being moulded into Serbs or Bulgars according as their destinies lead them. I am speaking of the people of central Macedonia. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 209 II Undoubtedly the Serb cause has been prejudiced in England by the view taken of the provisions of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 which preceded the first Balkan war. It has been argued that the Serbs by agreeing to the territorial delimitation contained in that Treaty acknowledged the ethnographical rights of Bulgaria over the region assigned to her, and were therefore morally debarred from demanding any revision in the terms of the treaty so far as the territorial arrangements contained in it were concerned, and could not put forward any claim to central Macedonia without thereby disavowing those rights of nationality upon which is based the whole Southern Slav case. It is contended further that in consequence of the foregoing arguments Serb rights in central Macedonia are based purely upon the successful issue of the second Balkan war, i.e. upon force, and that in any general Balkan settlement a return must be made to the provisions of the 1912 Treaty as representing the considered moral judgment of the two States themselves upon the question at issue. It is urged even further that in pursuit of the aim of a Balkan accord in spite of Bulgaria's treacherous stab in the back these views must find concrete expression in the proposals of the Allies notwithstanding Serbia's position as an ally and Bulgaria's hostility, and although these same .Allies have already signed away large areas of territory which are as indis- putable in their Southern Slav character as the nationality of the central Macedonians is disputable. There are here evidently two main points. The first is matter of fact and historical argument, the second, partly dependent upon the first, is largely matter of policy and honest dealing with an ally. The first is concerned with the genesis, the aims, the underlying causes, and the rupture of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, and the second with the policy which ought, in view of all that has happened, to be pursued by the Allies in the Balkan 14 210 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS settlement. In this section I will endeavour to set forth the truth about the 1912 Treaty. A commonly received view is that the first real, as apart from formal, breach of the Treaty was made when Serbia demanded a redistribution of the spheres allotted to the two States by the set terms of the Treaty, and this view necessitates the consideration of the motives that underlay that distribution. The Bulgarians, as we have seen, have long laid claim to practically the whole of Macedonia and of what the Serbs call Skoplian Old Serbia, i.e. the districts of Skoplje, Kumanovo, etc. The general history of those claims has already been reviewed. In these pretensions of the Bulgars the Serbs never ac- quiesced, even though prior to 1878 they concerned themselves more immediately with their prospects in Bosnia and the Hercegovina. They claimed that the inhabitants of central and southern Macedonia were at least as much Serb as Bulgar, and that their own historic claims were as good as those of their rivals. Unless it is recognized that the Serbs never acknowledged Bulgarian claims to Macedonia on ethnological grounds, we shall fail to understand the reasons which led them at a later date to reassert their own claims by the demand for a revision of the 1912 Treaty. The main object of Serbia in concluding the Treaty was to secure an outlet to the Adriatic under her own control- It is unnecessary to deal with the conditions, economic and political, which pressed heavily on the State and made this desire imperative, as they are sufficiently well known. Under the terms of the Treaty Bulgaria was to furnish 100,000 men for operations in Macedonia and 200,000 against Austria if Serbia were to be attacked by that Power. There was also a territorial delimita- tion of the future acquisitions to be made in Macedonia, assigning by far the greater part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The reason why Serbia made these large concessions was, as has been said above, the need of a port on the MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 211 Adriatic, for the possession of which she was willing to pay a high price ; and this was perfectly understood by the Bulgarian statesmen with whom the Treaty was con- cluded. The Macedonian concessions to Bulgaria were made to her in return for her support in the matter of an Adriatic outlet, which for Serbia was the governing motive throughout for entering upon the Treaty at all. " Why, under these circumstances ", I asked a well-known Serb in a position to know the facts, ** was not the question of a port definitely included in the terms of the Treaty ? Your attitude then could not have been liable to misrepre- sentation". "We made a mistake in not doing so", was the reply, " a great mistake which we bitterly regret. But we did not want to alarm Europe ". Forced by the jealousies of the Powers to conceal their plans under the usual guise of a demand for Macedonian reform, the Balkan States desired no disclosure of the fact that in reality they intended a root-and-branch settlement of the Balkan question. " The extent of the concessions ", it was added, " was due to the fact that we, like the Bulgarians, did not think that we were so strong as we were ". When, therefore, at a later date the Bulgarians argued that there was no mention of Albania, i.e. of the Adriatic outlet, in the Treaty, they were literally accurate, but at the same time they knew that, though not mentioned in terms, the matter was fundamental — was, in fact, virtually a suppressed clause. It is this that gives real importance to a visit paid in November 1912 to Budapest by M. Danev, an ex-Premier and at the time President of the Bulgarian Sobranje. He went avowedly as the representative of his Government . On November 10 he was received by Count Berchtold (the Delegations were sitting at Budapest at the time), and in Hungarian official quarters he is stated to have intimated that Bulgaria was not bound unconditionally to support Serb claims in controverted territorial questions. Yet on the day following the Bulgarian semi-official Mir itself acknowledged that the question of a Serb outlet 212 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS was a sine qud non.1 For Serbia this action of Dr. Danev, the first of an ill-fated series connected with the name of that unhappy statesman, constituted nothing less than a breach of the Treaty. If Austria had attacked Serbia in arms Bulgaria was bound to come to her aid with 200,000 men,2 and a fortiori, if the attack took a diplomatic form, she was bound to aid her diplomatically. It cannot be argued that, though bound to military aid if required, she was free to withhold her diplomatic' assistance. Yet here Bulgaria, far from doing diplomatic service, actually did her Ally a disservice, and so far as the diplomatic field was concerned abandoned her. To Austria the information was important. It must be remembered that at this date — early November 1912 — the decision as to the Adriatic outlet had not yet been given definitely against Serbia, though Austria was loudly declaring the impossibility of conceding it. She knew, after Dr. Danev's declarations, that on this point the Allies were divided and that she had nothing to fear from Bulgaria, which would certainly not support her Ally in arms in a question which she had already declared was no affair of hers. It is true that in any event the military situation was such as to preclude any help from Bulgaria reaching Serbia, since the former State had some 50,000 to 70,000 men locked up around Adrianople, while the rest of her army was before the lines of Tchatalja. This, however, really means that the terms of the Treaty had become impossible of fulfilment on the military side as they had already been repudiated on the diplomatic. Doubtless the position of 1 So also Dr. Danev : " I should explain to you that, during the crisis of 1912, the most important question for the future of Serbia was her outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Austria was opposed to that. If the Allies ever meant to execute the clause of which we speak [Article III of the Military Convention between Serbia and Bulgaria], no better opportu- nity could have been presented. But no one, much less Serbia herself, thought of it ". — Speech in the Sobranje, May 1914. Git. " Balkanicus ", The Aspirations of Bulgaria, p. 85. Dr. Danev was trying to disprove the obligation of Article III, but the admission remains. * Article III of the Military Convention. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 213 Bulgaria was a difficult one, but at the same time Serbia was entitled to urge that by default, apart from stress of circumstances, her Ally had failed to give her the quid pro quo for the Macedonian partition boundary, and was consequently in no position to demand those con- cessions the return for which she had failed to render. The next point that calls for consideration is the position of affairs at the time when the first peace negotiations between the Allies and Turkey were broken off. The question of the Adriatic outlet had been settled against Serbia; the whole of Macedonia and Southern Epirus were in the hands of the Allies ; the Bulgarians were before Adrianople and Tchatalja. The negotiations had been broken off on the question of Adrianople at the demand of Bulgaria, though in fact the Great Powers had signified that they would themselves see to it that the town should pass into Bulgarian hands. The other Allies had obtained all that they required, and there was no mention in the Treaty, implicit or explicit, of Adrianople or Thrace,1 both of which by race are predominantly Greco-Turkish, yet they loyally continued the war. The action of Bulgaria appears to be the more self-willed as she now declares that Thrace is of only secondary interest to her and not worth bothering about. If that attitude represents her real opinion, then her action in 1913 becomes almost incredibly foolish. It has been a matter of dispute as to when Serbia first made known her desire for the modification of the Treaty. So far as Bussia was concerned she was informed in December 1912, as appears from a dispatch of M. Sazonov to M. Hartwig, Bussian Minister at Belgrade, under date December 16, 1912, in which the former states : — "Dans la conversation qu'il a eue avec notre ambassa- deur a Paris, M. Novakovitch lui a dit qu'en cas d'un refus des grandes puissances de lui laisser en propriete 1 "Now when in the month of May ... we have got an enviable part of Thrace which we did not hope to get ". — Speech of Dr. Genadiev May 22, 1914, referring to the position the previous year. 214 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAYS souveraine un port de l'Adriatique, la Serbie sera contrainte de demander des compensations en Mac6doine, au dela des frontieres fixees dans le traite serbo-bulgare ".l He added that he could give no support. At Paris also M. Danev learnt that Serbia would ask for a rectifi- cation of the Macedonian delimitation. The Bulgarians, unable to make sufficient progress in front of Adrianople, asked Serbia for help. It has been suggested 2 that Serbia did not at this juncture demand an alteration in the Macedonian terms of the Treaty. I am in a position to set that right. Serbia replied that she was sending forward two divisions, 50,000 men, with practically the whole of her siege artillery, but in view of the altered circumstances must demand compensation. This compensa- tion, of course, could only be had in Macedonia. Bulgaria tacitly accepted the aid, but made no reply to the note. The last point for consideration is the situation that immediately preceded the outbreak of war between the former Allies, and the attendant negotiations. Bulgaria claimed practically the whole of Macedonia in virtue of the Treaty with Serbia ; Thrace she claimed in virtue of con- quest ; Kavala by occupation and as a commercial outlet ; and finally Salonica, which was not hers by treaty nor nationality nor conquest, because she wanted it. To the last-named port she had early asserted her claims. On December 15, 1912, M. Isvolski reported from Paris to M. Sazonov, inter alia : — "A une question que je lui posais sur les difficultes a prevoir a ce sujet [division of territory] M. Danef repondit que la Bulgarie en aucun cas et a aucun prix n'abandonnera la ville de Salonique et me pria de porter a votre connaissance que c'etait une question de vie ou de mort pour la Bulgarie et que le gouvernement bulgare ne pouvait consentir a la soumettre a l'arbitrage ". 3 1 Vide Russian Orange Book, Becueil de documents diplomatique* concernant les evdnements des Balkans. * Mr. Frank Fox, Bulgaria's Attitude, Fortnightly Beview, March 1915, p. 488. J Vide Russian Orange Book, %t supra. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 215 Easily recognizable here is the inflexible temperament and brusquerie of the minister who — in so far as he was not the agent of others — has to bear so large a responsibility for the misfortunes of his country. Bulgaria had not conquered Salonica, her troops were only there en droit d'allUs, and yet before any negotiations have been entered upon she demands the town, while asserting in advance that she will not submit the matter to arbitration. Later on Bulgaria refused a general arbitration on the matters in dispute with Serbia on the ground that the Treaty provided only for specific arbitration on a particular point, but this predetermined refusal of arbitration on a point not covered by any treaty throws doubt on the bona fides of her plea in the other case : evidently she preferred to "hack her way through". Wherever, then, Bulgaria could advance a plea of treaty or nationality or conquest, that particular plea was advanced, and where such pleas were wanting she fell back upon her desires backed by force. When to this general attitude is added the oft-repeated boast that the Bulgars were the Prussians of the Balkans (a boast not without elements of justifica- tion), it is no wonder that Serbia and Greece took alarm, and asked themselves whether they were cast for the parts of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Evidently they were face to face with the design of a Bulgarian Balkan Empire. The occupation of the whole of Macedonia by Bulgaria coupled with a return to an Austrophil attitude on her part, as indicated by various symptoms, would mean absolute ruin for Serbia. Serbia was willing to submit the whole Treaty to the arbitration of the Tsar, not the delimitation clause only.1 1 Article II of the Secret Annexe to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty contains the " delimitation clause " and provides for the arbitrations of the Tsar within the limits contained therein. Article IV, however, is a general arbitration clause providing for the definite submission to Russia of every dispute which might arise concerning the inter- pretation or execution of any stipulation of the Treaty, the Secret Annexe, or the Military Convention. It would follow that a dispute solely concerned with the delimitation of territory would be decided 216 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Her plea was that the reciprocal obligations should be examined and the degree in which they had been ful- filled. Thus the non-fulfilment of Bulgarian aid in the Adriatic affair would carry with it a reconsideration of the delimitation agreed upon as consideration. Bulgaria, dominated by Austrian counsels, claimed her price though the consideration had not been forthcoming. Two methods of easing the crisis commended themselves to Russia : a partial demobilization and a meeting of the Balkan Premiers. On May 20, 1913, M. Sazonov proposed a reduction of forces to a third or a quarter — a proposition which a little later, on the initiative of Russia, was adopted by the conference of Ambassadors in London, and on May 31 Petrograd was able to announce that the pro- posal had been accepted. Bulgaria, however, adopted an equivocal attitude, and on June 7 M. Sazonov in- tructed M. Nekliudov to put the pointed question to Bulgaria : — " d'ou vient maintenant le retard de la Bulgarie a proceder a cette mesure simultanement avec les allies. Cette pro- position nous a ete formulee par la Bulgarie, qui, a ce qu'il parait, evite maintenant de la remplir, ainsi que by the arbitration provided for by Article II and within the limits of that Article. If, however, the dispute were concerned with the whole question of the applicability of Article II, with its proposed delimitation of territory and the specific arbitration provided in that regard, to the changed circumstances then such dispute would fall under the general Arbitration clause of Article IV being a matter concerning the stipulations of Article II of the Secret Annexe. Bussia would thus have to decide first on this latter dispute. It was for the arbitra- tion under Article IV that the Serbs stipulated, the Bulgars for the specific arbitration of Article II. The text of these conventions with a full discussion will be found in " Balkanicus ", The Aspirations of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian case is given by Dr. Gesov in The Balkan Alliance. The demand of the Serbs was justified by the text of Article IV, for otherwise the subject-matter of Article II (the delimita- tion and specific arbitration) would have been expressly excluded from the purview of the general arbitration provided for by Article IV. The matter in dispute was the applicability of Article II in to to to the changed circumstances, and that would certainly seem to be fit matter for the general arbitration proposed by Article IV. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 217 de prendre part a l'entrevue des quatre presidents du conseil a Salonique ". The Bulgarians made conditions of a joint occupation of Macedonia, and the proposal fell through, although again directly advanced by Serbia. The second measure proposed by Russia was a meeting of the Premiers. It is incorrect to represent Russia as stiffening the attitude of Serbia or as lukewarm in the cause of peace. While Count Tisza was championing the right of the Balkan States to engage in internecine war, Russia strove for peace in every way and was ready to approve of anything that would tend towards securing it. In April M. Nekliudov reported the warlike feeling in Sofia, and added that M. Gesov was evidently powerless to control events. On the 22nd of that month the Russian Foreign Minister proposed a meeting of the Balkan Premiers, but was informed from Sofia that the idea found no sympathy there. Throughout Bulgaria was opposed to a round-table conference, since her object was, after obtaining a settlement of the dispute with Serbia, to be left face to face with Greece. Russia, while advo- cating a general reliance on the Treaty, was in favour of reasonable concessions by Bulgaria as being likely to contribute to the solidity of the alliance. She naturally had no liking for the invidious task of arbitration which M. Sazonov confessed would be tres penible for her, and she therefore welcomed the meeting between the Serb and Bulgar Premiers and counselled a meeting with M. Venizelos also. In the event of these meetings proving fruitless, she would welcome the Premiers to Petrograd. Time pressed, and the idea of a general preliminary meeting was abandoned, and Russia asked for a meeting in her capital, which M. Pa§i6 considered more likely to lead to the desired end. Bulgaria again adopted an equivocal attitude : she was willing to accede to the idea if her point of view were adopted previously, to which the Russian Minister replied that if all the matters in dispute were cleared up beforehand there would 218 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS obviously be no need for the meeting itself. On June 17, ten days after the Tsar's telegram, he wrote to M. Nekliudov : — " Nous insistons done pour obtenir de M. Danef la reponse la plus prompte : desire-t-il, oui ou non, venir a S. Petersbourg " ? Finally M. Danev caused M. Sazonov to be informed that the Bulgarian condition that the arbitration should be confined to the specific territorial stipulations of the Treaty was his last word. This was on June 25, and early on June 30 the Bulgarian attack was made. There has been printed1 a private letter from the Bulgarian Minister to Russia, M. Bobcev to M. Todorov, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, which throws a vivid light on how the situation was regarded by the former. It is dated June 20, and in it occur the following words : — "-. . . Le refus de notre premier ministre de se rendre ici a la conference produira le plus terrible, le pire effet. On le prendra comme une offense a l'Empereur lui-meme. Que la guerre doive avoir lieu ou non, j'estime que nous ne pouvons pas nous refuser a prendre part a la conference. . . . L'Empereur et la gouvernement sont decides a l'arbitrage conformement au traite et dans son cadre. . . . Que le premier ministre vienne ici et qu'il dise sa pensee ; mais qu'il vienne. . . . M. Delcasse . . . m'a dit, ' Gar- dez-vous des conseils secrets qu'on vous donne, car ils ne visent que les interets de leurs auteurs . . .' ". It was not for want of good advice that Bulgaria fell ; she had been warned by Russia of the Turkish and Roumanian dangers, and the result bore out the words of M. Sazonov that it was clear to him that Bulgaria was acting on the suggestion of others who were holding out hopes which would only lead to bitter disillusionment. The poignant words of the Bulgarian Minister passed unheeded. The nature of the Bulgarian attack is well known, as 1 M. Yakchitch, La seconde guerre Balkanique, La Revue Politique Internationale, April 1914. This article gives extracts from the Russian Orange Book for which I am indebted. MACEDONIA: TREATY OF 1912 219 also General Savov's truly extraordinary reasons, that it was necessary to raise the moral of the troops and make them consider their ex-allies as enemies, to make the allies more conciliatory as a result of the " violent blows " that would be dealt to them, and to put Russian policy in face of the danger of a commencement of a war I The Bulgarians subsequently explained that they did not regard the attack as a beginning of war and were apparently astonished that their violent blows had failed in their conciliatory object.1 Even Serb forbearance was distorted into a confession of weakness by the Bulgarian command, which paid an unconscious tribute to their enemy's desire for peace. General Kovacev, commanding the Fourth Bulgarian Army, in an order, No. 29, dated June 17, said : — " Our men must be told that the Greek and Serb soldiers, so courageous against defenceless populations, are only cowards whom our approach alone has terrified. . . . By allowing the various echelons of our army, at the moment of concentration, to pass before the front of the Serb troops without acting against them, our enemies have clearly shown their moral state, and the fear they have of measuring themselves against us. If it were otherwise, they would never have allowed our concentration to be effected without hindrance in conditions altogether unknown hitherto in history ". It is useless and harmful talk to hark back to the Treaty of 1912 as a basis of proposals. The Treaty is as dead as Jacob Marley, it belongs to conditions that are past, was entered upon by Serbia for a consideration not received and for motives no longer operative, and has finally been ruptured by Bulgaria's second declaration of war. It is true that as a result of the war she will obtain an Adriatic coast line, but that will not be thanks to Bulgaria, and the 1 The documentary evidence produced by " Balkanicus " in The Aspirations of Bulgaria proves conclusively that the treacherous Bulgarian attack had been deliberately prepared for by both the civil and military administrations. 220 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS former concessions can therefore no longer be in question. Before the war we recognized Germany's rights in the Bagdad railway, and were about to negotiate with her on the basis of recognizing further rights of German com- mercial exploitation in Asia Minor. Does any one suppose, however, that if successful we shall hand over the Bagdad railway to Germany and Asia Minor also for pacific pene- tration? Why then should we deal otherwise with the interests of our ally ? In both cases the war has funda- mentally altered the conditions of the problem. The same holds good of the otherwise well-founded claim of Germany to the possession of a colonial empire : we, I imagine, will not return South-West Africa, or German East Africa. If it be argued that the cases are differentiated on the ground that the principle of nationality is involved, and that Serbia in 1912 recognized the Bulgarian character of central Macedonia, that point has been dealt with above. CHAPTEE VII THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA In the previous chapter the conflicting claims to Macedonia derived from the past history of the province and from its ethnographical characteristics have been examined, and the result was to establish the fact that in the Middle Ages there was no continuous Bulgarian rule over that country, but that it passed to Bulgar, to Greek, or to Serb, accord- ing to which of the three States was able at the moment to exercise supremacy in those regions, and that in fact from 1018 onwards the Bulgarians only held Macedonia for a period of fifty years on a liberal estimate, and assum- ing the Bulgarian character of the rule of the Asen family. It was seen, also, that the racial character of the people is indeterminate so far as central Macedonia is concerned, the inhabitants belonging to a primitive Slav stock without definite national consciousness and capable of being moulded into Serbs or Bulgars as each may be -able to subject them to a generation of rule and schooling. The Treaty of 1912 was also considered in its inception, the motives which underlay the territorial distribution contained in it, and the events which led to the second Balkan war. It was observed that there was no implied recognition of the validity of Bulgarian ethnographical claims, but that the delimitation proposed was set forward as consideration for access to the Adriatic by Serbia, was in fact the price which Serbia was prepared to pay in order that she might make use of the opportunity which offered of securing her econo- mic emancipation. It remains now to be considered what 221 222 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS should be the line of policy to be pursued by the Allies in the present situation, in view of all that has passed, and having regard to the actual attitude of the different parties to the Allies and to the objects and aims pursued by them, account being duly taken of the facts established in the previous chapter. While, then, in view of the events of the last few months, it would seem that no question as to the future of Mace- donia can arise, seeing that Serbia has been for nearly two years a loyal ally in arms, and that she has been treacher- ously attacked by Bulgaria, who has thus become our enemy as well, yet, on the other hand, it is by no means certain that the disastrous course of sacrificing Serbia to Bulgaria has even yet been abandoned. So far our Balkan policy has had Bulgaria as its pivot, and our relations to Greece seem to have been based on the idea that if we could not win over Bulgaria to our side by any means, then we did not want any other Balkan ally — at any rate Greek aid, when proffered, was refused, and an attempt made to get Greece to cede to Bulgaria the Greek region of Kavala. There are still r a number of people in our midst who care more for the interests of our Bulgarian enemy than of our Serb ally, who continually urge a course of policy which should aim at buying Bulgarian support at the expense of Serb territory. More frequently such a course is urged on the specious ground of the necessity of securing a Balkan accord and a permanent settlement with which all the Balkan States will be satisfied. Thus Mr. J. L. Garvin, whom I do not include in the category just men- tioned, and whose talents, as I happen to know, are highly appreciated in Southern Slav circles, despite things which have wounded them, wrote as follows in the Observer of April 2, 1916: "Again, despite all that has happened, and all the iniquities of King Fox's policy in Bulgaria, the fundamental problem remains just what it was in 1912 — 1 March 1917. In spite of Bulgarian engagements against Russian troops, we are still without a pronouncement on the official attitude of the Entente towards the Macedonian problem. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 223 to establish a system by which bearable relations between neighbouring peoples may be restored and racial hate may cease to be the master-passion of the Balkans. In grasp of this fact still lies the key to the creation of a Greater Serbia, which, with an enlarged Boumania, would rank high indeed, next to the leading Powers amongst the king- doms of the new Europe." This, perhaps, puts the argu- ment at its best, but it requires little consideration to see how weak is the case made out. It cannot be said that the Balkan problem remains what it was in 1912. Since then Bulgaria has twice stabbed her neighbour in the back, Bulgarian troops have overrun Serbia, and the Bulgarian authorities have systematically looted that unhappy country, while graver charges of massacre have been made on good evidence. To say that after all this the problem remains the same is to ignore facts as completely as if it were asserted that the European problem as a whole is the same now as four years ago. The cessation of racial hate is a thing to be desired in the Balkans as elsewhere, but that is not a political problem, but an unrealizable ideal in present circumstances. I have alluded more than once to the strange obsession which regards racial feeling as some- thing different in the Balkans to what it is elsewhere, which imagines that a little persuasion, a little diplomatic treatment, and some unexceptionable homilies will assuage those deep and dark human instincts which we do not imagine for a moment will be allayed easily in western Europe. Possibly it may be due to our own success in establishing good relations between different peoples in our own Empire, but reflection will show, though the topic cannot be pursued here, that the conditions are altogether different, both as to the peoples concerned, the nature of the problem, and the means to be employed. It is difficult to understand in what sense the key to the accomplishment of Southern Slav unity is to be found in unjust concessions to Bulgaria, unless it be meant that the latter are to be made a condition precedent for the former, a project of disloyal coercion that has unfortunately not been without 224 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS its upholders in a certain section of our publicists. While regard for the future will avoid imposing upon Bulgaria terms of peace which might seem a vindictive punishment for her past action, on the other hand, as any idea of Serbo-Bulgarian friendliness for many a long year is absolutely Utopian, we cannot impose upon Serbia conditions which have regard to considerations possessing no correspondence to reality. A question of honour is undoubtedly involved. Part, at any rate, of the prestige which we have enjoyed abroad in the past has been due to recognition of the fact that we have stood loyally by our allies. The honour of an English- man and of the English nation, the respect paid to an Englishman's word, the feeling that an Englishman can always be relied upon, that he will never desert a friend in distress — these are a priceless heritage from the past. It has been very largely by means of such considerations that we have been able to build up our Empire at a cost so comparatively small ; they have stood us in good stead time and again. This honourable prestige is not a thing lightly to be thrown aside or impaired. Already we have gravely compromised our position in the Balkans by action which has appeared to be actuated by other motives. It cannot be denied that the suspicion with which we were regarded in Greece in October 1915 was largely due, not to the action which we were compelled to take upon Greek soil, but to our treatment of Serbia, for the Greeks felt that even alliance with England would not obviate demands opposed to their interests, just as a year's comradeship in arms did not save Serbia from exigences put forward on behalf of a State whose attitude was well known in the Balkans, and apparently to Sir Edward Grey, though not to Lord Crewe.1 Such considerations reinforced others of 1 " We did not originally assume that Bulgaria was, or need be, hostile to us in the first instance". — Lord Crewe in the House of Lords, October 14, 1915. " The German and Austrian sympathies of the King of the Bulgarians have always been known, and reports of Bulgarian negotiations with Turkey, under German influence, came from various Balkan sources as early as April". — Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, November 9, 1915. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 225 a more questionable nature in determining the Greek Government to repudiate its treaty obligations to its ally. The point of honour thus finds contact with considera- tions of policy. It is necessary that we should declare ourselves in unambiguous terms. On April 28, 1916, when Mr. R. M'Neill asked in the House of Commons for an assurance that Bulgaria should not be permitted to acquire territory at the expense of any people who had fought or might hereafter fight on the side of the Allies, Lord Robert Cecil stated in reply that such a statement made without discussion with our Allies would be contrary to the declara- tion of September 5, 1914, by which each of the Allies was precluded from making a separate peace and from demanding conditions of peace without the consent of each of the others, and he did not think that at present any such discussion would be opportune. In plain English, he refused to give any assurance that Bulgaria would not be permitted to acquire any Serb territory until we had discussed the matter with our Allies, and he did not think that any such discussion would be opportune. At that date, therefore, we had not yet determined whether not to betray the interests of Serbia and refused to initiate a discussion of the matter with our Allies. Discussion with our Allies should certainly have been not merely inopportune but unnecessary, on the ground that as a matter of course we should stand by our friends. So long as the attitude disclosed in Lord Robert Cecil's answer represents the policy of the British Government it is childish to expect Balkan neutrals to put any confidence in us. All the time, moreover, we fill the world with our contention that Germany is using her Balkan allies as mere pawns in the game and will be ready to sacrifice their interests to her convenience. We are giving great scope to our enemies to point out that their assertion is true that perfidious Albion is always ready to sacrifice those foolish nations who throw in their lot with her; nor, as will be seen, does our attitude inspire either respect or gratitude in Bulgaria. If we give grounds for the belief that even now we are 15 226 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS prepared to sacrifice Serb interests the effect will be more than unfortunate. In brief, the impression produced would be that to be allied with the Entente would not protect national interests even in the case of success, since they might be sacrificed to a rival and hostile Power, while, on the other hand, openly to join the Central Powers would not preclude the gaining of what is desired at the hands of the Entente itself. In short, to join the latter might bring disappointment in either event, while to side with the former would bring realization. The effect might, of course, be obviated if it were announced that this peculiar privilege is reserved to Bulgaria alone, but even such an announcement might induce undesirable reflection. Our aims should be to encourage our friends by unshakable loyalty, to win the confidence of neutrals by our transparent honesty, and to impress our enemies by the strength of our hostility, rather than to encourage our foes, depress our friends, and give pause to neutrals.1 It remains to consider how far there is any justification for the arguments which are derived from certain alleged tendencies among the Bulgarian people. It is asserted that we must not identify the nation with the policy of King Ferdinand, that a large section of it and of the political leaders are pro-Ententist and have been the objects of coercion, that they are only claiming their co-nationals according to their interpretation (which has been seen in the previous chapter to be in any case without justifica- tion), and that the Bulgarians are not imperialistic. These points can be elucidated with the help of the Bulgarians themselves by means of the notices of articles appearing in the Bulgarian Press, interviews granted by Bulgarian politicians, and signed communications, which in various ways have become known in England. A common assertion is that the Bulgarians are not united in sentiment, and that large sections both of the people and of the politicians are strongly opposed to the course adopted by King Ferdinand, are animated by friendly 1 These words were written before the entry of Eoumania into the war. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 227 feelings towards the Entente, and are only awaiting the first opportunity both to manifest their sentiments openly and to take action upon them. In this connection frequent allusion is made not only to Dr. Danev, the leader of the former Russophil party, but to M. Gesov, who is described as Bulgaria's " moderate " statesman and as being strongly pro-Ententist. Every scrap of news, every despatch from a neutral journalist, giving evidence of bad economic con- ditions in the country, is hailed as further proof of the correctness of these opinions and as being a sign that the day is fast approaching when Bulgaria will turn in her tracks, while an immediate response to any such move- ment is demanded by those who have always held by the Bulgarian legend. Conditions, we are told, are fast becoming unbearable, the Bulgarian army and people are deeply dissatisfied, and the end is not far off. That the economic conditions in Bulgaria have approximated to those of their allies is probably true enough, but that the natural dissatisfaction arising therefrom is a proof of change of purpose is pure hypothesis. Economic conditions in Serbia were long bad, but there was no consequent instability of purpose, and it would be foolish to expect anything different from the Bulgars. That Prussian arrogance is distasteful is also likely enough, but the Bulgarian official classes must have made their people so well acquainted with that particular quality that it is unlikely to produce any real revulsion of feeling, and after all it is only in a comparatively few places that it can be in evidence from the nature of things. There is not the slightest proof of any division of feeling among the Bulgarians ; on the contrary, all the evidence points the other way. The Bulgarian papers are full of abuse not only of Russia and the Russian Emperor but of the other two Powers of the Triple Entente as well, and they are equally insistent on the unanimity of Bulgarian feeling. On January 15, 1916, the Sofia Dnevnik gave some messages for the Orthodox New Year from prominent Bulgarian statesmen. Dr. Gesov, the " moderate," the 228 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS pro-Ententist, said that they were greeting the New Year with a Te Deum to the war and with praises to the Allliance. Dr. Danev, it is true, speaks of striving in ways commensurate with Bulgarian dignity and vital in- terests to facilitate the conclusion of peace. Dr. Genadiev, who has lately, according to report, been arrested, pleads for one effort more. At a later date Dr. GeSov, in an interview with the German Vossische Zeitung, stated that in Bulgarian home politics there was no opposition. Before the war his party had believed in Russia's strength, but as the opinion of Dr. Radoslavov had proved correct Bulgarian politicians could not do otherwise than acquiesce in the present state of affairs. Before the entry of Bulgaria into the war he had declined office not because he was in favour of joining the Entente Powers, but because he wanted a coalition government in order to preserve neutrality. On January 18 the Mir, which is M. Gesov's organ, remarked that the English and French still believed that the Balkan peoples were ready to go knife in hand against their rulers. They had been expecting a revolution in Bulgaria in the event of mobilization. Events had proved the fallacy of their opinion, and now they were believing the same thing of the Greeks. The Socialist leader, M. Sakazov, at the New Year remarked that Bulgaria's destiny was inseparably bound up with the destiny of the Central Powers. According to the Frank- furter Zeitung of January 3 the Democrat M. Liapiev said that no one would hinder the government, and that what had been undertaken must be successfully finished. The Dnevnik, on January 24, alluded to the report which had appeared in the Daily Telegraph of dissatisfaction with King Ferdinand, and in the Daily News of friction between the Bulgarians and the Austro-Germans, and repudiated their accuracy, its own explanation of their appearance being the alleged dissatisfaction in England over the in- troduction of compulsory service, an explanation which perhaps serves to point out the need of caution in accept- ing news of similar character from abroad; probably all THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 229 the belligerents are apt to lay too much stress on reports of bad internal conditions in enemy countries. M. Malinov, who, as well as M. Genadiev, is said to have been arrested, in the debate in the Sobranje on February 28 on the speech from the throne is reported in a Sofia message to the Berliner Tageblatt to have delivered a speech which was distinctly hostile in its general tenor to the govern- ment, but in which he, nevertheless, alluded to the omis- sion in the royal speech of any allusion to Russia, saying that in his opinion Russia in the bombardment of Varna had acted no less disgracefully than England and France in Salonica. It is needless to add that the members of the Bulgarian ministry and the government organs have been equally emphatic in their assertion of Bulgarian unanimity. The statement frequently made that the Bulgarians are after all merely seeking the satisfaction of legitimate national claims, besides being negatived by the rejection of the offers made by the Entente, which included a large area of territory which the Serbs have always claimed as part of the national heritage, as has been seen above, and to which any claim of definite Bulgarian nationality is not borne out by independent testimony, is further shown to be baseless by the extravagant claims on the score of nationality now put forward by the Bulgarians. Thus on December 27 the Mir, the organ of the moderate Dr. Gesov, remarked that the Bulgarians had not joined in the war to conquer foreign territories but to unite their sons of one blood and one faith. At Zajecar and Pirot, at Nis and Leskovac, at Skoplje, Kumanovo, Veles, Prilip, Monastir, Ochrida, Debar, and Kicevo beat the Bulgarian heart and lived the sons of the Bulgarian people. It is no longer then a question of a Bulgarian Macedonia, but apparently of a Bulgarian Serbia as well ! It is not sur- prising therefore to find the Narodni Prava, Dr. Rado- slavov's organ, taking up the same line of thought in an article published on February 4, and dealing with a debate in the Sobranje on the government bill establishing 230 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Bulgarian schools in the occupied territories. Some members, to their honour, had spoken in deprecation of a policy of denationalization. The paper remarked that even if Bulgaria were anxious to denationalize anybody it had no scope for such a propensity. Whom was the State to denationalize in Macedonia or the Morava Valley? The Bulgars perhaps? If any Serbs were living in Pirot, Vranja, or Zajecar they would not be denationalized by Bulgaria, but only so far as by living in the midst of a compact Bulgarian population they would forget their Serbomania. On the two following days the same paper published letters from a "soldier-schoolmaster", a certain Dr. D., alluding to the manner in which the inhabitants of Ni§ quickly pick up their old mother-tongue [the two languages are mutually intelligible and a large part of the vocabulary is practically identical], and advocating the establishment of schools as the best agency for the propa- gation of the Bulgarian tongue among a population which still believed in the return of the Serb government. "When, however, a train was fired on near Sveta Petka, to the north-west of Ni§, the paper quickly discovered the presence of Serbs, and alluded to the incident on January 22 as a manifestation of the impotent malevolence of Serb chauvinism in extremis, and it advocated severe measures against the Serb population — which on other occasions does not exist, being replaced by a people with a Bulgarian heart. It demanded less tolerance and more severity ! Decidedly the Bulgarian appetite grows with satisfaction when all eastern Serbia, including the Morava Valley, is claimed as a genuine Bulgarian land. The claim is of interest, however, for other reasons to be alluded to below. In curious contradiction to some of these claims is an article by Dr. Boris Vazov, a member of Dr. Gesov's party, in the Mir of January 16, in which he paid a tribute to the work of the Serb government and scientific and literary societies in the publication of excellent periodicals and of a scientific popular library. The Bulgarians had neglected their language. In Bulgaria not a single serious literary THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 231 publication could last, there was not a Bulgarian grammar [presumably a scientific grammar of the language], nor an adequate dictionary. All this implies a contradiction of the extreme national claims of his countrymen. In spite of all, therefore, a policy of Bulgarization is needed, and Dr. Vazov calls for it. He avowed frankly that the struggle was one between the two languages, and victory for Bulgaria would only be complete when Bulgarian should predominate in the Balkans. In the occupied territories he said that soldiers and officials were struggling to speak Serb with the population [the sons of the Bulgarian people with the Bulgarian heart] , which was a great mistake. In the same style on January 26, Dr. Ge&ov's paper, the Mir, said in a leading article that the school was the only means of uniting the population of the new territory to that of the old, and the Ministry of Instruction was deserving of praise for its bill for the establishment of schools in the conquered territory. All this sheds a valuable light on Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. We find the Bulgars, in the first place, not less insistent in claiming all eastern Serbia as a true Bulgarian land than they have been in the past in making a similar claim to the former province, a claim which by ceaseless repetition had come largely to be accepted abroad. The worthlessness of the claim in the one case, to say the least casts doubts upon its value in the other quite apart from other considerations, and it ought now to be clear to every one that a Bulgarian claim is not to be regarded as justified merely because Bulgarian chauvinists repeat it ad nauseam. It has been remarked above that originally the population of the Ni§ district of Serbia and of the Sofia district in Bulgaria was of the same indeterminate character as the present population of Macedonia, though now the political boundary has become a genuinely national one. In the pretensions which the Bulgarians are now putting forward we have an undesigned corroboration of the truth of this. It may be agreed that it has been Serb rule and Serb schools which have made the 232 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Nis-Pirot region definitely Serb, but the Bulgarians forget that it has been equally Bulgarian rule and Bulgarian schools which have determined the final character of the Sofia basin. The corollary of the renewal of the Bulgarian claim to NiS would be a revived Serb claim to Sofia and the one is no more absurd and unwarranted than the other. Here at any rate, and this is the second point which emerges from this riotous chauvinism, we have an acknowledgment that the schools have influenced, and definitely crystallized, the national consciousness of the population, though it^may well be doubted whether, once definitely roused and formulated, that consciousness could ever be induced to flow into another channel. If the Bulgarians grudgingly acknowledge that the Serb schools have had this influence on a population which they seek to claim as Bulgar (with- out any justification whatever, for it was never Bulgar but only amorphous), and if they even go so far as to imagine that it could be Bulgarized by the establishment of Bulgarian schools, what then becomes of the contention that the population of central Macedonia, which practically every impartial authority regards as being of an intermediate type, is so definitely Bulgarian that it should be assigned to Bulgaria and that it is incapable of being permanently acted upon by Serb influences ? If the Bulgarian con- tentions be taken at their face value, if they really believe, as they affect to believe, that Ni§ can be Bulgarized, as according to them it has been previously Serbized, then a fortiori central Macedonia even if, as they also assert, of Bulgarian character is capable of yielding to Serb assimila- tion. In short, Bulgarian chauvinists in their frenzied eagerness to claim everything for their country have, accepting their own position, knocked the bottom out of Bulgaria's Macedonian claims. The real truth is that whatever may have been the case in the past, Ni§ is now finally Serb as Sofia is finally Bulgarian, and that the central Macedonians are of an intermediate type which a generation of Serb rule will make as permanently Serb as a generation of Bulgarian rule would make them Bui- THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 233 garian. Finally, we have in the above manifestations of Bulgarian policy abundant evidence of a definite desire and plan to attempt the forcible Bulgarization of a large part of Serbia, which forms an illuminating commentary on the assertion that the Bulgarians value the principle of nationality and are themselves struggling for it. They stand self-confessed as striving for their own racial pre- dominance at the expense of an ancient nationality with a history greater than their own and much more fertile in cultural advancement. Not only do the Bulgarians desire to Bulgarize part of Serbia, but they seek the final and entire destruction of that State. The Berliner Tageblatt of January 30 gives an interview which its Sofia correspondent had had with Dr. Radoslavov, in the course of which he said that Serbia had played out its role for ever and that Austria-Hungary would of course retain what it needed in order to obviate the dangers by which she had been threatened. In the same way on January 7 the Vossische Zeitung reprinted part of a conversation between Dr. MomSilov, the Vice- President of the Sobranje, and the representative of the Hungarian paper Az-Est, in which the former remarked : " Ceterum censeo Serbiam esse delendam ". The Bul- garians who have filled the world with their clamour for the accomplishment of their national unity, as they in- terpret it, are determined so far as they can to prevent the consummation of the unity of the Southern Slavs, and in striving against it they cynically admit their jealousy and anger at the idea that there should be a Balkan State larger, more populous, and more powerful than Bulgaria. In the Westminster Gazette of November 17, 1915, will be found a lengthy extract from an inter- view granted to a German paper by M. Eizov, the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, in which he asserts that a governing motive for the Bulgarians was to prevent Serbo- Croat unity, since if the Southern Slavs were united they would be more powerful than the Bulgarians. It is thus not national rights that the latter desire but their own pre- 234 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS dominance,1 and as they are not numerous enough to achieve that predominance if others are given the liberty of full development, they must be thwarted, divided, left weak, and have their territory partitioned in order that Bulgaria may realize her ambition of being the mistress of the Balkans ; it is the Prussian spirit exactly reproduced in this people which its admirers are always telling us is a peaceful, non-imperialist, peasant democracy. The idea has been expressed with characteristic coarseness and brutality by the Narodni Prava, the government organ, on October 17, 1915, within a week of the declaration of war. In the course of an article on Bulgarian aims it underlined a passage in which it was asserted that the Serbs had taken the lives of the Austrian heir and heiress in order to rea1,-,ze their impracticable chauvinist designs. The foolish S ^b government, said the article, expected to unite to Serbia fifteen millions of Slavs, and the Bulgarians d' V not admit the idea that Serbia should be united to th >se Serbs, therefore the Southern Slav slaves must be joi .ed by the Serbs from the free kingdom of Serbia in t^e Austro-Hungarian cage. On May 19, 1916, the same paper published a leading article under the title " GeneroPity at the Conclusion of Peace ", in which it says: — '•- "Very sc on the Bulgarian diplomats will have to speak at the general peace conference, which will bring about the *Q,**Aj-.iaQ cf. the present war. They will have to demon- ic6 ahead theoretically prove the Bulgarian claims which J-he questioly been fully established by the force of our arms. eignbouringn of Serbia's future and our relations with the definitely forh States, etc., will all have to be discussed and egarded to the uulated. In these matters, especially in -e question of the future of our real enemy — aimofUB^ian.pab]ic^A The nth ^a,?a ls to Sista have never made any secret of the fact that the to £L e* main motive lnestablish a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, are * s ao"8htnent of ^ avowed during the last two years is opposition course correlative r Russia in Constantinople. The two motives * lgai THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 235 Serbia — our diplomats will have to be circumspect, and most important of all they will have to be strictly in- exorable. In this question our diplomats will have to lay aside all sentiment, all humane consideration and feeling. The continued existence of Serbia, no matter in what form, means the subversion of all peace in the Balkans, constant quarrels, and conflicts between Bulgaria and other nations, and a permanent obstacle to the prosperity and peaceful development of Europe. That State, which since the beginning of its independent existence has been a breeding-place of dissension and strife, must be wiped from off the face of the earth, in order to establish an understanding for peaceable cultural work in other nations of Europe and the Balkans. This is neither malice nor barbarity on our part. It is one of the main necessities for the future of humanity, and principally for ourselves and our neighbours. To this question it is most suitable to apply the words of the German political genius, Bismarck, spoken by him on the night from the 1st to the 2nd of September, when the conditions for the sur- render at Sedan and the rounding-up of the French army there were being discussed. Only the brutality of the Iron Chancellor in face of the entreaties of the French secured peace and prosperity to Germany for forty-three years. The relations between Germany and her western neighbour are similar to those between Bul- garia and Serbia. That is why it is the bounden duty of our diplomats to take to heart Bismarck's motto : ' No generosity at the conclusion of peace'". This is the people for whom there are still to be found intriguers in our midst, a people which has never as a nation evinced gratitude for the benefits it has received, and is now actuated by a deadly malice against its neighbour. It is no wonder that the campaign has been waged by the Bulgarians with such ferocity, if such be the ideas by which they are animated. We find here an ex- planation of the systematic looting of the Serb libraries, of the carrying off to Bulgaria all the movable property 236 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAYS which is desired by the government for utilization in its own country, of the theft of agricultural machinery supplied to the Serb peasantry in the manner described in a previous chapter, of, worse than all, the massacres, of which there can be little doubt that they have been guilty. I well remember how in October 1915 a young Serb diplomatist, in conversation with me, with difficulty restrained his emotion as he said, " What we fear is that the Bulgarians will exterminate the population in the districts they enter". On the evidence of German wit- nesses, officers, pastors, and women, backed by documents and photographs, Professor Schiemann had branded Bul- garia's methods of war in 1912-13 as "a disgrace to humanity ", and it is hardly likely with Germany's example before them, and against the Serbs, that the methods of the Bulgarians have become more humane even though they might now obtain a more lenient judgment from the Germans. The Bulgarians do not evince that gratitude towards those in England who have upheld their cause which might have been expected. Sir Edward Grey's efforts on their behalf, and the manner in which during 1915 our Foreign Office subordinated the interests of Serbia to the exigences of Bulgaria and her demand for blackmail, should have earned for him at any rate a measure of appreciation. Those, however, who sacrifice their friends to their enemies while they shake the confidence of the former rarely earn the gratitude, still less the respect, of the latter, who are apt to despise those whom they dupe and of whom they make use. On December 5, 1915, for example, the Narodni Prava published a derisive article, " The bargainings of the bankrupts," directed against the British Premier and Foreign Secretary. England is represented as partition- ing the territories of others in order to bring in the neutrals, as increasing her offers when they prove unsuc- cessful, and when even the increased offers prove to be of no avail, as reducing them to a minimum again. It can hardly be denied that there is a certain painful accuracy THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 237 in this summing up of one aspect of our Balkan policy, and it is exemplified in our dealings with Bulgaria and Greece. The article deals with special severity with the famous promise of aid given, as all the world believed at the time, to Serbia, but afterwards explained away as a promise to Greece if she fulfilled her treaty, and with the Foreign Secretary's explanation that his words " without reserve and without qualification " were a " political " promise, and meant merely that Serbia and Greece would not be required to yield territory to Bulgaria — if the latter attacked them ! « The Narodni Prava represents the Ministers as losing their heads, as making declarations only to deny them, of declaring to-day that they will help Serbia and to-morrow hastening to explain that it was only a "political" promise; they have become, it says, 1 The pertinent passages are as follows : '* Not only is there no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a warm feeling of sympathy for the Bulgarian people. ... If, on the other hand, the Bulgarian mobilization were to result in Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side of our enemies we are prepared to give our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies without reserve and without qualification". —Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, September 28, 1915. This promise seemed as explicit and categorical as it well could be, but it was subsequently evacuated of all intelligible meaning. " On September 24, when I first informed the Serbian government, in answer to an appeal for help, of the despatch of troops, I did so in the words that 'we were offering to Greece to send forces to Salonica to help her to fulfil her obligations towards Serbia ', I said nothing as to what we could, or could not, do in the contingency of Greece refusing to help Serbia. ... As regards the last part of the question, I do not understand how the words ' without qualification and without reserve ' could have any other construction than the political one I have placed on them, viz. that promises and concessions previously suggested to Bulgaria were at an end, and that our troops would be used solely to help our friends and fight our and their enemies ". — Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, November 9, 1915, in answer to Mr. Ronald M'Neill. It surely hardly needed a formal undertaking for people to understand that our troops would only help our friends and fight our enemies 1 Even so the British ministry endeavoured to get out of its undertaking, and the troops at first were forbidden to cross the Serb frontier. 238 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS a mock with their theories on political and non-political promises. From Bulgaria that is indeed black ingratitude, however appropriate such words might seem in the mouth of an Englishman, not to say a Serb. It is, after all, only another exemplification of the old truth that to stand firm by your friends is the only way by which to gain the respect even of enemies. That Bulgaria in certain eventualities would be willing to cut her losses by abandoning her present allies is highly probable. Her past policy shows that she would not be deterred by any scruples of honour or plain dealing, and it is fairly evident that the possibility of another act of betrayal has by no means been lost sight of by her rulers. Just as the Hungarians have endeavoured to make use of the English Press,1 so from Bulgaria there has been in the past the pretence of an existence of a pro-Entente party, so that if ever a change become advisable the plea might be put forward that the Bulgarian nation was not behind King Ferdinand's betrayal of the Slav cause and should not be punished for his mistakes. As has been seen above, that is no more than a pretence in view of the expressed opinions of the so-called pro-Entente leaders. It is very noteworthy that in the discussions which were alleged to have taken place between the Bulgarian and German authorities the former were stated to have pointed out that they have gained their end in the war, and that if further efforts were required further rewards must be promised. What is the assumption underlying this 1 Letters from Hungary, if genuine, pass the Hungarian censor in spite of the fact that they are full of diatribes against Count Tisza. Cud bono t To whose advantage was it that the combined attack upon Serbia was described as bluff up to the last moment ? To whose advantage that the old fallacy of regarding all "Hungarians" as Magyars should still be maintained ? To whose advantage that it should be set forth week by week that the heart of the Magyars is not in the war ? It has been the frenzied chauvinism of the Magyars and their gross misgovernment that has been largely responsible for years for some of the most sinister aspects of the Near Eastern problem. The only reasonable explanation is that the Hungarian government wishes not to be without sympathizers in the Entente camp. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 239 attitude? Primd facie it would seem that Bulgaria's Macedonian ends cannot be considered as attained until the final victory of the Central Powers, and that Bulgaria must go on on pain of losing what she has so far won. The underlying assumption is obviously this, that it is open to Bulgaria at any time to make her peace with the Entente on terms that she should be allowed to retain Macedonia, for only on that assumption could Bulgaria maintain that her ends have been secured and that fresh efforts cannot be required of her. This idea has been fostered in England by those who always stand by Bulgaria. In certain sections of our Press it was frequently pointed out last winter that Bulgaria had won what she was fighting for, and would probably be henceforth lukewarm in the Germanic cause. Again, the assumption is a bargain by which Bulgaria should be allowed to keep at any rate her Macedonian conquests, a bargain which would be dis- honouring in the last degree to any statesman of the Entente who should entertain the idea of entering into it — more dishonouring to him than to the Bulgarian states- man who after betraying one side (by dishonest negotiation) should afterwards betray the other. It is inconceivable after all that has happened — or it should be inconceivable — that such a bargain should be struck. Encouragement was unfortunately given to such ideas in the mind of the Bulgarians by a passage in the interview accorded by M. Sazanov to M. Naudeau, the special correspondent of the Paris Journal, which was telegraphed to England on October 5, 1915 : " That people, the Bulgarian people, Russia created it and cared for it in its trouble. Further, however great may be its errors, maternal Russia will never cast off its child ; she will always be ready to open her arms to it." These words were a direct encouragement to the Bulgarians to hold fast by the idea that whatever they may do, however grievously they may sin against their benefactors, however great their treachery, they have only in the event of the failure of their plans to cry peccavimus to be received again into the arms of Russia and to escape 240 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the consequences of their deeds, or even to receive as a reward for their penitence what they had sought by their wrong-doing. It is fairly certain that they are reckoning on the sentimentality of the Allies. There is a story, the authenticity of which is guaranteed by those from whom it emanates, that a Sofia solicitor, one Ivan Dimitrov, had been staying for some time till the early part of last year in Geneva, and represented himself as an ex-secretary in the Sofia Ministry of the Interior and a personal friend of King Ferdinand. A Belgrade merchant, also staying in Geneva, reproached him for the fact that Bulgaria had attacked Serbia at the moment when Serbia had yielded to her demands. After saying that Bulgaria was bound to join the Central Powers in order to prevent Russia coming to the Dardanelles and to prevent Serbia from becoming larger, which two things the Bulgars must im- peratively hinder, he replied to a question as to what the Bulgars would do in the event of the Allies winning the war, "We will cut off the heads of Ferdinand and Rado- slavov, and afterwards we will go to Petrograd, and fall on our knees in front of the Tsar asking his mercy. Russia will be moved with compassion, and nothing will happen to us ".x Without demanding that anything special should "happen to" the Bulgars, at the very least we should see to it that they should not be allowed to retain their spoils of war.2 We have to remember what would be the position of Serbia if the statement made by the Allies just previous to ' The new Russian Foreign Minister, M. Miljukov, was at onetime a professor in Sofia, and is a very strong Bulgarophil. His expression of Bulgarophil feelings in the French Press during his visit to France and Switzerland last autumn gave rise to some feeling in Southern Slav circles. — Vide La Serbie, September 17, 1916. It is to be hoped that this obsession will find no place in his official policy : we have suffered more than sufficient losses owing to our persistent Bulgarophilism. ■ The manner in which the Bulgars have fought against the Russians ought surely to have destroyed the last illusions on the subject of this people, which demonstratively denies its Slav character, and claims, with justice, to be of Turanian stock and congeners of the Turks and Magyars. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 241 the Bulgarian attack that the offers previously made to Bulgaria had lapsed were to be treated as a scrap of paper and if those offers were to be renewed. The result of the Dalmatian agreement is that Salonica remains for Serbia of practically undiminished importance as giving her a commercial backdoor free of Italian domination, a point the importance of which has been brought out by the analysis given above of the effect of that agreement upon Serbia's future maritime position. The line of the Vardar, which connects her with Salonica, will assume an even greater importance if certain canalization schemes mature. English engineers are already studying the project of making the Vardar and Morava rivers navigable and connecting them by a canal through the relatively easy waterparting which divides their head-streams. Such a canal system would unite Salonica by water-carriage with the Danube and the central European canals connected with it. The great importance of such a project is obvious. If central Macedonia be given to Bulgaria, then the latter will march with the frontier of Albania, which is apparently destined to become an Italian protectorate, and in any case will be in close contact with the district of Valona. As has been seen, on the Adriatic a small stretch of coast from Dubrovnik downwards will be in Serb possession, but above that the coast will be commanded by the Italian islands till at Trogir commences Italian Dalmatia. Northward, again, the Croatian coasts will be commanded by the Italian islands in the Quarnero, which link Italian Dalmatia to Istria. It is obvious, therefore, that Serbia would be entirely cut off from Greece, and could be held tight in an Italo-Bulgarian vice which would render her inde- pendence precarious unless she relied upon some stronger Power. The Powers of the Triple Entente would be even more badly circumstanced from the point of view of render- ing aid than they are at present, for the lines from Salonica to Skoplje and to Monastir would pass through Bulgarian territory ; in fact, they could render no direct assistance of &ny description. North of the Drave, again, would be 16 242 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Hungary, which for some time, at any rate, would be sore at the losses sustained in an unfavourable issue of the war, and only by two narrow necks of land, north-eastward through Koumania and north-westward through German Austria, could Serbia communicate with the rest of Europe. It would, in fact, be difficult to devise any means more calculated to throw Serbia into the arms of Germany, as the only Power which could render direct assistance to her if assailed by a hostile coalition, than the surrender of central Macedonia to Bulgaria, apart altogether from the sentimental and psychological reaction of such a loss. The position of the Southern Slavs will in any case be difficult, as they will be almost surrounded by States which have either lost territory as the result of Southern Slav uni- fication, or are jealous at the prospect of the rise of an important Jugoslav State, and if they are to be altogether cut off from the outside world save through Roumania and Germany, the effect may be such as largely to nullify some of the gains to Europe of a successful result of the war. It is not a mere question of pique or of cutting off the nose to spite the face, but a question of the political results which may follow from the hard facts of political geography. To go to war in order, inter alia, that the Germanic Powers should not completely absorb the Southern Slavs, and to impose terms of peace which might force the latter into the arms of Germany, would indeed be an act of supreme folly. At the moment of writing it is of immediate importance that an unequivocal assurance should be given to the Serbs. Is it really seriously proposed that the Serbs should be asked in conjunction with the Allies to conquer Macedonia, already twice acquired by them at the cost of great bloodshed, only in order that when conquered again it should be handed over to Bulgaria? Doubtless these questions have been asked at the recent conferences by the statesmen of Serbia, who would hardly receive with equanimity any suggestion that they should act as a catspaw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Bulgaria. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 243 The various phases of the problem of Macedonia and the settlement with Bulgaria have now been passed in review, and the conclusions to be drawn from this study are obvious enough. There is no evidence that the Bulgarians are not in substantial accord on the policy that has been pursued by their government ; it has been seen that the so-called pro-Ententist M. Gesov has him- self proclaimed this accord and acclaimed the alliance with the Central Powers. So far are the Bulgarians from fighting merely for the claims of nationality that we find them extending these claims to a large area of the old territory of the modern kingdom of Serbia, and again it has been seen that M. Ge§ov endorses these claims. We find that the Bulgars are pursuing a policy of aggressive imperialism, and are entering upon a campaign of forcible Bulgarization directed against undubitable Serbs. We find the open avowal that they will not permit the union of the Southern Slavs if they can help it, that they are aiming at the complete and permanent destruction of Serbia, that they assert the necessity of Bulgarian predominance in the Balkans, and that it is in fact for the hegemony of the peninsula for which they are struggling. No plea can, therefore, be made out for a special treament of Bulgaria on any of the grounds which have been brought forward by their special friends in this country, or for sharply differentiating their case from that of our other enemies. On every ground alike of honour and policy we are bound to stand by Serbia, our Balkan ally. Though the Balkan crisis was the occasion and not the cause of the war, yet the advance of the Germanic Powers in the Balkans was one of the prime gains which those Powers sought to harvest as the result of the war. Indeed, supposing it to be conceivable that a peace should be patched up by which the Central Empires should be forced to relinquish their gains in the east and west, and to retain their present position in the Near East, their statesmen would probably consider that the war had been well worth while. The 244 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS cause of Serbia, therefore, forms an integral part of the general cause of the Allies, and interest no less than military and political honour demands that that cause should enjoy our full support. No State, not even Belgium, has suffered more in the general struggle, and it is known now, though not at the commencement of hostilities, that the aggres- sion upon Serbia was as deliberate and unprovoked as the attack upon Belgium : this has been determined definitely apart from all arguments drawn from political study by the revelation of Signor Giolitti. That war has been loyally waged by Serbia, which has refused to accept a separate peace even at the time when she was being left to face alone the great attack which was to break down her resistance in the field. It cannot candidly be said that she has during the war received that support and recognition, or even at times sympathy, which as a faithful ally she had a right to expect, apart from the fact that her cause, as will be seen later, is in every sense the cause of England as of France and Russia. It is now coming to be recognized, though even yet only slowly, that a well-nigh fatal mistake was made when she was left to face the double attack alone. It was the Serb army which was acting as a flank guard to our Gallipoli enterprise, and which was, in effect, shield- ing Egypt. This became apparent when that army was forced to yield its ground and to evacuate its territory ; the Gallipoli expedition had to be withdrawn, the Turks in Mesopotamia, with renewed supplies, were able to make head against our army,1 and Egypt was so far in a position to be threatened that large forces were concentrated there for its defence — in short, the whole aspect of the eastern campaign was altered. The debt which we owe the Serbs and our own interests cannot allow us now to play them false and to make a corrupt bargain with their 1 The fall of Kut was a logical result of the fall of Belgrade and Ni§, for without German supplies and German officers it is doubtful how far the Turks could successfully have withstood the advance of the relieving force. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 245 implacable enemies at their expense. I cannot imagine that, in any other circumstances, or with any other pro- tagonists, any such course would be advocated for a moment, but some malign influence seems for years to have manifested itself in our Balkan policy, probably the influ- ences of ignorance, in part, and the sheer indifference to which a British diplomatist alluded some years ago when he said that "England does not care a damn about the Balkans." Added to this has been the curious infatuation which has caused the greater part of our Press and of our publicists to regard Bulgaria as the only Balkan State whose wishes were ever to be considered. It is time to be done with such ignorance and folly. Any sacrifice of Serbia's interests to Bulgarian perfidy now would finally seal our Balkan policy as untrustworthy to those who fight with us, and as plainly lacking in the old British staunchness and sense of honourable obligation. The effect of such a betrayal upon Boumania might be dis- astrous. There is no need to be vindictive in the terms of peace to be imposed upon Bulgaria, not because she has done any- thing to deserve leniency of treatment, but in the future interests of the Balkans. One thing is certain, that Ferdi- nand should have to go as the condition precedent to the granting of any terms of accommodation. Throughout his long reign he has lived in an atmosphere of deceit, low cunning, and chicanery, and he has exaggerated rather than modified favourably precisely those servile vices to which his recently emancipated politicians were already too prone. He has tricked and duped all with whom he has had any dealings, and his retention of power would in itself con- stitute an absolutely unconditional condemnation of the schemes to which reference has been made. There can be no question of any concessions to Bulgaria, in any event in central Macedonia, for the reasons already given. Nor, indeed, if Bulgaria is to be treated like any other enemy can there be any question of territorial gains at all at the expense of Serbia. It cannot be too often repeated that 246 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS neither before 1912 did Serbia recognize the justice of Bulgaria's Macedonian claims, nor did the delimitation clauses of the 1912 Treaty constitute any such recognition, nor still less did the concessions acquiesced in by Serbia on September 1, 1915, which latter were nothing more than blackmail extorted from her by the military necessi- ties of the moment and the importunity of her allies. Neither in honour nor in policy can there be any reopening of negotiations with Bulgaria. Such negotiations have already cost us dear. It is true that Greece was bound by the terms of her treaty with Serbia to come to the aid of the latter, but it must not be forgotten that, when from the necessities of Serbia her allies wrung such great con- cessions for her enemy, we at the same time destroyed the raison d'etre of the treaty from the point of view of Greece. The treaty was designed to prevent such an aggrandizement of Bulgaria as might lead to the estab- lishment of a Bulgarian hegemony, and to secure a common Serbo-Greek frontier — objects which were frustrated largely or completely by the concessions in question. The con- cessions, it is true, were withdrawn, but it is not altogether surprising if the Greeks were unable to keep pace with those sudden and pitiably undignified reversals of policy so trenchantly satirized by the Bulgarian official organ already quoted.1 What would be the effect produced if that with- drawal were itself withdrawn ? What little credit for states- manship, for stability of purpose, for understanding of the Balkan position which still remains to us would be entirely lost, and we should be left with a reputation for naked perfidy. As Bulgaria has elected to throw in her lot with the Central Empires, she must abide the result. As for any genuine movement of Bulgarian opinion in a direction hostile to King Ferdinand and favourable to the Allies, it has already been seen that there is no ground whatever for such an assumption. That when an advance is made by 1 It is true that the later policy of Greece has been moulded by the personal will of the King, but it is undeniable that the position of M. Venizelos was badly shaken by the course of the Allied diplomacy. THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA 247 the Allies, and the plotters of Sofia see that the game is up, there will be the pretence of such a movement is more than likely, as also that it will meet with a response in certain quarters of England ; but if we would be true to ourselves and to our friends, such a feigned repentance should not modify the Macedonian settlement. When Bulgaria declared war one or two writers, not hitherto conspicuous for their support of Serbia's cause, in the first flush of anger, characterized by a passage from one extreme to the other, spoke wildly of a possible dis- appearance of Bulgaria, and one of them concluded a paragraph with the words "finis Bulgariae ". There can be no end of a nation short of extermination ; and while the Bulgarians have no claim on our regard, it would be foolish and detrimental to the interests of all concerned to partition the territory of Old Bulgaria,1 it would be a mere copying of the action which has brought Bulgaria into disrepute. That Ferdinand should be dethroned and that Bulgaria should be confined roughly to the limits of the Treaty of Bucharest, together with the loss of all hopes of Balkan hegemony will be punishment sufficient. Placed under the rule of a Slav prince with a thorough purge of those political elements which have dragged her down there is still a chance that Bulgaria may settle down to a peaceful and orderly development undisturbed by the mirage of a Balkan empire. She would still retain all the lands (excepting indeed the southern Dobrudza) which are indubitably Bulgarian, and would therefore lack the incentive to an adventurous policy which would be furnished by the grievance of a partition of the genuinely national territory; and while, as I have said, the idea of an approximate Serbo-Bulgarian friendship is Utopian, and any policy based upon such an idea foolish, yet no 1 Minor rectifications apart. In Macedonia the Serbs should be given Strumica as a safeguard for the Salonica railway, which at this point the present frontier closely approaches. The Bulgars in December 1914 utilized this salient to cut the railway at a critical juncture when Serbia was short of munitions. 248 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS unnecessary hindrance should be placed in the way of an eventual rapprochement between the two States. We stand pledged, moreover, to the principle of nationality, and our sincerity should be proved in the case of Bulgaria, perfidious enemy though she has been. Upon a review, then, of all the factors in the problem, the past history of Macedonia, its ethnographic charac- teristics, the Treaty of 1912, Bulgaria's two attacks upon Serbia, our obligations in honour to a sorely tried ally, the fact that Bulgaria is fighting for predominance and the complete extinction of her hated rival, the unanimity in this course which characterizes Bulgarian statesmen and the Sobranje, and their support of King Ferdinand, such should be the nature of the settlement with Bul- garia— restriction to the boundaries of the Treaty of Bucharest. We must have an end of the pro-Bulgar sentimentalism which, exhibited in the greater part of the Press and by almost all our publicists, has tended to obscure counsel, and to dismay our friends and allies by a display of weakness without excuse ; we must have done with the folly which to all that has gone before would add this last, that Serbia should even now be sacrificed and Bulgaria should gain by her stab in the back what she sought. We have one good and loyal friend in the Balkans, and that is the Serb people, and it is the Serbs and their interests which must form the pivot of our Balkan policy. CHAPTER VIII THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE It cannot be said that the proposals set forth in the foregoing chapters are conceived in a spirit of blind adherence to the most extreme Southern Slav opinion, for in several directions, as has been said, they fall consider- ably short, for the reasons given, of what has been claimed by some, at any rate, of their spokesmen. On the other hand, stress has been laid on those claims which are in- dubitably justified, though in some directions they have been notably infringed by the diplomacy of the Entente, a circumstance which has vastly enhanced the difficulty of making moderate proposals in other directions and of avoiding the appearance of consistently loading the dice against the Southern Slavs. A brief conspectus of the elements of the new Southern Slavdom as above outlined may be of use. The State would be, considered as a whole, remarkably homogeneous, since only in the north-east and south-west would there be any appreciable admixture of alien elements. The vast bulk of the population would be composed of Southern Slavs. Of these the Slovenes inhabit the area to the west of the present Croatian frontier with a large majority of Croats in eastern Istria. It has already been pointed out that though they have been for centuries under the Habsburg sway, and were formerly noted for their loyalty — they are said to have given as their reason 849 250 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS for not rising in 1848 that they had not been ordered to do so by the Emperor — they have now become fully possessed of the consciousness of their race brotherhood with their Serbo-Croat neighbours, with whom they pro- claim their essential solidarity and unity. The total number of the Slovenes is about 1,400,000. Next to them come the Serbo-Croats, the term used as a common designation for these two branches of the race. The Serbs and Croats are ethnologically one people, speaking one language, with but slight tribal differences. By race the inhabitants of Croatia, a great part of Slavonia with the exception of Syrmia or Srem, and northern Dalmatia are Croat, while the inhabitants of Syrmia, the Serb Vojvodina of Hungary, southern Dalmatia, Bosnia, the Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia belong to the Serb stock. Politically, however, the real division is by religion, Orthodox Croats considering themselves Serbs, and Catholic Serbs considering themselves Croats, and in that sense the terms will be used in this section. It is, however, to be noted that there is a certain misuse of terms in speaking of the Hercegovinian Catholics — among the purest Serbs — as Croats, and on the other hand that the Dalmatians in recent years have become among the warmest partizans of a greater Serbia. The Serbs, including Orthodox Croats, use the national phonetic alphabet known as the Cyrillic, akin to the Russian, and ultimately derived from the Greek. It has discarded useless letters such as c (which is either k or s) and has added others, its phonetic quality greatly aiding the work of education. The Croats use the Latin alphabet, but with various diacritic marks in order to render the sounds of the language : this is the only " correct " way of spelling Serb words in our alphabet, and it is a pity that it is not generally followed. In the Austrian crown-lands the Croats number some 700,000, of whom 168,184 are to be found in Istria, and the remainder in Dalmatia, where the river Cetina marks the old boundary between Croat and Serb. In the Hungarian crown-lands, the kingdom of Croatia- Slavonia has a population of over THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 251 2,621,954, of whom 1,638,354 are Croats, and 644,955 Serbs. There are some 300,000 Croats and Slovenes in the south-west of Hungary between the Mur and the Drave and in the adjacent region. Next in geographical order come the Serbs. " In Bosnia there are three religions but only one nationality — the Serb ". So wrote Baron von Kallay in that history of the Serbs which, as he used to relate, was the first book he put on the Index when, after the occupation of Bosnia, he became governor. Using the two terms " Serb " and 14 Croat ", however, in their political sense, we find in Bosnia some 856,158 Serbs, 451,686 Croats, and 626,649 Serb Moslems. The last-named include the old nobility of Bosnia, who became renegade on the conquest in order to preserve their position. The " Croats " here are entirely Serb by race, as can be seen by their geographical distri- bution in the following table, where it will be noticed that the Orthodox are strongest in north-west Bosnia, nearest Croatia, while the Catholics are strongest in the centre and south-east. The figures are those of the census of 1895, as I have not been able to find the figures of any later census given in the same manner. They serve to indicate, however, the distribution of creeds in Bosnia and the Hercegovina. Orthodox. Mohammedan. Catholic. Bosnia — Sarajevo 72,904 111,984 38,096 Banjaluka 195,039 78,016 59,493 Bikac 101,152 81,777 8,726 Dolnja Tuzla ... 150,814 155,780 49,080 Travnik 78,448 69,940 90,559 Hercegovina — Hostar 74,889 56,135 88,188 673,246 548,632 834,142 43 per cent. 35 per cent. 21 per cent. The areas are those of the six " circles " into which the country was divided by the Austrians. The Krajina 252 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS >a th r-t t-t O i-H A o O B T-t CJ rH CQ CQ to n B EH p O CQ H EH O o P Pm O (^ Q < « <1 III i I I I I I a i l i os •«* eo o rH^ tH OS I I I I 8 S 2 S 03 o © I I I I I I I I I I I I 3 I i 8 III II i-i r-i CO •2 2» as S » lis * ■>* CO o 1 of rH t- ll CO P4 f-H iH 4g co 0 I l> iH CO 0 1 r-T ck CO t- d 1 ■<* tH CD o 1 o tH T-i o Pi i 9 c 00 c ? tr-nd 5 op ■* g W3 to o o « - ■* o 3 CO Pi 00 co t © CD | oT a t- 00 ■ © r-T & OS -u" 3 d i «o rH ■ B i to »b oo d CM 3 -* CD «o Pi s O CO 8 iH a o co o CD Pi 1 CO B M o rH 92 CO of Pi § eo o i-l d ft- «o a CO "<* 8 eo IO C5 o * B 5 a o S3 © -2 <5 BlC c3 o «SmSSS.2^§3 o _, B^ 5 fc cs £ .2 « 2 -3 d JS c« g-^rS 3' >"e8 CN § JjCO ,2 49 Ct ■si ^» o g£ h°mo r d oa gen fl°m l^coSS^Q^. lllllis* OQ t-l -5 .O CO K rH ,**"' H CD 'Ci. o U eo •- Q gllf;JSg| Sod „ 9 ■ d co*^ q rtj*3 SI d^s-** • •**• • Mad eh EH "".a EH Eh „ 2 " o s d S 2 ^io g^co .a 5 1 S 9 H23 254 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS or "Turkish Croatia", as it is sometimes called in our maps, is the most predominantly Orthodox portion of Bosnia. In the kingdom of Serbia, in its extent before the Balkan wars, there were 2,778,706 Serbs and about 200,000 of other races, the most numerous being Roumanians and Cechs. Of the population of its newly acquired territories there are no good statistics, and the most that is possible is an intelligent guess which should disregard the extreme claims of partizans. Probably 550,000 would be a fair estimate of the Serbs in Old Serbia, the Serb share of the sanjak of Novipazar, and in what the Serbs call Skoplian Old Serbia, i.e. the districts of Kumanovo, Skoplje (Uskub), and Tetovo. In its new territories Serbia prob- ably embraces some 250,000 Albanians, of whom a large number live in the Debar and Ochrida districts of Mace- donia, while there may be in central Macedonia some 550,000 Macedonian Slavs. In these regions all estimates are hopelessly at variance and irreconcilable, and the majority are not even plausible, but the estimate is some- where near the mark. The Serb population of Montenegro is estimated at about 500,000. In southern Hungary, formerly known as the Serb Vojvodina, there is a numerous Serb population, of whom some 250,000 would fall to the new State. A conspectus of the whole therefore yields the following results. In the triangle of territory between the Drave and Danube on the north, as far as Negotin, and the Adriatic from Istria to Bar (Antivari) on the south-west, there is a population of nearly 11,000,000 of Southern Slav stock, who occupy that area to the practical exclusion of any other people, the majority of whom could be, and ought to be, included in the " Greater Serbia " of the future. The area is compact, geographically well defined, and homogeneous. The chart on pages 252 and 253 gives in tabular form the area and population of the Southern Slav State on the basis of the proposals made above. If the treaty with Italy be carried out as signed, then THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 255 a reduction must be made in respect of Dalmatia of some 370,000 Croats, 80,000 Serbs, and 13,000 Italians, the figures for Istria and Gorica-GradiSka disappear, and some 100,000 Slovenes, besides some Germans, must be deducted from the population of Kranjska. The totals would read roughly as follows, the percentages moving slightly against the Southern Slavs as a whole, but slightly in favour of the Serbs by themselves : — w ( , a to M E ■ to "5 O E O o o 53 in d a 3 3.2 M 3 oo a B i 1 § ■ a 3 O 3 o hi N 86,604 6,095,463 2,321,408 626,649 874,628 32,859 [300,000] 170,472 260.000 199,982 10,879,703 9,918,148 II There remains the important question of the form to be taken by the future Southern Slav State, the relations which will subsist between the different provinces as we know them. This is a subject on which it is impossible for a foreigner to dogmatize ; it is pre-eminently a matter for internal solution. It is of good augury that no cut- and-dried plans exist in this regard. Serbia will leave the form to be taken by these relations to the people of the new territories, it will not endeavour to force a predetermined solution — "In Belgrade", said Professor Cviji6 to the writer, " we have no policy in this matter, only ideas". At the same time it is hignly important that the matter should be fully considered in an informal manner betimes, since when the time comes for a definite decision the leaders of the nation should be in a position to give some clear guidance to the people ; nor is a dis- cussion of the matter by a foreigner altogether out of place, if only on the assumption that onlookers see most of the game and that freedom from local influences leads 256 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS to an impartial judgment. There are obviously three forms which may be taken by the new State : it may be a federation of the existing provinces, it may be a dual Serbo-Croat monarchy, or it may be a unitary kingdom. There has been a good deal of somewhat vague talk of a future Southern Slav federation, so that it may be well to commence with a consideration of that solution of the problem. With some " federation " like " Meso- potamia" is a word of blessed import. Federation has been suggested for all manner of States as a cure for all manner of ills, taking rank as a panacea only after the grant of a constitution after the latest British model. In part this fondness for the idea may be the result of the example of the United States, in part due to the insistence of our own Imperial problem, which so far as it admits of formal solution can be solved only on the basis of a federal or rather confederate system, in part to the formation of the German Empire. This has led to the theoretical consideration of the applicability of the idea to States which like the United States cover a vast area, and to those States which number within their confines a variety of races, the latter application being directly suggested by the success of the Swiss Confederation. There has been, however, a tendency to apply the idea somewhat indiscriminately to those States whose con- ditions hardly call for a formal federal system, and to others which lack the internal cohesiveness which in Switzerland is largely the result of pressure from with- out, of its situation between the Great Powers. In par- ticular have theorists been prone to press its application to the Balkan Peninsula as a whole. In the formation of a federal State a strong common interest is essential, as otherwise there is no basis on which to build. On the other hand, if the interest be very close and the political, social, and economic conditions not too markedly dissimilar, there will be a desire not for a federal but for a unitary government. There is all the difference again between federalism as a means of uniting THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 257 under one supreme government elements which would otherwise stand apart, and its employment for splitting up an already united people, while the instance of a people unwillingly united in a unitary State forms a third case. If the interest be not close then there is no possibility of federation, and consequently talk of a Balkan federation lacks political "reality". It is very well to say that the Balkan Peninsula forms a geographical unit, that it seems marked out by nature to be the home of a single strong Power, and that the highest interests of its peoples would be best served by a cordial co-operation in a federal State, but if the peoples themselves do not desire this union, if on the contrary some of them have been secular enemies all such arguments are beside the mark. It would be well for Europe if French and Germans, and English and Germans, could heartily co-operate with mutual respect, esteem, and liking, but we have to take the world as it is and human nature as we find it. In the Balkans the secular struggle between France and " the Empire " has its counterpart, as remarked before, on a smaller scale in the secular enmity of Serb and Bulgar, and Greek and Bulgar. It is absolutely mischievous to talk, as some have talked and talk, of imposing some such solution on the Balkans as a whole ; it cannot be done in the first place, and in the second place, if the idea leads to the proposal of measures to be adopted with an eye to an ultimate solution which is impracticable, the result will be neither the ideal solution nor the next best but a series of measures adopted in one plane of ideas which will be worked out in another. Professor Freeman considered the Balkans as offering ideal ground for the establishment of a monarchical federation, but since he wrote the old feuds have broken out anew and have been exacerbated by recent events to an extent which puts off indefinitely, I fear, the day when Balkan lambs will willingly lie down with Balkan lions. It is very necessary, not merely in the case now being 17 258 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS considered but, in all discussion of the idea of federation, to keep clearly in mind the distinction between the two main types of a federal system, between the Staatenbund or confederation of States otherwise sovereign and the Bundesstaat or federal State. In the former type the central executive, except in the matter of the assigned functions, can only act on the citizens, if at all, through the medium of the State governments. In this form each State of the confederation is a sovereign State and retains all the attributes and powers of a sovereign State except in respect of those functions and powers which are ex- pressly assigned to the federal authorities, i.e. to the central executive and the federal Parliament, and also to the federal judiciary, which in this type is apt to become of necessity a co-ordinate authority under the federal Constitution. Sovereign powers belong to the States, and these States delegate certain powers to the federal authorities. In the second type, the Bundesstaat or federal State, the conditions are reversed ; the central government can act upon the citizens directly; sovereign powers belong to the Union and the separate States enjoy only such powers as are delegated to them by the central government. In the first case, sovereign States combine in a confederacy and delegate certain definite powers to the common government ; in the second case, a sovereign State delegates certain powers to local authorities ; and the distinction still remains vital even if in the second case the powers possessed by the component parts be as extensive as the reserved sovereign rights of the different States in the former, for the central government, if sovereign, can vary the powers of the local governments, while if the latter be sovereign no such variation is possible without an alteration of the Constitution which inevitably is a difficult and complicated business. In spite of the fact that in the American Civil War it was the party known as the Federals who were victorious over the Confederates, the United States are an example of a Staatenbund or confederation of States and not of THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 259 the more unitary type. Each of the States of the American Union is a sovereign State, and the Federal Government only enjoys delegated powers, a point which has many times proved of great practical importance, and which accounts for the elaborate measures necessary for any change in the Constitution, which represents in effect a treaty between the different States composing the Union. Of the second type, the Bundesstaat or federal State, Canada is an example, and this sharply differentiates its case from that of the United States. It is true that Professor Dicey » has insisted strongly, in spite of some Canadian criticism, on the fundamental identity of the two Constitutions, and to disagree with such an authority on his own ground may seem presumptuous, but the dis- tinction noticed above seems to be fundamental in the literal sense of the word and does in effect modify very considerably the working of the two governments in the internal affairs of the two countries. It is difficult to see an essential identity, however close may be the likeness of their outward form and even of a great deal of their everyday working, between two Constitutions in one of which the sovereignty lies with the central govern- ment while the local legislatures possess only delegated power, while in the other the local governments are sovereign while the central government enjoys only delegated power. The difference in the assigned powers respectively, and therefore in the practical working of the two Constitutions, is brought out in the analysis of the attributes of the central and local governments in the two countries given by the Professor himself.2 The fact strongly insisted on by him that the constitution of the Dominion under the terms of the British North America Act can only be altered, except within narrow limits, by the sovereign power of the British Parliament, does not seem to be essential to the form of government in Canada, whose federal Parliament might have been given full * A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, pp. 157 *q. Fifth edition. * Vide A. V. Dicey, op. cit. Appendix, Note II, pp. 410 sq 260 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS rights of amending the Constitution, and though the limita- tion provides a certain resemblance to the difficulty of amending the United States Constitution, it does not invalidate the distinction drawn above. Indeed, so great is the contrast that the Dominion Government has even the power of disallowing a Provincial Act which falls within the powers assigned to the Provincial Legislatures by the Constitution.1 The distinction is by no means of theoretical value only. Hamilton in 1789 thought that the individual States were too independent, and in practice to-day we find such flagrant evils as the diversity of marriage laws in dif- ferent States, while the Federal supervision of inter- State traffic, for example, has presented great difficulties and internal State traffic lies outside the scope of Federal authority. In some cases legal fictions have come to the aid of the Federal Executive. When Australia was federalized various circumstances, such as the fact that Western * Australia was cut off by land from the other colonies, the jealousy between New South Wales and Victoria, and the strongly developed local independence of all the colonies, led to the adoption of a confederation, Staatenbund, and the results have in many ways hardly confirmed the wisdom of the choice. Conflicts of authority have been numerous, and a large section of the electorate is in favour of an increase in the power of the federal authorities. Possibly it was with this example before its eyes that South Africa in forming its Union, mindful also of the grave danger of the old jealousies breaking out in a fresh form, framed its Constitution on the Canadian model. This apparent digression will, perhaps, have served the purpose of enabling a consideration of a possible Southern Slav federation to be approached with a clear idea of what may be involved. It will be apparent that the looser form of confederation is not called for in their case by the ' Dicey, ut supra, p. 412, cit. British North America Act, 1867, s. 90, and Bourinot, Parliamentary Practice and Procedure, pp. 76-81. THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 261 necessities which may make that form the best attainable. The territory of the Southern Slavs is not so extensive as to require the subdivision of its area for purposes of administrative convenience and efficiency, neither is it inhabited by diverse races, nor by populations which have long possessed a complete internal autonomy which they might be unwilling to relinquish. Nor does there seem any necessity for the closer form of federation on the Canadian model for the reasons just recited. The great argument for a federal system arises when it serves to unite those who for national or physical reasons cannot combine willingly or conveniently in a unitary State. One of the advantages of federal government is the combination of national unity with a strong local patriotism, while the exercise of an extensive local government gives a higher political education to a large number of the citizens. On the other hand, the central power tends to be weak at the extremities, especially in the case of a Staatenbund. An instance of the danger to be faced in this respect was afforded by the dispute between the United States and Japan over the anti-Japanese legislation of California. Complaints addressed to the federal government elicited the reply that the matter lay within the competence of the State sovereignty of California, and that the central executive possessed no coercive jurisdiction in the affair, a response which gave rise to the light-hearted jest that the United States should rather be called the Disunited States. The problem assumed the most serious proportions. If the central authority had no sympathy with the legislation in question against whom did a remedy lie ? If the Japanese had recourse to the ultimata ratio against California could the federal authorities stand aside? If not the wheel of diplomatic argument came full circle again. Even the closer organization of Canada has not relieved the Domi- nion government of problems similar though less serious. A federal system for the Southern Slavs might tend to perpetuate the local particularism of the different provinces, and the race has suffered so much in the past from its 262 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS internal divisions that any Southern Slav statesman should be careful in the extreme before advocating a system which might perpetuate or exalt similar divisions in the future, and they should be on their guard against the surface attractions of federalism. The bitter misfortunes which have made the history of the race an age-long tragedy, and its present parcelling out among different jurisdictions, have led to an overpowering desire for a real and unequivocal unity. It must be remembered also that the Skupgtina would not be burdened with the concerns of an extensive empire, while the vice of over-centralization does not postu- late for its avoidance a fully developed federal system. " Federal government means weak government. ... A federation, therefore, will always be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of equal resources ",I The Southern Slavs are not so circumstanced that they can afford to neglect any element of strength ; after the war they will be faced by jealous neighbours, at whose expense their unity will have been achieved, and the stronger they are the more likely are they not only to maintain their own position, but to preserve peace in their part of the world. Attention has been directed to the different level of culture attained by the various territorial divisions of the Southern Slavs, but that consideration argues rather for a unitary government, since under a federal system the different provinces might be governed under varying standards of administrative efficiency, unless the actual administrative personnel in the more backward provinces were supple- mented from the more developed. In that event, however, the argument for federation would seem pro tanto to fail, and there would still remain a varying level of legislative competence. The resources of the whole should rather be applied to the development of the whole. On the other hand, a federal system accompanied by the counter-checks which are present in the American constitution makes for a certain stability and continuity of policy.* It is doubtful, 1 A. V. Dicey, op. cit, pp. 162, 163. ■ Vide Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 53 ta. THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 263 however, how far this system of counter-checks could be transplanted. On the whole, then, the balance of argument is decisively against a federal system for the Southern Slavs, as unnecessary, not being required by the extent of area of their country, diversity of racial elements, or past political freedom in the provinces ; as being fraught with the danger of particularism ; as likely to be accompanied by a varying standard of legislative and administrative efficiency which would be a great weakness for the State as a whole ; as not providing for the best possible utilization of the strength of the nation in its cultural elements ; as dissipating instead of strengthening the concentration of the national energy ; as being more expensive and less efficient ; and as tending to weaken the nation's international position. The second form which might be taken by Southern Slav union is that of a dual State. If Serbia, Bosnia, southern Dalmatia, Montenegro, Syrmia, and the Serb portions of southern Hungary were united into a single State the result would be a kingdom whose population would be overwhelmingly Orthodox Serb with a Catholic Croat minority of about ten per cent, of the Serb numbers, as a glance at the table in the preceding section will show. If the remainder of the Southern Slav lands were formed into another State, Croatia, northern Dalmatia, eastern Istria, and the Slovene country, or such portions of them as may be left to their natural possessors after the appetites of others have been gratified, the resulting kingdom would be overwhelmingly Catholic Croat and Slovene. These two States could be united in a Southern Slav dual monarchy upon a close basis — closer than that of the present Habsburg monarchy. The idea at first sight is not without its attractions. Some such scheme seems to have been at the basis of Russian proposals in 1915, and it was advocated by the present writer in an article written at that time, but further reflection has considerably modi- fied the opinion then advocated. The very points which at first blush indicate such a solution as desirable tell to a large degree against it. The two elements of the State 264 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS would certainly be very homogeneous, but in that homo- geneity would be a danger for the future unity of the whole. The fact that one-half of the monarchy would be Orthodox Serb and the other Catholic Croat would tend to give a sharp, and more disruptive, note to any disputes between the two, and disagreements might even harden into a certain antagonism, or at any rate jealousy ; it would in some ways make it harder for either to give way to the other. The old distinction between those Southern Slavs whose past history has been linked with the fortunes of the house of Habsburg, and those whose fortunes have been specifically Balkan, would be renewed and stereotyped, and the ultimate result might be fraught with danger to the hardly won unity of the race. Such a solution would not, of course, preclude a future fusion in a unitary State, and would for the time being preserve the intensive strength of each of the kingdoms. It was this last argu- ment, that the Serbs should preserve the solidarity which has been their great strength, and should avoid the sacrifice of intension to extension that formerly weighed with the writer. The war, however, has forged still more strongly the links of national solidarity, has indicated still more vividly the danger of disunion and the advantages of full fusion, and it is doubtful whether the argument now carries the weight that might formerly have been attached to it. More and more it has become evident that the different branches of the Southern Slavs are resolved on a real union even though the exact form be not settled. Experience has shown the extreme difficulties which attend the working of a dualistic system of government. Neither the personal union (with a common Foreign Office but separate armies, etc.) of Sweden and Norway, nor the closer union of Austria and Hungary, has given good political results. This seems to lie in the nature of the case. In a federal system the majority opinion will be composed from time to time of varying combinations of States, but in a dualistic system whenever there is disagree- ment it is of necessity always between the same two parties. THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 265 If one of them usually succeeds in getting its way a sense of soreness and of inferiority will be engendered in the other. If, on the other hand, there is in general unanimity on most important matters, or at any rate an even see-saw, then to that extent a dualistic system seems uncalled for unless it be demanded by local considerations and con- ditions in the two halves of the State.1 The difficulty of course is the greater when it is a genuine dualism between two equal partners, and not a mere matter of granting an extended measure of local self-government to a certain area in an otherwise unitary State, for it is the very equality which is apt to make the citizens watch with jealous regard that the equality be not infringed. At the same time, there is in theory no reason why two States each managing its own internal affairs should not find themselves fundamentally at one on the great matters common to both — the army, foreign affairs, trade policy, banking and commercial legislation — nor why such divisions as may exist on these matters should not be cross-divisions affect- ing the citizens and legislators of each State equally — divisions horizontal rather than vertical. The arguments, perhaps, are somewhat nicely balanced, save for the warning that history seems to give, though even here it must be remembered that historical analogy is at once the most facile and most dangerous of arguments, depending upon an identity of causes which seldom exists for the validity of the deduction sought to be made. . There can be no doubt that the complete fusion of the Southern Slavs in a single unitary State would be, if it can be effected and if it be the desire of the race, the ideal solution of the problem of their national union. A unitary government is the strongest form of government, and a unitary State can act with a decision and promptness which cannot in general be achieved by any other. The 1 I mean that theoretically the two halves might have a common opinion in common matters, but different opinions relative to internal matters. This divergence, however, could only arise by reason of great differences of local conditions. 266 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS case of the German Empire is no real exception to this rule, for its constitution is anomalous. While the relations between Prussia and Bavaria partake of the character of a Staatenbund, the relations of Prussia with the minor States are those of a strict Bundesstaat, and it was for that reason that Bismarck, as readers of his reminiscences and of Prince Hohenlohe's memoirs will remember, was by no means anxious to force the pace of internal union be- tween 1866 and 1870, since he was anxious that the southern States should find themselves forced eventually to come in on Prussia's terms, and the concessions made to Bavaria were always regarded rather as a matter of necessity than as being desirable in themselves. In spite of these concessions, the constitution of the German Empire gives an almost complete predominance in all matters of common concern to Prussia, a predominance which is enhanced by the constitutional position of the Emperor and the abso- lutism in the ministry of the Chancellor, facts which make for prompt decisions. The arguments which might be adduced against a Southern Slav unitary State have been noticed from time to time above and need only be sum- marized here. They rest on the different degrees of cultural development attained by the different divisions of the race, the difference of historical development and of historical tradition which has distinguished the Serbs on the one side from the Croats and Slovenes on the other, the danger of the enthusiasm for unity cooling when the race is delivered from alien domination, and the difficulties which will attend the amalgamation and co-operation of political parties which have been formed in consequence of different needs and for the pursuit of different sets of objects in the past. On the other hand, the answers to these arguments have also been brought forward in discussing the various problems that affect the future of the race. We have had the testimony of various spokesmen of the race to the desire for unity, and the opinion that the feeling is permanent and deliberate, and the result of definitely con- ceived judgments borne in upon all sections as the great THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE 267 and lasting lesson of the past. In any case, change will be inevitable as the result of the war in the composition and outlook of the various political parties, and complete fusion would afford the opportunity, and carry the necessity, of fresh political groupings to meet the new conditions, and such changes casting the parties adrift from their old moorings would be in fact a boon and enable the politicians to approach the future freed from the trammels of the past. It has been observed above that the religious division no longer operates as it has done, Orthodo*x and Catholic priests have enlisted under the same national banner and have suffered in the same cause as good Southern Slavs. In short, as a unitary government is the strongest and in itself the most desirable, so it appears to be the goal at which the Southern Slavs are consciously aiming. The race is certainly less divided than was the Italian at the time of the risorgimento , and in the latter case we know that federal schemes had to give way to the desire for complete fusion in spite of the great distinction which still exists between north and south. The title of the new State and the style of its sovereign are matters for the Southern Slavs to decide for themselves. The term Jugoslavia (Southern Slavia) has come into common use of late, yet it is perhaps permissible to hope that no newfangled term will supersede old terms which have an historical past behind them. Only superficial people will lightly deride old historic- terms, formulae, and styles, for they carry with them the flavour of past glory as of past suffering, form part of the complex texture of race and government, and have a real even though often un- perceived influence in moulding the thoughts, the reverence, and the sense of historic continuity of the citizens. It has been suggested that perhaps a personal style may be assumed by the King — King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. No foreigner can dogmatize, but the present writer confesses to a great dislike — not very reasonable — to this style. Possibly it may be the result of that sorry episode when the King of France was succeeded by a 268 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS King of the French in a reign of appalling commonplace, while the Tsar of the Bulgars has not made the style more grateful. I confess to the hope that the renewal of ancient glories may see a revival of the title of Tsar, and that we may see the old King Peter end his days as Tsar of Serbia, King of Croatia and Slovenia. No in- feriority would be imputed to Croatia in such a style. It is true that in practice the title Tsar or King of Serbia would be colloquially used, but that would be the case also if the pergonal style were adopted. No one speaks of the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ; to the world at large he is the King of England, nor is any grievance felt save perhaps among the Scotissimi of London ! The Scotch probably think of him as King of Scots, and in the same way good Croats could think of their ruler as King of Croatia. Jugoslovenski (Southern Slav) would serve as the adjectival qualification of the functions of the Southern Slav Monarchy. Trivial matters, perhaps these — to those who do not understand that senti- ment, Bismarck's imponderabilia, is a very hard fact and closely to be reckoned with. CHAPTER IX SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE In whatever form the unity of the Southern Slavs be accomplished, the new State will have to face many urgent problems not only in the political sphere but in the economic and social. The first question is that connected with the German element. Allusion has been made already to the position of the Germans in the territories which may be taken into the new State and to the possibility of taking comprehensive measures to guard against the dangers which their presence might bring. There is, of course, no question as to the German and Magyar functionaries employed in various capacities in the administration of Bosnia central and local, and in the Banat, or of the same elements which have been foisted upon the kingdom of Croatia. They will, of course, dis- appear and return to their own countries. The Austro- Hungarian government has also since the occupation of Bosnia introduced various " strategic " colonies of Germans and Magyars (also some Poles), who have been planted in order to break up the Slav solidarity of the country, and similar colonies are to be found in Syrmia. There can be no valid objection to the expulsion of these colonists. As they have been planted, so can they be transplanted. They have been introduced into a land not their own as an alien garrison, as a disuniting element in the country in which they have been planted, and as a guard against Serbia, and they cannot now complain, having lent themselves to these purposes, if under the 369 270 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS changed conditions they are now sent home again; the retransplanting should be loss painful than the original planting when they left their own home and their own kindred, and in any case Serbia cannot be expected to tolerate the presence of a foreign garrison introduced as such and coming with knowledge of its function. The general question of the German elements, apart from the two categories just mentioned, who will be found in greater Serbia is more difficult and complex. No question of expulsion would have arisen after the wars of the past waged as honourable war used to be waged, but the facts of the present war must have an effect of the greatest importance in the after-settlement. Most illuminating has been the attitude of the American Germans. That American Germans should possess a lively sympathy with their country of origin is natural and to be expected, but what was not to be expected has been their attitude towards the country of their allegiance. They have emigrated of their own free will, they have been cordially received, they have received the rights of citizenship and all the rights and privileges of the native- born American, they have, many of them, acquired great fortunes in their adopted country, they have exercised a great influence on its politics and its industries, and yet in spite of all they have not merely evinced a sympathy with Germany which was natural but have also evinced a plain and outspoken hostility to the United States which not only argues the grossest ingratitude but has constituted a grave danger external and internal to their country. In order to achieve their aims they have stuck at nothing. Factories have been destroyed by bomb or incendiarism with great loss of life, attempts have been made to blow up bridges and railways, destruction of shipping by means of infernal machines has been attempted frequently, though happily with great lack of success ; murder and arson and dynamite outrages all alike have been resorted to, and resorted to not only against the enemies of their original country, or the original country of their parents, but SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 271 against their own fellow-citizens, resorted to not to prevent hostile acts against their race-home, but to prevent their fellow-citizens, the citizens of their State of allegiance, from engaging in a trade recognized by international law as a legitimate trade to be carried on by neutrals. The non-German world cannot afford to allow matters to stand there, the peril of the German alien and equally of the naturalized German alien has been conclusively shown, and that peril must be taken account of by every State where an appreciable German element is to be found, since this element has exhibited an acrid and cunning capacity for hostility which might have the direst consequences. Just as German disregard of the rules of honourable warfare have put the Germans in a pale apart from honourable foes, so has the conduct of the " hyphenated- German " placed him in a category apart from other alien denizens naturalized or non-naturalized. In Belgium, further, it has been seen how the German denizen has been a spy and an advance agent acting in the interests of the military policy of his government. These facts will have to be taken into consideration by the Southern Slav government in the reorganization of its territory after the war. The Germans who have shown such callous brutality cannot complain if such consideration should result in a considerable measure of expulsion against members of their race from Jugoslav territory; if the Serbs should regard with disquiet, for example, the large German element" in the town and district of Pancevo almost over against Belgrade. The whole problem in its present acute form is a new one, and has been created by the action of the Germans themselves. It will be remembered that it was in view of this question that, in dealing with Southern Slav claims in southern Hungary, I suggested that they should be put forward with the strictest moderation in a territorial sense, and in a former chapter I traced a frontier line which comes considerably short of extreme demands for this very reason. The principle laid down was that the line should 272 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS be drawn to coincide with the limits of a solid block of Southern Slav population with no more than small islands of alien race embraced in it, and that it should not be so drawn as to include a solid block of alien territory even though it contained considerable Serbo-Croat islands. The suggestion was made with a view to the possibilities of transmigration after the war, and with especial refer- ence to the German element, and thus the line drawn excluded all Baranja from greater Serbia, by far the greater part of the Baeka, and a large area to the east of Veliki BeSkerek, inhabited by a mixed population chiefly of Germans and Magyars. Any forced system of trans- migration savours of barbarian times (but we live in barbarous times) and excites a natural distaste, nor must the effects on the Serbo-Croat population left in Hungary be overlooked. Yet such a measure applied under safe- guards and with liberty to transfer movable property of all descriptions would add but little to the miseries of our time, and by giving ethnographical frontiers would afford solid advantages for the future. At any rate the question of the Germans will have to be faced by the Southern Slav government, and it may be that a trans- ference of the German element may commend itself to it, leaving the Magyars to act in turn as they please. It must be distinctly understood that reference has been made exclusively to the German element, and for the reasons already recited, and not to the Magyar or Roumanian elements of the Banat. As to the former, while it is true that they are strongly anti-Serb and have committed in Serbia the most horrible atrocities, yet it must be remembered that politically they have been exploited even in their own country by the Magyar- Jewish oligarchy, so that the mass of the Magyars, them- selves for the most part peasants, cannot be held responsible for all the misdeeds of the politicians. In the Hungarian plain, even in the Southern Slav portion of it, they may be said to be in their own home. It is to be hoped that after the war there will be a new SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 273 Hungary reduced to a genuinely national State, in which the Magyar peasantry will come politically to their own. Such a Hungary should eventually become a friend of the Southern Slav monarchy, belonging, like itself, in part to the Danubian system, and no action should be taken by the Southern Slavs of a nature calculated to hinder such a consummation. The Magyars then, apart from the functionaries, exploiters, and strategic colonies in Bosnia and Syrmia, should be left in peace, in enjoy- ment of their properties and with full rights of citizenship. There is nothing to suggest that such Magyars would constitute the peculiar danger attendant on the presence of a large German element. Reciprocity of treatment for all Serbs left in Hungary must be a sine qua non, and full liberty of action assured. What has been said of the Magyars applies with even greater force to the Roumanians. The latter have always got on well with the Serbs, they seem to be mutually sympathetic, the interests of their countries are identical. A solid Serbo-Roumanian alliance would go a long way towards ensuring peace in the Near East when each of the States has become one of a new order of secondary Powers of considerable strength and resources. While Serbia, Old and New, will include some 200,000 Rou- manians, Roumania will include close upon 100,000 Serbs, and there is every reason for mutual toleration. The two States should facilitate any voluntary cross-migration that might manifest itself, but their efforts should be strictly limited to the supervision of such a voluntary tendency, and no compulsion of any sort, direct or indirect, should be used. Roumanians and Serbs alike must receive full rights. Special measures of an economic nature will be called for in Bosnia. Its resources have largely been placed at the disposal of ruthless exploiters of Hungarian nation- ality but of Jewish race, to the detriment of the real interests of the population. It cannot be expected that these men will be left in possession of franchises granted 18 274 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS in despite of the protests of the inhabitants themselves, and of many members of the Austrian Reichsrath. The concession of a central land bank, for example, was granted on scandalous terms to Budapest capitalists, and was the subject of acrimonious debate in the Austrian Parliament, even non-Slavs expressing their condemna- tion of the transaction which was subsequently, I believe, somewhat modified. Here in place of an indemnity the Serb government can claim the right to cancel concessions without payment. Commercial, timber, land, and mining concessions, so far as the concessionaires are Austro- Hungarian subjects, should be resumed and worked by the State. The forest wealth of the Jugoslav kingdom will be an important national asset, there is a forestry department in Serbia, but it needs extension and working on modern methods, and so reorganized it will be able to take over the working of the State forests of Bosnia, now leased out to exploiters. The forest resources of Croatia are also very considerable, the oak forests of Slavonia being especially famous. In view of the dearth of timber and its rising price throughout the world, the State should organize this source of national wealth in the most thorough and comprehen- sive manner, and above all keep it in its own hands. The alien exploiters of Bosnia can very well follow the functionaries to their own land, and the country be developed for the benefit of its own people and its own national government. One long-standing question that will be settled by the terms of peace will be that of the Oriental Railways which, so far as Serbia is concerned, is a matter of the main Salonica railway from the former Serb frontier at Ristovac to the Serbo-Greek boundary. At the time of the Balkan wars this length of line was taken over and worked by the Serb government as part of the State railway system. As soon as events foreshadowed a victory for the Balkan States, the Austrian government induced certain banks to buy up shares in this line, originally one of Baron Hirsch's lines, although the operation entailed enhanced prices for SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 275 the stock. A proportion of the shares was held in Paris. The object was to place the Austrian government in a position to refuse its consent, acting through the owning banks, to the buying out of the company by the Serb government. As soon as the latter got wind of the proposed operation, and before it had been effected, it declared that it would refuse to recognize the legality of any transfer of shares in the railway subsequent to the outbreak of the war. When peace was declared Serbia made offers for the purchase of the railway from the company, but the offers were refused. In turn the Austrian government, acting nominally for its nationals, demanded the return of the line, which Serbia refused. From then to the outbreak of the Great War negotiations were entered into from time to time without result, and the position remained that the Serb government remained in possession of the line, which it refused to return but was willing to purchase, while the Austrian holders refused to sell and demanded its surrender. The line will now, of course, become the property of Serbia, and it is likely that she will refuse to compensate the Austrian share- holders at all. For this course she will have two grounds; in the first place, that the purchase of shares by the Austrian banks was a political manoeuvre inspired by the Austrian government and not a bond-fide investment, and that consequently the banks must look for compensation to the government whose agents they were ; and in the second place, it may contend that the real owner of these shares is the Austrian government, and that they are therefore lawful prize of war, while even if they were genuine property of the banks holding them the value of them will be some offset to the claim for damage done in Serbia by the Austrian army, for which there is no likelihood of compensation by way of indemnity. Share- holders other than Austrian or German will doubtless be bought out at an agreed price. There will be also the opportunity of denouncing the convention-d-quatre by which Austrian goods obtained 276 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS preferential rates over the Oriental Railway and over the original State railway of Serbia, namely the lines Belgrade- Nis-Pirot, and Nis-Ristovac to the former Bulgarian and Turkish frontiers. It will be to Serbia's interest to grant a generous railway tariff to Hungarian trade passing through Salonica in the interests of its own railway system, so as to attract through traffic and earn the freight charges ; but she will probably prefer to make any such arrangement a part of the future commercial treaty with Hungary rather than to place her railways again under a perpetual servitude in the matter of such rates. In any case she will probably refuse anything in the way of internal preferential rates, the granting of which would be equally unfair to the Serb trader and to other foreigners doing business in Serbia. Our own exporters, for example — and after the war our trade with Serbia should grow enormously — would be prejudiced by any renewal of the old convention, which, it is to be thought, Serbia will certainly refuse.1 A difficult question will arise as to whether any of the Austrian debt should be taken over with the annexed territories. Of late years in such cases it has been usual to lay it down that a portion of the debt should be taken over. It has to be remembered, however, that such a provision is not, as sometimes asserted, a matter of international law. When Germany took Alsace-Lorraine from France she did not take over any of the French public debt with the pro- vinces, on the contrary she took £200,000,000 in addition. After the Russo-Turkish war Russia exacted an indemnity from Turkey (not yet paid off) as well as territory in Asia. It is true that the newly emancipated Balkan States were to take over a portion of the Ottoman Debt, a flagrant instance of one law for the strong and another for the weak, but as a fact the provision was never carried into effect. Even more pertinent to the question is the fact 1 The convention-a-quatre applied only to the lines specified above in Serbia. Before the war Austria made an endeavour to extend its appli- cation to all Serb lines present or prospective, but Serbia refused. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 277 that Austria-Hungary, which was not a belligerent, assumed no portion of the debt when she occupied Bosnia. It is true that in 1908 she paid over a sum to Turkey in respect of government property in Bosnia when the annexation was carried out, but this was obviously an after-thought and designed to smooth the way to Turkish acquiescence. No such provision was announced at the time of the annexation proclamation, and if Austria had considered even this payment obligatory, the natural time for it would have been when the provinces were occupied and when she entered upon a free usufruct of its govern- ment which she enjoyed without payment for thirty years. In any case this was a purchase of government property not an assumption of debt. The idea that such an obli- gation exists, or should exist, to assume a portion of the debt in respect of annexed territory is due to the great influence of international finance and to the fact that holders of national debts are to be found in all countries. At the present time, for example, France is deeply interested in the financial future of Turkey, and in the financial arrangements to be entered into in respect of what was once Turkey. The classic example of the results of such interests is of course our own occupation of Egypt for the benefit of the Egyptian bondholders. It cannot be argued that by international law Serbia or the Southern Slav Kingdom should assume any part of the Austrian or Hungarian debts, or of -the common debt of the Dual Monarchy, especially as the former will perforce have to forgo any war indemnity. Moreover, the financial situation of the Jugoslav kingdom will be in any case extremely difficult. In addition to her previous debt Serbia has incurred fresh obligations in the Balkan wars, and to an enormously greater extent in the present war, which will make a vast addition to the dead-weight of the national debt. She has also lost an enormous amount of wealth owing to the course taken by the war. The kingdom is purely agricultural, and its sources of wealth consist precisely in those things of which she has been so largely 278 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS deprived. The Macva, the richest agricultural district of the country, has been utterly laid waste by the Austrians in their invasions, and since the occupation of the whole of the national territory the population has been bled white. The pastoral industry is perhaps even more im- portant to Serbia than tillage — the Serb pig has not had to pay any rent, but he has largely paid the taxes. It is known that the Austro- Germans have carried out a systematic requisition of stock throughout the country, and pigs, cattle, and sheep in thousands have been sent into Germany and Austria. Leipzig alone was stated by the Germans to have received 20,000 pigs last Christmas season, and it must be years before the head of stock in the country reaches its former amount. These ravages have extended to Macedonia despite its alleged Bulgarian character. The Bulgars have also carried away, on their own admission, a great quantity of agricultural machinery. For a long time, therefore, the Serb peasantry will be steeped in dire poverty, and the financial resources of the State will be correspondingly diminished. Serbia is entitled, therefore, to refuse to take over any part of the Austro- Hungarian debts or of the Bosnian debt (the province has its own budget and liabilities), since she will be unable to obtain any compensation for these losses. So far, indeed, will she be from receiving compensation that she will be obliged to incur fresh liabilities in order to set the popula- tion on its feet again ; in other words, the Serb State will have to compensate its subjects in part for the havoc wrought by the Austrians. All these liabilities, the debts, the compensations, the means of restoring the economic life of the people, will be a burden to be shared by the whole Southern Slav State, for the present Serb kingdom could not stand the strain, and in a sense a great deal of these burdens may be regarded as having been incurred in the common cause. If, in addition, the State were to take over any Austrian debt it would be plunged into a morass of financial trouble just at the moment when it would need all its resources to effect an economic recovery. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 279 It may be said, on the other hand, that to impose upon the reduced States of Austria and Hungary the full burden of their existing debts and their new war debt would involve them in something like national bankruptcy. But as they are largely responsible for the war, and as, at the very least, it was their action that gave occasion for it, and as it was hailed by them with rejoicing as giving them at last an opportunity of dealing finally with the Southern Slavs, there is no injustice involved in their suffering the penalty of their misdeeds. They willingly took up arms in an unjust cause and must abide the result ; to saddle the Southern Slavs with a portion of their war debt, for that is what it would come to, would be to make the latter pay part of the cost incurred by the enemy in the wanton attack upon themselves. The Emperor Francis Joseph and his advisers stated at the commencement of hostilities against Serbia that they had counted the possible cost of their action, and Austria and Hungary applauded, and if now the cost is considerably more than they bargained for that is their affair ; they are reaping what they have sown. The question hinges partly upon the amount of the pre-war debt of the Dual Monarchy that was held in the countries of the Entente, which means practically in France, for the amount held by the other Allies must be small. It should be possible in the terms of peace to put the foreign pre-war debt of the Monarchy in a privileged position, leaving the Austrian and Hungarian governments free to do as they will with the debt held by their subjects or Germans. If they repudiate the latter or reduce the rate of interest it will be a matter between them and their friends. Without a doubt both here and elsewhere when peace comes to be made we shall have to guard most carefully against the influence of la haute finance, the finance which knows no country, and is inspired solely by regard for its own interests. It was largely international finance which bolstered up the Ottoman Empire in the past, and more and more it has become a custom for such finance to act 280 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS for its own gain and then to call upon the national governments, or whichever government can be brought in ostensibly for the protection of its nationals, to support its claims. The peace that is to be made must be made in the largest interest of the Allies, great and small, and not to secure the profits of those who recognize their country chiefly when they have need of its services. At any rate the Southern Slavs should not be crippled at the outset by a load of debt not incurred by them but by their enemies, incurred not for their benefit but for the express purpose of dealing them a final blow. A comparatively minor matter to be dealt with in the terms of peace will be the return of the manuscripts, books, antiquities, etc. which have been looted from Serbia, and at the same time the Austro-Hungarian museums should have to give up all manuscripts, antiquities, and objects of art which have their origin in the Southern Slav provinces. Many antiquities, for example, including coins of the early Serb Kings and Tsars have been removed from Bosnia ; it has been stated indeed that, especially, early Serb coins have been taken to Vienna lest their presence in Sarajevo should convey too pointed an historical lesson to the Bosnian Serbs. The destruction of historical memorials carried out by the enemy un- doubtedly was not the result of mere wantonness. It was conceived with the subtle idea of destroying the material facts and influences which go to feed historical and national consciousness and self-realization. The local conditions in the different Southern Slav provinces differ in many important respects. In the present kingdom of Serbia there is practically no land problem save that of guarding against an excessive parcel- ling out of the small peasant properties, and that unfor- tunately will have been largely solved by the grievous loss of population during the war. Already the Austrian papers are talking of the measures of colonization in Serbia proposed in view of that decrease. In Bosnia there is an urgent land problem akin to the Irish, and SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 281 soluble only by the same means. While some of the peasants own their holdings as in free Serbia, it is estimated that there are 112,000 families, comprising 650,000 persons, who farm their lands from the Agas, or land-owners, estimated at 10,000 families and 40,000 persons ; these agas, or begs, are mostly Moslems, and in great part represent the old Bosnian nobility who turned renegade. These Moslems or " Turks " are, of course, Serb by race. The rent principle is almost universally the metayer system. The mStayer peasants naturally desire to own their land like their freeholding neighbours, but the Austrian law has made mutual consent a neces- sary condition of sale, and the process of enfranchizing the land has been correspondingly retarded. Acting upon the principle divide et impera, the Austrians have fostered the privileges of the begs in order to divide the popula- tion into hostile sections. The remedy can only be an act for compulsory sale even at the risk of arousing a certain amount of discontent among the begs. Among the majority of the Moslems, Serb sympathies are by no means wanting,1 for after all the early history of the Serb race is largely a history of their own families, a fact of which many are quite conscious, as Sir Arthur Evans discovered in his travels forty years ago, and told in his Illyrian Letters. When to this is added the fatalism of the genuine Moslem, we may expect the greater number to acquiesce without any great trouble, and in any case a certain amount of transient fanaticism mani- fested probably by the more ignorant Moslems will be better than the dragging out of a long and embittered agrarian dispute. The sooner the nettle is grasped the better for all concerned. In Croatia and the Banat side by side with peasant properties are large landed estates belonging to the great magnates, some of native stock, but the majority Magyar or Magyarized, as well as to the Church. As regards the properties of the Magyar 1 The Moslem Serbs of Bosnia residing in Switzerland have pro- claimed their wholehearted adherence to the Southern Slav cause. 282 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS nobles there is little to be said against confiscation. It must be remembered that the Magyar aristocracy has been reactionary in the extreme, and that it has always been its policy to keep under " the nationalities " of Hungary and to Magyarize them as much as possible. It has been the tyranny, misgovernment, and chauvinism of the Magyar nobles which have been largely responsible, not only for the chronic unrest in Hungary and its borderlands, but also for the war itself. Their policy has made it impossible in the past for any tolerable modus vivendi to be entered into with the subject peoples, and they were among the foremost in insisting upon a settle- ment with Serbia which should take the form eventually of the disappearance of the kingdom, or at least in its reduction to the position of a helpless vassal. They may now be feeling the pinch of the war, but it was the Magyars who at the beginning were most anxious for the chastisement of Serbia and most enthusiastic in the cause of war. The evidence of Professor Reiss is conclu- sive as to the methods of the Imperial army in Serbia, and Hungarian officers and soldiers were foremost in the atrocities committed on the population and in the utter devastation of the richest district of the kingdom. They have since looted and carried away property, and have been considering projects of colonization. The financial situation of Austria-Hungary does not offer much prospect of an indemnity, indeed if the Monarchy be decomposed into its elements the exaction of an indemnity would become practically impossible. In place of indemnity, therefore, the Serbs should claim the right to undertake various necessary measures of reform and reconstruction without having to indemnify the Austrians or Magyars concerned, the latter being left to the solicitude of their own governments. One* such measure should be the parcelling out of the estates belonging to the Hungarian nobles in Croatia and the Banat among the peasants without indemnity. These men showed no consideration when they murdered and ravaged and laid waste the SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 283 property of the Serb peasants, and the loss of their own properties will be a just punishment in kind. As a matter also of public policy, it is necessary to make it plain that conduct such as has distinguished our foes in the present war will entail retribution, not merely national but, per- sonal to those who have been the authors of the violation of the old honourable codes of warfare. With these varying agricultural problems a unitary government, endowed with a greater total ability, experi- ence, and independence than local legislatures and adminis- trations, will be better able to deal than the latter more at the mercy of local conditions and influences. Not so immediate as the land question, but hardly less important, will be the problem of the form to be taken by the future industrial conditions of the Southern Slav Kingdom. It possesses large mineral resources in Danubian Serbia and Bosnia, while Macedonia, hitherto outside the sphere of mineral production, is also stated to be rich. The best coal in the Balkans comes from Serbia, which is rich also in copper and lead, while iron and some gold and silver are also found as well as other minerals. It is asserted that it should be a potential oil- field also. By law all minerals belong to the State, which simplifies some matters greatly, and if full insistence is laid upon the consequences of this ownership the benefit to the State should be very great. The manu- facturing interests are but very slightly developed, and the Serb happily does not take very kindly to the process of ceasing to be his own man in 'order to become somebody else's hand. The great importance and interest of the industrial development of the country is twofold : in the first place there arises the question of foreign capital and the dangers of pacific penetration, and in the second the extremely interesting point as to the exact form to be taken by the industrial edifice. These two questions are distinct and must be considered separately. There is no need here to attempt anything approaching to a full discussion of the manner and method of the 284 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS process of pacific penetration, or to do more than indicate a few general propositions. It has been said that " the nation, proposing to absorb a district and make a colony out of it, loans money to the ruler and to as many of his subjects as possible ; obtains a security for the money advanced, if it can, a part of the public revenue ; builds railways in exchange for large grants of land, and, in general, develops the country. Then, when the available resources have been pretty completely hypothecated, the nation claims that its interests in the territory are so considerable that it must be conceded a share in the direction of administration and policy, in order to assure the safety of its investment." 1 " To be sure, the financial operations known as peaceful penetration are not exactly what we have been accustomed to consider methods of violent conquest ; but by such means large numbers of the inhabitants of the smaller countries have just as certainly lost their land and the products of their labour as if an army had destroyed them." 2 The American Professor's remarks in their literal application deal rather with the methods which have been applied to decadent Oriental States, such as Egypt and Morocco, than with the processes applicable to such a State as the Southern Slav Kingdom will be, but they describe accurately the means employed in their most open form. It is not, how- ever, such States alone which have been subjected to the process of pacific penetration with baneful effects upon the economic, and even the political, independence of the countries concerned. It is not necessary for a State to sink as low as Egypt or Morocco, two classical instances of different forms of a similar pressure, the one by means of la haute finance and governmental necessities, and the other by means of politico-commercial exploitation, to find itself seriously curtailed in the exercise of its sovereignty.3 1 R. G. Usher, Pan-Germanism, p. 121. 2 Ibid. p. 246. 3 I am not calling in question the action of England and France in the two countries mentioned, but I instance them as examples of the consequences of financial pressure and pacific penetration. That the occupations were legitimate rather emphasizes the danger in question. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 285 Before the war Antwerp had become largely a German port, and its German population acted entirely in the interests of Germany in the political sphere besides acting as spies for the General Staff. In Italy we have an even more noteworthy example of the dangers of this sort of penetration. A great part of the trade has been in German hands and has been transacted with Germany, and the latter above all has made full use of the weapon placed at her disposal by the development of the modern banking system. The great Banca Commerciale, with its numerous branches, was practically in German hands ; it maintained the closest relations with German producers and merchants, it was in a position to finance German exports to Italy, and, by discounting the debts due by the Italian buyer to the German seller, to provide the former with the long credit which he needed and the latter with ready cash. Such functions are of course merely in the ordinary way of the business of a bank of commerce, but when such a bank is extremely rich and able to crush possible rivals, and when it is in the hands of foreigners, it places in the hands of the latter a powerful lien on a country's trade. In England itself the same results have been at work. When war broke out Baron von Schroder was naturalized on the ground that it was necessary for the credit of the City of London.1 Com- mercial companies of every description were found to be German even when nominally British. German firms controlled a great part of the trade in metals, large German interests affected in some cases even the senti- ments of a great town, and the country became conscious of the startling extent to which its commercial and manu- facturing freedom was mortgaged to its enemy. In Australia special legislation has been necessary to free 1 As a matter of fact the plea was absurd. Had the Baron's office been taken over by a representative of the Treasury, the financial houses were quite capable of supplying the necessary personnel for carrying on the business. All that was necessary was to act at once before the books could be tampered with. 286 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the metal trade. If such a state of things had come to pass in England, the centre (with Paris) of international finance, and the home of intensive manufacturing and commercial activity, it is easy to see the plight to which might be reduced a smaller country with great unde- veloped natural resources but with a practically non-existent financial and industrial organization and a lack of fluid capital. This points to the extreme unwisdom of any forced industrial development in the greater Serbia of the future, and the absolute necessity of framing betimes such banking, industrial, commercial, and company legislation as shall leave the Southern Slavs masters in their own house. It will be incumbent upon the government to see that its people shall not be exploited for the benefit of foreigners, that its population shall not sink to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for foreign capitalists and financial interests, and that the profits arising from the exploitation of the country's resources shall be for the benefit of its own subjects, not merely the profits of wages but the net profits of capital also to the extent that may be practicable. Above all will it be necessary to guard against the possibility of such a lien upon the country's development being held either by those who are opposed in heart to the nation's independence or by those who are nationals of a State which makes financial, industrial, and commercial interests a normal lever of political pressure. It is not unusual for English merchants to complain that they receive insufficient support from the English government, that their in- terests are not pushed and not efficiently safeguarded when menaced. I doubt whether on the contrary these things have not been, and in the future may be still more, to the benefit of English trade. It has been the recognition that an English trader is not a politician thinly disguised, that an English bank is a financial institution and not a government weapon, which has in many cases caused the foreigner to have dealings with SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 287 the Englishman, whom he does not suspect of enter- taining deep political designs, rather than with the trader behind whom is very visible the form of an active and aggressive government. It will be for the permanent benefit of the Southern Slavs if there is not too great a desire on the part of the government to encourage foreign capital to work the natural resources of their country, but rather a resolve to work them with national funds. State ownership is already familiar to them ; the railways are State railways, the minerals belong by law to the State, by far the greater part of the forest area of Serbia belongs either to the State or to the communes, the latter working under State supervision, there is a tobacco regie, and salt, petroleum, cigarette papers, and matches are all State monopolies, and other resources should be worked as far as possible in the same way. A great source of power in the future will be hydro-electric, derived from the water- falls and swift rivers of the mountain regions which comprise so large an area of the land, and it would be wise before vested interests are created to declare a State monopoly of hydro-electric power. The Serbs, as has been seen, take kindly to co-operation, and this mode of exploi- tation should be fostered to the uttermost and protected from unfair and " wrecking " competition. It may be said that under such circumstances progress may be slower. This raises the question, which cannot be argued here, as to what is the real content of national progress. There are those who, when a fair countryside is defiled with smoke, when the peasantry are replaced by towns- men, when villages give place to gaunt factories belching their fumes into the air, when large areas of land become covered with acre upon acre of mean and ugly streets composed of brick boxes with slate lids, when wealth is accumulated frequently by absentee shareholders of in- dustrial companies ("a company has no soul"), and when the early night, and the late night of Saturday, rings with shouts of vacant laughter, and the whistling of the latest 288 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS music-hall inanity, are eloquent of the " progress " and " development " achieved. There are others who look upon these things as a degradation, who say that the vitality of the city population is maintained by the influx of country blood, and deny that these things constitute "progress" still less "civilization". Towns were not always, however, a blot upon the landscape, associated with ugly speculative building, or consecrated to the multiplication by machinery of things sometimes un- necessary and often ugly. Old towns like old houses (not because they are old) add to the beauty of the countryside, and what modern industrialism needs is a method of reconciling utility with beauty, of restoring as far as we can pride of workmanship, of giving the workman a living and proud interest in his work, in short of restor- ing civilization to the home to which as the name implies it properly belongs. Extremes meet, and many a true- blue Tory is attracted by the underlying ideas of the Socialists Ruskin and William Morris. In strict bearing upon the subject immediately under discussion it can be said that slower progress on national lines is infinitely to be preferred in the interests of any people to quick progress and swift development at the cost of foreign exploitation ; nations like individuals suffer if they try too hard to get rich quick. If there were a large amount of native capital available the whole case would be altered, but the point is that such capital is non-existent, and the choice for Jugoslavia will be between handing over its resources to foreign capitalists or proceeding by the utili- zation of national capital, a process which will be slower but will bring with it the securing to the nation at large a greater portion of the profits derived from the country and full national mastery over the national wealth. The war has shown the grave perils to real independence which are the effect of foreign exploitation, the facts have never before emerged so clearly, and nations must shape their course in accordance with the knowledge now acquired. Foreign capital is of course necessary, but it may be SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 289 borrowed by the government and by it used for the commercial and industrial development of the country, and if the Southern Slav becomes a hand he will at any rate be a hand working for his national State. It will be said that this is State socialism pure and simple; but circumstances alter cases. Our own colonial administra- tions working in undeveloped countries work on the lines indicated. They endeavour to prevent the exploitation of the native inhabitants, prevent the wasteful exploitation of natural resources, use government capital freely, and assure to the State the enjoyment of natural, and some artificial, monopolies. In such countries the government undertakes a great deal of work and supervision that in developed States can be left to private initiative. The Sudan has been largely, indeed almost entirely, built up by government expenditures and government supervision, and the same course is pursued in other undeveloped areas, and from the Western point of view the Southern Slav Kingdom will be an undeveloped country. Even in England itself the war has seen many changes in this respect and some of them will probably be permanent ; it is unlikely that when the war is over we shall slide back into the old groove; we have seen the growth of "con- trolled" industries, and some of the knowledge acquired will probably be utilized when peace returns. It is agreed that certain "key" industries should be maintained, and if such industries cannot be started with private capital they will probably be started with national capital ; if again they can only be maintained under the protection of a high tariff, it is likely that in return for this protection, and the profits thereby secured, the community, acting through the State, will insist on a certain amount of control. In any case industrial conditions in England are in a flux, and we shall have to beware of the tyranny of catch phrases, and of prejudice in the strict meaning of the term; still more is such caution necessary for undeveloped communities.1 1 Apart from the outstanding instances of Australia and New Zealand, I believe that in so individualistic a country as Canada State activity is 19 290 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Concretely the new State will have to guard against, preferably prohibit, foreign ownership of land * ; it will maintain its State railways and forests ; it will have to pass comprehensive legislation in restraint of certain activities of foreign banking corporations and foreign companies. In many cases no more will be necessary than the maintenance of the existing legislation of Serbia such as its homestead law, and the regulations noticed (in Chapter III) on the subject of bills of exchange on agricultural produce, etc. The present activities of the Land Bank must be extended to the whole kingdom, land mortgages, rural or urban, prohibited except with the State bank, and the co-operative institutions fostered and strengthened. Foreign banks must be prevented from acquiring a hold over the essential productivities of the nation, and their activities must be subject to a control which will enable the government to arrest any operation injurious to the national interests. Restrictions will also be necessary upon the holding of shares in companies by certain foreign elements. The working out of these projects in detail may show that control may be better in this or that matter than prohibition, and moreover there ought to be a distinction between the capital and the projects of allies and those of enemies ; what should be forbidden to a German bank with politics in the back- ground could well be conceded to an English bank engaged in its legitimate business, subject always to national control over the national heritage. It is here employed in the western fruit-growing areas in the direction of grading and packing fruit. Co-operation in Ireland is another example of the same general trend of ideas. 1 I cannot endorse Dr. Savic's suggestion of Englishmen starting farms in Serbia. It seems to me an example of that sentimentalism which is capable of becoming a weakness in the Serb character. Such ownership could not be confined to Englishmen, and the result might be the buying up of large areas of land by foreign capitalists from an impoverished peasantry. That is a real danger to be guarded against, and for a considerable time foreign ownership of land should be prohibited. Such prohibition is equally necessary in the case of urban land in view of prospective developments. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 291 that the absence of governmental pressure to which I have alluded should stand us in good stead. Some mines are worked by the State, some are leased. If the latter system be employed in the future it should be remembered that as the State is the real vendor or lessor the capital of the company should not be watered with a dead weight of vendor's shares. It should be practicable to insist upon all such companies being capitalized upon a purely working capital basis, apart from a small promoter's profit to be paid in ordinary shares in return for his enterprise. Under such a system royalties could be replaced by a provision securing all profits to the company up to a certain percentage upon the capital, all further profits to be shared between the company and the State. This, it seems to me, would be an excellent way of uniting the exploiting interest of the foreign capital employed and the interests of the State acting for the community, and of guarding alike the interests of the genuine investor and the proprietary interest of the national government. Such regulations would doubtless raise opposition in some financial circles, but it will bear repetition that slower development on national lines will be better than quicker development under the exploitation of the foreign company promoter. Moreover, in the case of the mining industry such legislation should, when it becomes known, encourage the genuine investor whose interest, it will have been seen, will not only be guarded by the State but will be identical with that of the latter, since both would be adversely affected by watered capital and unscrupulous promotion, and the current of genuine in- vestment capital would therefore be attracted. The government should not be deterred in these matters by the objection of a certain class of foreign capitalist, or by the charge of being retrograde and reactionary, or by the taunt of slow progress as compared with other States whose quick advance has been paid for by the mort- gaging of their resources. In all cases provision should be made for the resumption 292 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS by the State, should it be desired, of its original proprietary rights by the compulsory repurchase on equitable terms of the shares of the concern in question. One of the sources of interest in the Balkan States is the fact that from the industrial and commercial point of view they are practically tabula rasa on which may be written a new page in the history of industrial develop- ment. From some points of view modern Western industrialism may be said to be morally bankrupt, and we are conscious of a growing distaste for many of its manifestations, a distaste which is shared by people of various habits of mind. There has been, for example, the marked growth of appreciation of hand-work as applied to many articles until recently given over, since the full development of machinery, to factory production. " Machine carving " of wood is now a term of reproach ; hand-made furniture is sought by those who can afford it, hand-woven fabrics from thick tweeds to finest linen are in demand, the architect specifies hand-made brick and tile when his client's purse will allow it, hand-wrought ironwork, jewellery, silver-ware, book-binding are all increasingly appreciated. One of the most formative of our architects, Mr. Baillie Scott, whose work is to be found in Russia and Poland, even in America, as well as in England, has not only practised a return to older and simpler methods of] planning but uses hand-work whenever possible. Mr. C. F. A. Voysey, whose architectural style is quite different, is at one with Mr. Scott in the methods which he advocates, while an architect who is not one of the so-called craftsmen architects like the two just mentioned, Mr. Detmar Blow, owes some of the qualities of his work to the knowledge of material gained by working on it with his own hands. The whole " arts and crafts " movement and the colony of craftsmen at Chipping Campden, where Mr. C. R. Ashbee practises architecture on the lines spoken of, is eloquent of this change. It is not merely from an aesthetic point of view that dissatisfaction is felt. Industrial unrest despite increase SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 293 of wages and better conditions is endemic, and it is noteworthy that it is shown most acutely in trades where wages are highest. In part this may be put down to growth of the appetite and the desire for more, but in part it would seem to be indicative of an unrest which is really spiritual — men are discontented they barely know with what even though the concrete form which the discontent takes is a demand for an increased wage. Many of the leaders, however, have become more articu- late, and it is seen that men are increasingly dissatisfied with being somebody else's hands, they want to be their own masters. The rise of syndicalism (I speak of syndi- calism as properly understood — the man who puts grit into a machine and calls it syndicalism is a mixture of knave and fool who does not know what he is talking about) is a direct product of this feeling, and in some of its aspects — extremes meet again — recalls a harking back to the guild system of the Middle Ages. State socialism and syndicalism are commonly held incompatible, but I think that a blend of the two would be preferable to either and not more difficult in operation. We have in England a wage-earning proletariat divorced from pro- prietorship of land or other means of production such as no other country possesses, and that represents a state of society which is full of danger to the community besides yielding some of the objectionable results already alluded to. The substitution of limited liability companies for personal ownership and the growth of combines further divorce the more wealthy classes of the nation from the wage-earner, and society tends to become sharply strati- fied with a lack of cohesion between the different strata. Even the rise of individuals usually means that they pass from one stratum to another rather than that they form a bond between the two. The organization of industry has passed during the past century through three main stages. The first was the era of comparatively small concerns, as business is measured nowadays, in the hands of private owners, it was 294 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS the age of the private entrepreneur. The second saw the growth of the limited laibility company. The latter was the more elastic as it allowed of various combinations of capital; some companies were private concerns con- verted into limited companies with but little addition of outside capital, others were in the main in the hands of a small number of capitalists with some smaller share- holders, while others again were owned by a large number of shareholders whose individual holdings were small in comparison with the aggregate capital engaged in the business. Then ensued a period of industrial consolidation : rival firms amalgamated, smaller firms were bought out when they were not crushed out, interests were pooled, and industry thus came under the sway, speaking quite generally, of a smaller number of very large firms, side by side with which, or rather over against which, stood the similar combinations of artizans in their trade unions. The policy of laissez /aire, as it is generally but somewhat erroneously called,1 has been gradually aban- doned ; workmen were protected, the labour of women and children forbidden or restricted, regulations imposed in matters of ventilation and sanitation generally, and the principle of each for himself and the devil take the hindermost has given place gradually to an increasing appreciation of the essential solidarity of society. The growth of the larger limited companies was fostered not only by the desire to eliminate competition, but by the many economies inherent in a system where operations could be undertaken on a very large scale, the same economies which had accelerated the decline of the small private firms. Late years have seen this process of consolidation carried yet further. Apart from pooling agreements and trade understandings between firms formally independent, we have seen the growth of the trust, combine, or kartel, which in its extreme form includes 1 To speak accurately the general system is laissez aller " go as you please," divided into laissez /aire, freedom of manufacture, and laissez passer, free trade. SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 295 all, or practically all, the firms engaged in a particular line of business, and in less extreme instances a very large proportion of such firms. The great home of the trust is America, with its Standard Oil Trust, Beef Trust, Steel Trust, etc., but the German kartels are extremely strong, and it has been very largely the organi- zation of these kartels, their close co-operation with each other, and the support given to them by the German banks, which has accounted for the growth of German trade. The objections raised to these trusts are familiar and need not be restated ; on the other hand, it is un- deniably true that they stand in the due line of industrial development and follow in logical sequence from what has gone before, that they can effect great economies, and therefore if they will can reduce prices in many cases, that they can give stability to manufacture, and in short repre- sent the scientific use of the resources of modern capital, machinery, labour, and banking. The problem is how to reconcile their existence with the rights of labour, and of the general consumer, with liberty of trade, and even in extreme cases with the full enjoyment by the nation at large of its sovereignty over the national territory and the activities of the community. Some socialists have been not altogether adverse to this growth ; Mr. Bernard Shaw has remarked that the Trust magnates are preparing the way for State socialism far more effectively than any socialist propaganda, because eventually the community, if it must have a sort of collectivism, will prefer to see it in the hands of the State to seeing it in the hands of a small number of irresponsible capitalists. There is also the via media of State control, an idea with which, as remarked, we are becoming more familiar. With the great trusts we have arrived at a point of development where there is a possible reconciliation between ideas in appearance diverse and even contradictory. On the one hand, the trust stands for the almost untram- melled power of the great financier, on the other hand, with a modified internal organization, it could be made 296 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS to approximate closely to the syndicate or guild ; on the one hand it stands for a tremendous force even against the State, on the other by control, not to speak of expro- priation, it would lend itself to the State supervision of industry (also a medieval idea) ; on the one hand it has come to stand as a symbol of the negation of popular rights, on the other it could be turned into a combination or co-operation of producers. A combination or correlation of trusts under the close control of the State and in alliance with a banking system working with it would be a near equivalent to a combination of guilds under State control, or in other words to a syndicalist system with a controlling element representing State socialism or collectivism. It is not a question whether we like these developments or not, for modern Western industrialism has come to stay, and the point is to make the best of it, and on the whole a large measure of State control is preferable to the dominance of the trust lord. This brings me to the point of contact with my general subject. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Southern Slav statesmen will not be led by a misplaced modesty, by fear of being branded as behind the times, or by the idea that they can best prove their modernity and their realism by exactly aping the contemporary West, into a policy which should allow the growth in greater Serbia of precisely the same industrial civilization with which we are blessed or cursed. The West has a great deal to learn as well as to teach, and moreover it is one of the large justifications of the existence of small States that they can act as political and social laboratories in which can be observed the working of scale models of innovation and experiment. In a large country and a highly developed the road is blocked by a complexity of legitimate vested interests, and also by the widespread harm that would result from a false move. There is not the slightest reason why the new Serbia should laboriously undergo all the phases of Western industrial development when she can instead take stock of the position and start where we have SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 297 left off, or rather, learning from our experience, determine upon an industrial polity which shall seek to avoid mani- fested evils and take due account of the obvious trend of growth. Precisely because industrially Serbia will be tabula rasa it will be open to her to predetermine by legislation the form which shall be taken by her own industry, to set up a framework to which, already erected, the nascent industry must needs adapt itself. "What, in my opinion, the framework should be has been already indicated. Since modern industrialism ends in trusts and kartels, and the process seems inevitable, let that be the starting-point. The rights of the workers must be guarded not merely by "factory legislation" but in the constitution of the trust by representation upon the directing board. But a trust, or a syndicate, can become as a whole an exploiting agent against the general community, so must enter the third element of State control by means of a representative or representatives with a power of veto over prices to be charged and so forth. All engaged in a given production should be included in the trust, there can be no question of crushing outside firms or of refusing admittance — all engaged in the industry ipso facto must become members. The way will be opened to co-operative productive societies, for such societies will no longer have to fear underselling, since there will be one selling price fixed for all with penalties for infringement ; they will no longer have to fear unfair competition in the buying market, for the economy of co-operative buying in gross for the whole trust will apply to them equally with others ; they will no longer have to fear the war of exhaustion waged by a firm with large liquid capital to sink against the co-operative producers with only their labour and the need of immediate returns. Thus the national zadrugas of the new type will find their place and scope in this modern industrial framework, they will not be overborne by capitalist production, and the instinct of the Serb for co-operation and for being his own master will be given full play, and his co-operative 298 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS inheritance from the former family zadruga (see Chapter III) will become to him a tower of strength. A place will be able to be found for handicraft as in the carpet zadruga, in which are already united those who make the hand- woven and natural-dyed Pirot carpets. This is obviously not the place to attempt to go into details, but sufficient has been said to indicate the main idea, which, let it be repeated, is but a development of the stage of industrial organization which has already been reached. We shall have in the West to adopt some form of State control almost inevitably before long, why then should not the Southern Slavs make that their starting-point since the road is already marked out, since no vested interests stand in the way, and there is no necessity deliberately to ignore the trend of modern industrial thought in order to allow to grow up a system which we ourselves our preparing to modify in spite of difficulties present with us, with all our past, but absent from the simple social organization of the Serbs ? In this way perhaps the new Serbia may be able to find a point of reconciliation between capitalism and labour, between syndicalism and socialism, between individualism and collectivism, between the old order and the new. These things lie in the future, but their roots are in the present, it is while the ground is clear that the seed can be sown. Such an attempt would be no small glory to the Serbs in the history of mankind, and if successful would confer a lasting benefit on others and on themselves an abiding-place in the history of civilization. Capital of the non-predatory type, too, would probably prefer to embark on industry thus stabilized rather than to meet untram- melled competition. For many years, however, it is to be hoped that no effort will be made artificially to stimulate industry. The ultimate strength of a nation is derived from agriculture, and for a long time the soil of greater Serbia with its agriculture, its forests, and its pastoral industry will suffice to maintain not merely the present population but SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 299 one very much larger. Nations pay dearly enough for industrialism in the loss of many things that make life sane and sweet, in the decay of a sturdy peasantry, in the loss of a simpler and more healthy mode of life, of simpler and healthy pleasures, and of a really gentle code of manners. To transform the Serb peasant into a copy of the western artizan would be a poor work, and if the Serb retains his present dislike for manufacture and town life, the evil would be still worse either in the form of a corruptio optimi pessima or in the introduction of an alien- owned and worked industry superimposed upon those elements which have preserved the heritage of the Serb through darkest depression to our own day. " A peasant State ", so let it remain as long as may be. The situation of Serbia's capital has for some years constituted a serious weakness for the State, and in the present war has proved most unfortunate. No other Power has its capital standing actually on the very frontier, and that frontier the one which marches with the most dangerous and formidable foe, in such a position that it can be bombarded from enemy territory immediately war is declared. Serbia had to commence the war with an act which in other States connotes a dangerous military position — the evacuation of her capital and the transference of the organs of government to a temporary seat of administration. Even the position of Paris in the north- east of France, though it is so much further removed from the frontier, has frequently been an embarrassment to France, and the situation of Belgrade regarded as a capital is infinitely worse, though its fine natural position at the junction of the Save and Danube and at the entry of the Morava valley will always make it one of the most im- portant, if not eventually the most important town of the Balkans, Constantinople excepted. When the Turk was more to be feared than the Austrian, and so much of Serbia's moral and intellectual strength was derived from the Vojvodina, the choice of Belgrade was natural, but with the decline of the Turk and the growth of Austrian 300 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS ambition Belgrade has become more and more unsuitable for the seat of government. While the capital of a country always tends to grow in population there is no necessity for the choice of the largest town for the capital : the Hague as a city is overshadowed both by Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Rome was not the largest city in Italy when it became the capital of the unified kingdom, Edinburgh is smaller and commercially and industrially much less important than Glasgow, as is the case also with Dublin and Belfast. In former days the choice was restricted owing to the lack of railway communication, but with the growth of the railway system the area of choice is con- siderably widened and includes towns whose historical associations and more central position entitle them to serious consideration as a future seat of government. The position will of course be considerably modified if at the end of the war Serbia obtain the opposite shores of the Save and Danube, Syrmia and the southern Banat, and the acquisition of the latter is urged for this very reason as well as on the ground of nationality. With both banks of the river in possession of the Serbs the latter would be able to fortify the approaches to Belgrade, but even so the situation of the latter would be far from ideal in spite also of the direct railway communication with Agram. Even if some portion of southern Hungary in the Banat be obtained the area thus acquired would be comparatively small in extent and the frontier with Hungary would be not more than some sixty miles distant, and the Roumanian frontier — a less important matter — would be still nearer. Moreover, the intervening territory offers no obstacle to military operations as hitherto conceived, the country being a dead level, a continuation of the great Hungarian plain without any marked range of hills. There would be, in fact, no natural obstacle to the advance of an army in this direction, even the principal river, the Theiss, flowing southward to its junction with the Danube. A further point for consideration is that in consequence of the Austrian bombardment the principal SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 301 government buildings will have to be rebuilt. The new SkupStina House still remained a project at the com- mencement of the war, and will in any case be a completely new building. The extension, moreover, of the kingdom will call for increased accommodation for the administra- tion, and fresh building on this score will in any case be inevitable. It will not, consequently, be a case of abandoning adequate public buildings in good repair, but in any case of building or rebuilding the majority and of adding to the remainder ; it is merely a question whether the inevitable expense is to be incurred in the existing capital or in some other town to be selected. After recent experience, and in view of the fact that the new frontier will in any case not be far distant with no natural obstacles in between, it would seem desirable that Belgrade should be abandoned. It has to be remembered that no great historical traditions are connected with Belgrade as capital, though the town is of extreme antiquity as a site dating at least to the days of the Roman Empire and probably before that. It is significant that in the Middle Ages it was frequently in dispute with Hungary. Even since the emancipation of Serbia Belgrade has not always been the capital, which under MiloS, owing perhaps to the presence of a Turkish garrison at the citadel was fixed at Kragujevac, though the Prince often stayed in Belgrade, while under Prince Michael it was for a time at Krusevac. The latter would be in many ways a better position. It has old historical associations as the capital of the last Tsar Lazar, whose church and the ruins of his castle remain, and of the Despots, his successors, until the advance of the Turks drove them to Smederevo (Senien- dria) ; it occupies a more central position than Belgrade, Kragujevac, or Ni§, and now stands on the railway, which latter though now of narrow gauge will eventually be widened to the normal gauge and extended to meet the existing Bosnian line at Mokragora, just east of Visegrad. When this connection is made Krusevac will be on the direct line between NiS and Sarajevo, and it may also 302 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS be on the Danube-Adriatic line if one of the proposed traces, Kladovo-Ni§-Sarajevo-Spljet or Dubrovnik be adopted. It is a small town, but as has been said that is not necessarily an objection, and the very fact of its smallness will enable a new capital to be laid out, an opportunity for town planning which in the future might have the happiest results now that architects have turned so much of their attention to this branch of their art. Indeed the result might eventually from a modest beginning give a fine and distinctive seat of government to the Southern Slav Kingdom. Belgrade could still remain an occasional place of residence as Ni§ has frequently been since 1878, and in any event as the northern gate into Danubian Serbia it should be strongly fortified, a project for which possession of both banks of the rivers and of the islands in mid-stream would give great facilities. It is a commanding position of which full advantage should be taken, but a frontier fortress, however strong its position, is emphatically not the place for a capital, and such sentiment as may attach to it, itself of quite recent growth, should yield to the still greater national sentiment attached to Krusevac which has been called for the Serbs a " sacred city ": no government should be placed in the position of having to evacuate its capital as the first operation of war. It is true that troubles from the north may be less insistent in the future, but Hungary will for some time at least be a jealous neighbour, and in any case the objection to fixing the seat of govern- ment in a frontier town remains. Both orthographies, the Cyrillic and the Croatian, will be put on the same footing, and it has been announced that both will be taught in the schools. Some years ago it was pro- posed by Croatian patriots to introduce the Cyrillic alphabet into Croatia itself both as a manifestation of Southern Slav solidarity and because of its phonetic quality, but it is unlikely that such a proposal will be made now beyond what is contained in the design to teach all children both orthographies. The central administrative documents will SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE 303 doubtless continue to be written in the Cyrillic script in order to avoid confusion as the central administration of the enlarged kingdom will be an extension of the present government offices. Any remains of the old jealousy on this score should be assuaged, and the matter regarded as being quite divorced, as naturally it is, from any question of religion or tribal difference, and the field left clear to the eventual predominance of whichever script forms the best vehicle of the common language. On the one hand the Croatian orthography is in line with the script of the western European languages though differentiated by diacritic marks which give it in practice several additional letters, on the other the Cyrillic is allied to the Russian alphabet and can claim the advantages of sentiment and of its phonetic character. Religion is no longer the dividing force it once was and the difficulties on this score will be less than would formerly have been the case. On sentimental grounds one may hope for the revival of the Serb Patriarchate, nominally perhaps at Pec as England's Primate is of Canterbury, though usually residing in London. The Jesuits in Bosnia have been a strongly anti-national force, but the Society is adaptable and will find it to its own interest to modify its Habsburg loyalty. It is not so strong anywhere in popular favour as to risk taking up an attitude hostile to a united Southern Slavdom when the fact is accomplished, "but", it was remarked to me, "we shall not allow it to proselytize ". [Note. — Only since this volume has been in the press have I read the full record of the fiendish cruelties and obscene bestialities committed in Serbia by the Imperial troops, chiefly Magyar, as related by Dr. Reiss : I do not see how Magyars and Serbs will be able to live in amicable juxtaposition, and this modifies the expression of opinion on pages 272, 273. The proposed boundaries having been drawn on a very moderate basis, I think that the proposal made on page 187 (note) might be adopted, i.e. to attribute to Serbia the south-western Bac"ka and apply to the enclosed Magyar f islets " a policy of cross-migration. In any case the latter policy might be adopted apart from the rectification of frontier mentioned.] CHAPTER X THE EUROPEAN IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS It would seem to be extremely difficult for Englishmen to realize even yet the extent of our interest in the nature of the Southern Slav settlement, and the manner in which a faulty solution will react unfavourably both on the general European position in general and upon our >own affairs. While Serbia was standing alone in the path of Austria there was admiration for her gallantry, but there was little understanding that it was our business that was being settled on the Danube. It is true that a writer in the Times described her as keeping watch on the Danube and holding the gate to the East, and again, " It is in truth for the supremacy over Great Britain that the fight is being fought out when shells fall upon Serbian regiments ", while the Relief Committee reminded the nation that she was guarding the flank of, and making possible our operations in Gallipoli, but I do not think that it will be denied that these words made no impression upon, and conveyed but little of their real meaning to, the generality of the public, ever slow to seize upon a new idea especially in the domain of foreign politics.1 Nor can it be altogether wondered at when even our political and military leaders failed to grasp the essentials of the problem. Not only was there a reaction from the 1 " Unfortunately the English mind has no grasp of ideas, and no sense of proportion. Indeed, the Englishman has no mind at all, he has only an hereditary obstinacy ". — Creighton. 304 IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 305 view that Serbia was the cause of the war to the idea that her affair was the merest occasion (in one sense the Austro- Serb dispute was a mere occasion for the open manifesta- tion of Austro-German aims, but on the other hand one of those aims was Near Eastern predominance), but the intimate bearing of Serb resistance on both our general military position in the East and also on the pursuit of an essential German aim seemed to be ignored. Our rulers, accustomed to look upon the Balkan States from the heights of Olympus and unwilling to mingle in the affairs of Balkan men, did not rise to the full conception of the issues at stake. Now at length we do realize how the whole current of our war in the East (not merely " Serbia's War", as one newspaper's headline constantly ran) has been changed, and we understand how different would be the aspect of affairs if an Allied army stood in front of an intact Serbia on the Danube, but still people do not see the importance of the future settlement. " Tha Southern Slav question is caviare to the general ", remarked a friend of mine the other day. It remains therefore to conclude this volume by a short rSsume of the extent and manner in which our particular interests are engaged. The prime importance of the Southern Slavs from a general European point of view lies in the enormous strategical importance of the territory which they occupy, an importance which has not lessened but increased because of the progress of modern politico-commercial development, with its eastward trend and growing con- nection with the opening up of the areas of hither Asia. The Southern Slavs lie in the way of a German advance eastward, and it was for that reason that the attack on Serbia formed an integral part of Germany's plan of expansion, for it must be remembered that the domination of the Near East is for Germany one of the essential objects for which the war is being waged, and should she at the close of hostilities be in a position to maintain her hold upon the Near East, she would be enabled to derive from that position fresh resources both for her commer- 20 306 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS cial and economic development and for the building up of her military power.1 Eight years ago the writer re- marked in an unpublished study of the Balkan situation, " Austria has strengthened her position in Bosnia, and the next move, if the conditions allow, and if the Entente Powers do not take the only means of precaution — the strengthening of their naval and military resources — will be made against King Peter's realm". Serbia lies on the land route between East and "West, and all the main lines of communication from western Europe to Asia Minor, and through Asia Minor to Persia and India, pass through Serb territory. These routes form also the lines of invasion, and whosoever from central Europe would exercise dominion over Asia Minor must sooner or later possess himself of Serbia, just as any southern Asiatic conqueror who desires a European realm must also conquer Serbia. These facts are well marked in the history of the land from ancient days. Under the Eoman Empire Moesia Superior was an important province united to Italy by the road which, passing along the Save valley, went through Siscia (Sisak) and thence by Emona (Ljubljana) to Gradisca, Venice, and Milan. It thus formed part of the overland connection between east and west, as well as a barrier against incursions from the Pannonian plain. Naissus (Nis) and Singidunum (Bel- grade) were important in those days as now, and when East and West came into conflict the territory now occupied by the Southern Slavs was a frequent scene of conflict. Invasion of Upper Moesia cut off the Eastern Empire from the Western, and resulted in mutual isolation save by sea so long as the invaders remained unsubdued. Goth and Hun in early times, as the Mongol in the Middle Ages, struck from the north at this nerve centre 1 Since these words were written the truth of the idea expressed has come more generally, but not generally enough, to be recognized very largely owing to M. Ch^radame's book, The German Plot Unmasked. A German Near East would mean a German domination of Europe, and if we would prevent a resumption of the plans a strong Jugoslavia is essential. IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 307 of the later Empire. When the Ottoman turned his atten- tion to the acquisition of a central European dominion, after he had secured his hold upon Asia Minor, which he conquered from the Seljuk from Thrace, which was the real seat of his power after the conquest of Adrianople, Serbia had to bear the first brunt of the attack. For some time after Kosovo the struggle lacked its fiercest intensity, but when Anatolia was secured and Constantinople had fallen to Mahommed the Conqueror, the days of Serbia were numbered. Six years from the latter event saw the end of Serb independence, followed after another four years by that of Bosnia. Europe then failed to appreciate the danger till it was too late, and the later Serb monarchs had frequently to defend themselves against Hungarian attacks. Hungary paid the penalty for this short-sightedness when, the Serb barrier overthrown, she had to lead the crusade against the Turks, and became herself the prey of the Asiatic invaders. With the decay of Turkish power the tide of conquest turned, as has been seen in a previous chapter, and the Habsburgs began their Drag nach Osten. Again it was upon the Serb lands that the waves of inva- sion broke as the Imperialists drove the Turks back along the roads by which they had advanced. Whether then the course of empire in south-eastern Europe were running westward or eastward, it was always the conquest of the Serb territory that was a necessary preliminary to advance in the enemy's country, always for the West she held the gate of the East, as for the East she Held the gate of the West. Had the Southern Slavs been united and strong, the whole current of European history would have been changed ; they would have formed a strong buffer State, a barrier regulating and confining the flow of invasion. Too weak to hold back the Turks, they have been too weak to hold back the Habsburgs, and until they are united and have acquired the strength that union will give there will always be chronic unrest in these regions, and one of the most important tasks in diplomacy will be to give them that unity which will enable them to stabilize the ebb and flow 308 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS of conflicting ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula : a weak people in an important strategical position will always invite attack from ambitious neighbours and be a source of unending disturbance. The different history of Rou- mania, a country so much more open to attack geographi- cally, and its comparative autonomy under Turkish rule have been the consequence of its geographical position, and illustrate by contrast the different strategical position of Serbia. Lying in a backwater, away from the great inter- continental routes, Roumania could be left to a certain extent to her own devices ; she led nowhere save into the vast expanses of Russia, and the would-be conquerors of central Europe passed through Serbia. A few geographical details will serve to illustrate shortly the general strategical position of the Southern Slav lands and to act as a commentary upon historical tendencies past and present. The north-western Balkans form the real point of junction between the Balkan Peninsula and central and western Europe. Below Belgrade the Danube is both wide and deep, till it is confined by the mountain masses, its passage through which forms the Iron Gates, below which the river besides being broad is fringed on the north by marshy country. Thus from Belgrade to the Black Sea there is at present only one bridge across the river, that at Cernavoda, and even at Belgrade the bridge is not over the Danube but over the Save, the Danube itself being bridged higher up at Petrovaradin. The whole area turns; its back upon Italy as Italy does upon the Balkans, the mountain system having its spine close to the shores of the Adriatic, so that the course of the rivers westward is for the most part short, the country thus draining chiefly to the north- east and thence by the Danube into the Black Sea. The north-western portion of the area inhabited by the race thrusts itself forward into the Alpine knot where the Julian, Carnic, and Noric Alps meet, Kranjska (Carniola) being in main the head valley of the Save. From this region the Croatian coast is bordered by the desolate Karst, forming part of the head system of the Dinaric Alps, whose main IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 309 longitudinal ridge separates Dalmatia from Bosnia and which throws off spurs throughout the greater part of Bosnia, Montenegro, and the western portion of Danubian Serbia. Croatia and Slavonia, apart from this mountainous region in the west, forms a long Mesopotamia, running eastward between the Drave and the Save with its eastern end formed by the Danube between the points of junction with it of these two rivers. Large portions of this Mesopo- tamian area are flat, and it is nowhere really mountainous. Bosnia is decidedly mountainous apart from the low-lying region, the Posavina, along the Save. It has easy com- munication with Dalmatia along the Narenta, the most considerable stream flowing westward ; elsewhere for poli- tical reasons the passes, such as the Ar2ano leading to the headwaters of the Cetina, have not been properly exploited. The Hercegovina, like north-western Bosnia which borders the Karst, is a difficult limestone region affording scanty tilth, scored by fissures, and undermined by subterranean watercourses. The central area, though difficult and mountainous, is richer in soil and forest growth. Commu- nications are everywhere difficult by the narrow mountain defiles, the more so as the mountains form tangled knots instead of running in well-defined continuous ranges. Montenegro is a wilderness of mountains, while the sanjak of Novipazar is traversed by mountains whose trend, almost due south, imposes increased difficulties in the way of south-easterly communication. Old Serbia x is in some ways the key to the Balkan Peninsula. It represents an elevated plain surrounded by high mountain ranges offering but few points of ingress and egress. On the north-west it is closed in by the sanjak system, the Albanian Alps, etc., and here stands the town of Novipazar, itself in a mountainous basin opening to the Ibar. This river opens a way into Danubian Serbia uniting wifh the western Morava at Kraljevo. It was by this route that the British hospital units retreated from northern Serbia during the Austro- 1 Region of Prizren, Pri§tina, etc. 310 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS German invasion. From Raska, where the Ibar flows from the plateau of Old Serbia, the north-eastern boundary of the latter is formed by the Kopaonik mountains, ranging to 7,000 feet in height with a practical pass at Prepolac, by which retreated the Serb forces from the Timok valley and Ni§, and by which runs one of the traces of the Danube-Adriatic railway. On the south-east lie the Sar Planina and the Crna Gora (Karadagh), the former rising in Ljubitrn to a height of 10,000 feet. Over the Sar is a difficult mountain track to Prizren. Between it and the Karadagh, 3,000 to 4,000 feet high, is the pass of KaSanik, down which flows one of the headwaters of the Vardar past Skoplje. This is also the route of the Mitrovica-Skoplje railway. It was in this direction that the retreating Serbs massed in Old Serbia endeavoured to break through in order to join hands with the French on the lower Vardar, and on the failure of this attempt it was the holding of the northern end of the pass which enabled the bulk of the army to make good its escape by the remaining route, that to the south-west by which Old Serbia connects with Porto Medua, which runs a little to the south of the united Drin, bifurcating from which is the route along the valley of the Black Drin to Debar and Ochrida. The remainder of Old Serbia is closed in by the mountains lining the western edge of the White Drin valley, through which is a difficult route through Pec to Berane, taken by many of the refugees, a few following the head stream of the Ibar which runs to the north of the Albanian Alps. Danubian Serbia approximates in general to Bosnia in its physical features, a tangle of mountains enclosing river valleys, well wooded and offering many difficulties to internal communication. To this there is one outstanding exception in the valley of the Morava, which has been in all ages the great road of communication between central and south-eastern Europe. The river itself reaches the Danube at Smederevo (Semendria), but the railway diverges to Belgrade. The main valley reaches into the IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 311 heart of the country to the neighbourhood of Krusevac, not far from which town the eastern and western Moravas unite. The eastern valley leads up to Ni§, whence two routes separate. The one passes up the Nissava valley to Pirot, and thence the trunk line goes to Sofia, Philip- popolis, and Constantinople, the other runs up the eastern Morava valley, past Vranja to Kumanovo and Skoplje, and thence to Salonica down the Vardar valley, the water- parting between the two streams in the neighbourhood of Kumanovo being low and easy. By way of the western Morava runs the route to U2ice and thence to Visegrad and Sarajevo, while at Kraljevo, as has been seen, it is joined by the Ibar ; there is thus a certain correspondence between the two head - streams of the Morava. The Oriental Railway runs from Belgrade via Nis" and Sofia to Constantinople, while from Nis" runs the Salonica line via Skoplje. So much is the line of traffic in the western Balkans dictated by the physical configuration of the country, that at first glance but little difference can be perceived between a modern railway map, showing proposed exten- sions, and a road map of the later Roman Empire. The Oriental lines follow the track of the old Roman roads ; the lines leading to Zagreb and Ljubljana correspond also ; the southerly and northerly traces of the Danube-Adriatic line follow also roughly the Roman roads from the modern Alessio through Prizren and the Prepolac pass to Ni§, and via Uzice to Sarajevo and the Narenta valley ; the sanjak line as proposed also represents an old road, and even the proposed Serbo-Roumanian Danube bridge which is projected is not far from Trajan's bridge. The point is of importance as testifying to the fact that the physical features of the country dictate now as in early days the necessary trace for the great lines of communication — the strategic conditions are permanent. From the foregoing summary some idea will have been obtained of the general geographical importance of the Southern Slav lands. The Morava valley at each end 312 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS receives a confluence of trade routes of the greatest im- portance, and destined to be more used and of greater value in the future than in the immediate past. The first of these routes is that of the existing Orient express, which from western Europe leads through Vienna and Budapest to Belgrade. This particular stream of traffic may be regarded as having several head-streams — Paris, Antwerp, Ostend, Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Berlin — meaning by that that traffic from these various centres emerges ultimately on Belgrade through Budapest. For some years there has been talk of a new international route from the West which would materially shorten the distance between Paris and Constantinople. This route, known as the Po and Save valley line, would make use of the Simplon tunnel and pass by way of Milan, Venice, Trieste, Ljubljana, and Zagreb to Belgrade. The utilization of this route has hitherto been blocked by Magyar jealousy, but the con- clusion of the war on favourable terms would see this obstacle removed. Eventually it could be shortened still further by the construction of more direct lengths of line from Belgrade to Mitrovica on the Save, and from the latter to Slavonian Brod, which would cut off the loops made by the existing track. This international line, which would serve to tap new sources of through traffic, joins the existing Oriental route, as has been seen, at Belgrade. Other trans-continental routes converge at the same point, for the shortest line from Warsaw to Constantinople and Salonica runs through Budapest to Belgrade, as does also the most direct line from Riga through Vilna and Lemberg, though in the latter case connections between Burgas and Varna and thence with the Roumanian system via Dobric might eventually provide a shorter line. All these convergent routes pass together up the Morava valley as far as NiS, where they meet a similar convergence of routes from Asia Minor and the Levant, which may be regarded as a branching out of the routes already men- tioned. From Ni3 the Oriental line runs through Sofia to Constantinople, and along this passes all traffic which IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 313 has been gathered in at Belgrade, from west, north-west, and north, which is making for that city. Important as this route is it will be of infinitely greater importance in the near future. "With the completion of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf will be established a new overland route to India. Nor is that all. There will inevitably be before long with the decay of old prejudices on the point a southern Persian line which, linking up at one extremity with the Bagdad line, will find its eastern terminus by way of the existing Indian system at Bombay. This will be a genuinely overland route to the East, broken only by the short Channel crossing from Dover and the still shorter crossing over the Bosphorus from Constantinople, and if train- ferry services were established over those breaks it would be possible to travel in the same railway carriage from London to Bombay. Such a line would not com- pete with the sea route for goods traffic, save perhaps for a small number of articles of little bulk and high value, but it would attract those passengers for whom a sea voyage has no attractions, and still more those whose object it is to reach their destination as soon as possible. Its effect on English trade development would be largely by its action on the personal element, since the English importer or exporter would be able to make a compara- tively quick passage to India to study local conditions on the spot or to meet his Indian correspondents. From Nis" diverges another through route of immediate importance up the head valley of the eastern Morava and down the Vardar to Salonica. The importance of the latter will in some respects yield to that of the Piraeus, for with the completion of the Greek lines to form a junction with the Salonica line, now just completed, the Piraeus may become the southern terminus of the present overland route instead of Brindisi, the voyage from the former to Alexandria being some three hundred miles shorter than that from the latter. Salonica also is a focus for Levantine traffic in and out. Hence NiS, " the Clapham 314 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS Junction of the Balkans," and Belgrade are of greater importance than Sofia or Skoplje, for while the former bestride both the Vienna-Constantinople line and the Vienna-Salonica, Sofia bestrides only the Constantinople line, and Skoplje only the Salonica route. It will be seen, therefore, that the Morava valley controls all the main arteries of traffic in the Balkans. All land traffic to the East from the western seaports from Marseilles to Rotterdam, as from Milan, Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam, and all the traffic from the northern ports from Hamburg to Riga, as from Berlin, Vienna, Prague, and Warsaw, enter the valley at Belgrade, while from Ni§ diverge the land routes to Constantinople and eventually to India, as well as the southern lines of traffic to Salonica and the Piraeus and thence by sea to Alexandria and the Suez Canal. If, as a result of the war, Asia Minor comes under civilized government and its vast natural resources are developed, it will become one of the richest regions of the world. What it was in ancient days, as Mesopotamia also, is known to every student, and its interior is studded with the ruins of what used to be great and prosperous cities. If in some respects its natural fertility has been decreased by de- forestation and consequent denudation, yet its poten- tial agricultural and pastoral wealth is immense. With the construction of roads and railways its mineral resources will be developed, its copper and coal as well as its marble quarries. A great commerce will spring up and the land routes to it will correspondingly increase in importance. It was with a sure insight that the Germans marked it down for their own, and so marking it cast their eyes also on the means of access, the lands of the Southern Slav who holds the gate to the East. Thus is apparent the role of the race as the great obstacle in the Drang nach Osten. The Germans so long as they cherish ambitions in hither Asia are bound to seek to crush the Southern Slavs, and conversely all those whose interest it is that German penetration in the Near East IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 315 should be prevented are bound by motives of self-interest, apart altogether from the doctrine of nationality or from any feelings of sentiment, to see to it that the Southern Slav barrier should be made as strong as possible. We English in particular have tremendous interests — naval, political, and commercial — in these regions, and conse- quently as a matter of purely self-regarding policy must give our closest heed to the settlement of the western Balkans. For years we have been disquieted by the hold of the Germans over the Bagdad railway, it has been a question that has aroused fiercest criticism of the conduct of our foreign policy; we have felt the menace of the approach to our Indian frontier of an aggressive military Power, and felt it so acutely that it furnished the in- centive to the accommodation of our long-standing disputes with Russia, it gave us an insight into our true interests and the harmfulness of a suspicion which had crystal- lized with one political party into a maxim of policy ; we saw the menace to our naval interests in the estab- lishment of the second naval Power on the flank of our sea route to the East in close proximity to Egypt and the Suez Canal, and so in Persia the era of rivalry with Russia was closed by an accord. These interests must form an abiding preoccupation of English statesmen, and it is therefore incumbent upon them to strengthen our position by a means which will make no call upon us, and raise up no fresh rival, by establishing upon a firm basis a State which can never be a danger to ourselves. It is not only the trans-continental traffic east and west which passes through Serbia. At the time of the annexa- tion of Bb-snia a great deal was heard of the proposed Danube-Adriatic line whose original trace was vid Ni§, the Prepolac pass, and Prizren to Porto Medua. The object of this line was both to provide Serbia with an outlet to the sea and to form a junction with the Roumanian system. After the war it will be one of the first tasks of the govern- ment to build this line. The trace, however, will be altered in accordance with the altered territorial arrange- 316 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS ments on the eastern Adriatic. If Spljet (Spalato) be left in Serb hands, and in such a way that its harbour is not commanded by foreign guns, then the line starting from the Danube at Kladova will run via Ni£, the western Morava valley to Uzice, Sarajevo, Bugojno, and the Arzano pass to Spljet. On this route connection will have to be made between Uzice and Mokragora, and beyond Bugojno with Sinj, moreover the sections Nis-Uzice and Mokragora- Bugojno are narrow gauge (2 feet 6 inches). An alternative trace which has not much to recommend it and would require a lot of new work is along the Danube to Belgrade and thence to Sarajevo. Should the position at Spljet be such as is foreshadowed by the secret treaty with Italy, then the Serbs will be well advised to abandon Spljet as a terminus in spite of its position and advantages, and to fix it at a port where they would be masters in their own house. By establishing Gruz (Gravosa), the port of Dubrovnik, as the terminus the latter part of the line from Sarajevo would be formed by the existing narrow-gauge line to the port mentioned : it would have to be made of normal gauge and a tunnel pierced through the Bielasnica range where now rack and pinion are utilized. Less will probably be heard of the proposed southerly trace, since the Serbs will naturally prefer to develope their own harbours rather than any Albanian port. A possible trace, however, would be from Kraljevo up the Ibar valley to Berane and thence by Kolasm to Antivari (a poor port) or Budva, which potentially is a good one. A lot of new work would be required here, and the line would be costly to construct, and in all probability the Danube-Adriatic railway will find its terminus at Gruz or Spljet. This line, however, is much more than a Danube-Adriatic railway. The project is to carry it over the Danube by a railway bridge and so to form a junction with the Roumanian system. It will thus become a transverse continental line, con- necting the Adriatic with Bucharest, and through Bucharest with Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow. It will thus become an important avenue of through traffic with Roumania and IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 317 Russia, an avenue, it will be noticed, that crosses the great east and west routes at Ni§ at the southern end of the Morava " funnel ", so that Nig will become the greatest rail and road centre in the Balkans. This line, also, emphasizes the important strategic position of Serbia and the Morava valley as the focus of trans-Balkan trade routes. Enough has, perhaps, been said to bring out the European importance of the Southern Slav lands and therefore of a full and proper settlement of the Southern Slav question. The Southern Slavs occupy one of the most important strategic areas on the continent, all move- ments of conquest from nearer Asia into Europe or vice versd have perforce made their way through this land, and it is a European interest that the Southern Slav mon- archy should be strong enough successfully to sustain the role thrust upon it. It has not been a matter of ambition or of national restlessness that has made this people loom so large in recent diplomatic history. Apart from the circum- stance of the parcelling out of the nationality among several governments, it has been the territorial distribution of the race that has thrust it willy nilly into the vortex of vast diplomatic combinations and immense ambitions. It cannot escape its destiny in the future any more than in the past, the happiness that belongs to a nation that has no history has never been Serbia's nor ever will be ; if she does not make history herself others will make it for her ; either she will be a strong barrier to lawless ambition or she will be again, as in the past, the roadway of conflicting nations of irreconcilable ambitions. If then anything like a permanent settlement is desired in the Near East, if in our own selfish interests — apart from all other considerations — we desire to put a term to the Germanic Drang nach Osten, then our course is clearly marked out, we must effect the union of the Southern Slav race and strengthen it by every legitimate means in our power. A strong Southern Slav kingdom will be a stabilizing element both in the narrow Balkan problem 318 THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS and in that much graver question of the future relation- ship between East and West, of the future interactions of central Europe and hither Asia. The European function of the greater Serbia of the future is to act as a sort of spring buffer between East and West so that political shocks having their origin in either quarter can be taken up and absorbed. That is clearly marked in the whole history of Serbia, in the history of Tsar Dusan, when for a time it seemed as if she might be able to take up and absorb the Turkish impact, as in the history of King Peter when the impact comes from the opposite direction. Not hitherto has this buffer been strong enough to stand up to its work, and it must be the task of the Allies in the general European settlement so to re-establish it that in future it will be able to perform its appointed work. A weak buffer State such as diplomatists love is useless, it can never do its work, it is always inviting attack, and is thus the cause of ceaseless jealousy and of constant trouble. This spring buffer of fundamental importance in the general European mechanism must be made as strong as possible. It would indeed be well for Europe if the Southern Slavs were more numerous and stronger than they are, yet I think that in union they will be, with proper support, strong enough for the purpose. As we have seen, a united Southern Slavdom would be even now a nation of some twelve millions, and as the area they inhabit amounts to some 90,000 square miles there is room for a much larger population. With a population of three hundred to the square mile at some future date the land would not be overcrowded in view of all its resources, and thus eventually we should have a nation numbering between twenty-five and thirty millions, which should be strong enough to hold the gate and to prevent it from being forced. If this desirable consummation is to be attained we must approach the settlement with a clear eye, not only to the innate justice of the Southern Slav cause, but also to our own national interests, which in this matter are also the general interests of Europe. We must endeavour IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS 319 even at the eleventh hour to bring to a wiser frame of mind those who, blind to their real advantage, would seek out of causeless jealousy to bring about a maimed and partial settlement which, so far from furthering European interests, would work them perhaps irretrievable harm, which might drive the Southern Slavs into a fatal course, which so far from bringing peace to south-eastern Europe would bring a sword and be the precursor of future wars, which instead of stabilizing the Balkan position would result in chronic unrest, and would fail to provide the bulwark we need. That bulwark can only surely be built up if all the Southern Slavs are united under the white double eagle of the Nemanjic. It is to our interest, to Europe's interest, equally to the interest of the threefold Southern Slav stock that not Serbs alone, but Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes should now at long last after five centuries of martyrdom gallantly borne enjoy the fruition of the aspiration expressed in S. Sava's proverb cherished all these long years, and enshrined in the four C's (in the Cyrillic alphabet), which find a place in the national arms of Serbia, " Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava" — Union alone is Serb salvation. NOTE ON THE MAP This map is included, by kind permission of the Jugoslav Committee, for the purpose of giving a general idea of the ethnographic features of the Southern Slav lands. Unfortu- nately the Bumanian element in North-Eastern Serbia is not indicated, nor the Albanian element in " Old Serbia." It would have been well, also, to differentiate the " Macedo- Slovenes." Apart, however, from these omissions, the map is substantially accurate. It has been included in lieu of a map specially prepared for this volume by the author which it was found impracticable to reproduce. INDEX Adrianople, conquered by the Turks, 52 Adriatic Question, Chapter IV passim Ethnological aspect, 128-86 General problem, 104-20 Historical, 121-8 Secret Treaty with Italy, 161 tq., 178 Strategical, 186-50 Aehrenthal, Count, 98 Agram, see Zagreb Agram High Treason Trial, 93 Agrarian problem — in Bosnia, 280, 281 in Croatia, 281-8 Agriculture in Serbia, 100-8 Albania — Frontier modifications, 197 tq. Future status of, 199 Italy, Austria, and, 107, 108 Alexander Karagjorgjevic, Prince of Serbia, see Karagjorgjevid Alexander Obrenovid, King, see Obrenovid Altomanovid, 53 Andrassy, Count, 85 Andrew II, King of Hungary, 37 Andronicus II, Emperor of the East, 39 Andronicus III, Emperor of the East, 41 Angora, Battle of, 89 Architecture, Serb, 45, 46 Austria — Effect of occupation of Bosnia on policy of, 86 $q. Austria — continued. Effect of Serb independence on policy of, 67 French opinion on future of, 176, 177 Necessity of dismembering, 174 tq. Occupies Bosnia, 79 Oppression of nationalities, 83 Policy towards Hungarian Serbs, 61 sq. See also Hungary and Magyar Austrian Press misrepresentation of Serb affairs, 25 Backa, 185 sq. Statistics of population, 252, 253 Bagdad railway, 815 Bainville, M., 176 Balcid, 53 Baldwin I, Emperor of the East, 37 Balkan war, second, 209 sq. Banat, 187 sq. Statistics of population, 189- 191, 252, 253 Baranja, 182 sq. Barzilai, Sig., 115 Bela IV, King of Hungary, 88 Belgrade, 43, 52, 299-302, 311, 312, 814 Berlin — Congress of, 85 Treaty of, 78 Bissolati, Sig., 118, 115, 160 Bogomils, 57 21 »a 322 INDEX Boris, Tsar of Bulgaria, 33, 34 Boselli, Sig., 116, 117 Bosnia — Annexation by Austria, 79 Land question in, 280, 281 Medieval history of, 32, 36, 37, 40, 43, 52, 53, 57, 58 Mohammedan Begs of, 281 Occupation by Austria, 84 Results of occupation on Austrian policy, 86 sq. Statistics of population, 251, 252, 253 Boundaries, ancient, of Southern Slav tribes, 30 Brankovic, Vuk, 54 Brankovic\ George, " Despot " of Serbia, 56 Brankovid, George III, " Despot " of Serbia, 61 British ignorance of Balkans, 26 British interests in the Southern Slav question, Chapter X passim British Balkan policy in 1915, 18 sq. British policy in the future, 222 sq., 241, 242 Bulgaria — Bulgarizing policy of, in occupied territory, 229-31 Desire for destruction of Serbia, 233, 235 Looting in Serbia, 235, 236 Macedonia and, see Macedonia Medieval history of, 31, 34, 40, 41, 42, 202, 203 Mutual antipathy of Serbs and Bulgars, 34 Policy of, in 1915, 19 sq Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, 209 sq. Settlement with, Chapter VII passim Bulgarian Exarchate, 207 Bulgarian Press on Sir E. Grey, 236-8 Bulgarophils, English, 20 sq. 222 sq. Reliance of, on sentimentality of Entente, 239, 240 Tartar origin of, 31 United in war policy, 226 sq. Cantacuzene, John, 41, 43 Oarinthia, 169 Cattaro, see Kotor Ceslav, Grand Zupan of Serbia, 85 Cippico, Sig., 120 Conversion of Southern Slavs to Christianity, 83 Co-operation in Serbia, 100, 101 Croatia, 80 sq., 250 Future of, 179 sq. Land question in, 281-3 Placed under Magyar domina- tion, 84 Statistics of population, 252-3 Croatian orthography, 8, 9, 82, 250, 302 Croats in favour of Southern Slav unity, 179, 182 Cyril and Methodius SS., 33 Cyrillic alphabet, 8, 33, 250, 302 Dalmatia, 80, Chapter IV passim Ethnology of, 128-36 Geographical claims of Italy 120, 121 Stronghold of Southern Slav unity, 90, 135 Statistics of population, 128, 252, 253 Venetian Dominion, 121-8 Character of, 123-6 Dalmatian, Agreement between Italy and the Entente, 161 sq., 173 Danev, Dr., 211 sq., 228 Danube-Adriatic line, 154, 315, 316 Debar (Dibra), 199 Decani, Monastery of, 39 and note INDEX 323 Dicey, Professor A. V., cited 259, 260, 262 Djakovica, 198 Dragutin, see Stephen Dragutin Drang nach Osten, 307, 308, 314, 315, 317, 318 Drave, R., 178 Dualism as form of Southern Slav State, 263-5 Dubrovnik (Ragusa), 43, 47, 124, 126, 131, 154, 165, 195, 316 See also Gruz Dusan, see Stephen Dusan Eastern Empire, Chapter II •passim Attacked by Milutin, 38 Conquests of Dusan, 41 Final attack of Dusan, 44 Invaded by the Slavs, 29 Macedonia and, 202, 203 Victorious over Stephen Nemanja, 36 English opinion and Serbia, 17 Exarchate, Bulgarian, 207 Federalism and the Southern Slav provinces, 256 sq. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria, 227, 247 Finances of Serbia, 98 sq. Financial conditions in future Southern Slav State, 283- 99 Fiume, see Rijeka Fleet, Future Serb, 143 sq. Francis Ferdinand, policy of Archduke, 91 French opinion on future of Austria, 176, 177 Friedjung, Professor, 93 Gauvain, M., 177 Genediev, M., 229 sq. German colonists in Southern Slav lands, 269-72 German Drang nach Osten, 307, 308, 814, 315, 817, 818 Germany and Trieste, 156 sq. Germany, Italy, and Serbia, 156 sq. Gesov, M., 227 sq. Gorica-Gradiska, 169, 172 sq. " Greater Austria," 91 Greece and the Entente, 224, 225 Greek Empire, see Eastern Empire Grey, Policy of Sir E., 224 sq. Gruz (Gravosa), 153, 316 Habsburgs, failure of, 92 Helena, wife of Stephen the Great of Serbia, 38 Hercegovina — Early history of, see Zahumlija Erected into a duchy (Herce- govina), 58 Hilindar, Monastery of, 36, 39 Hungary — Future of, 177 sq. Medieval relations with Serb lands, 32, 37, 38, 40, 43, 52 See also Austria and Magyar Industrial conditions in future Southern Slav State 283-299 Istria, 169, 172 sq. Isvolski, M., 214 sq. Italo-Slav accord, Necessity of, 159, 160 Italy— • and the Adriatic, Chapter IV passim and Albania, 107, 108 and Dodekanese, 109 Balkan policy under Marquis di San Giuliano, 110 Growth of Italian claims, 111 Imperialism of, 109 Negotiations with Austria, 111 Policy towards Serbia, 109 Press accusations against Southern Slav Committee, 116, 117 324 INDEX Italy — continued Press anti-Serb campaign, 112 sq. Press attempts to dissociate Serbs and Croats, 118 sq. Secret Treaty with Entente, 161 sq., 178 Jelacid, Ban of Croatia, 83 Jesuits, 803 John Asen II, Bulgarian Tsar, 87 John Vladimir, Grand Zupan of Serbia, 35 John Vladislav, Bulgarian Tsar, 35 Karadzid, Vuk, 81 sq. Kara George, 65 sq. Karagjorgjevi6, Alexander, Prince of Serbia, 71 Karagjorgjevid, Peter, elected King of Serbia, 78 Domestic policy of, 97, 98 Karlovci (Karlowitz), Patriarchate established at, 62 Kmet or Merop, 48 sq. Kosovo, Battle of, 54 sq. Kotor (Cattaro), 43, 106, 126, 144, 145, 165 Kranjska, 169, 172 sq. Statistics of population, 169, 252, 253 Krusevac, 301, 302 Kutromani6, Ban of Bosnia, 40 Kutzo-Vlachs, 32 Land question — in Bosnia, 280, 281 in Croatia, 281-8 Lazar, Tsar, 53, sq. Lissa, see Vis Ljubljana (Laibach), 178, 311, 812 Losinj (Lussin), 152 Louis the Great, King of Hungary, 48 Macedonia, 198, Chapter VI passim Bulgarian occupation of, in Middle Ages, 202 Bulgarian propaganda, 206-8 Medieval history of, 201 sq. Racial characteristics, 204-6, 231, 232 Serb occupation of, in Middle Ages, 203 Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, 209 sq. Macedonian Committee, 206-8 MaSva, 38, 89 Magyar — Atrocities in Serbia, 303 note Colonists in Southern Slav lands, 269-72 Intrigues in England, 238 note Opposition to Serbs, 63 Oppression of Croatia, 84 Oppression of nationalities, 83 See also Austria, and Hungary Manuel Comnenus, Emperor of the East, 86 Marica, battle of, 53 Marko Kraljevid, 53 Markovid, Professor L., Italian accusations against, 117 Mazzini, 133 Medieval conditions of Serbia, 46 sq. Merop or kmet, 48 sq. Michael, Grand Zupan of Serbia, 35 Michael Obrenovic, Prince of Serbia, see Obrenovic Milan Obrenovi6, King, see Obrenovid Milutin, King of Serbia, see Stephen Milutin Mirko of Montenegro, Prince, 197 Mohammedan Begs of Bosnia, 281 INDEX 325 Montenegro — Desire for Southern Slav unity, 195 Future of, 193 sq. Medieval history of, see Zeta Statistics of population, 252, 258 Morava valley, Importance of, 311-14 Muntimir, Grand Zupan of Serbia, 34 Nemanja dynasty, 35 sq. Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 194 sq. Nis, 36, 206, 229, 230, 231, 311, 812, 313 Novisad (Neusatz), 185, 186 Obradovid, Dositije, 81 sq. Obrenovid, Alexander, King of Serbia, 74— Domestic policy of, 74-7. Murder of, 77 Obrenovid, Michael, Prince, 70 sq. Foreign policy of, 72 Obrenovid, Milan, King, 73, 74 Obrenovid, MiloS, Prince, 66 sq. Ochrida, 42, 201 Old Serbia, 17 and note, 30, 309, 810 Oriental line, new, 312 Oriental Bailway, 274, 275, 812 Otrok, 49 Overland route, 313 Pasid, Dr. Nikola, 76, 78 Ped, See of, 39 Ped, Patriarch Arsen III, 62 Ped, Patriarchate of, 41, 59, 60 Place nameB, Serbo-Croat, 9 Pola, 106, 151 Prezzolini, Professor, quoted Chap- ter IV passim Primorija, see Zahumlija and Hercegovina Prizren, 198 Putnik, Field-Marshal, 95 Badoslav, Grand Zupan, 33 Badoslavov, M., 228 sq. Railways, Serb, 102 Raska, 36 sq. Renascence of Serbia under King Peter, 95 sq. Rijeka (Fiume), 153, 182 Resolutions of, 90 Roumanians, 278 See Banat Russia and Bulgaria, 239, 240 Second Balkan war, 213 sq. S. Sava, 87 Salandra, Sig., 113 Salonica, 241, 311, 813 Salvemini, Professor, 119, 143, 160 Samuel, Bulgarian Tsar, 35 San Stefano, Treaty of, 73 Sarajevo, 311 Sebar, 47 sq. Sebenico, see Sibenik Serbia — Claims on the Entente, 243 sq. Concessions to Bulgaria in 1915, 21, 246 Social conditions in medieval, 46 if. Statistics of population, 252, 253 Serbo-Bulgarian enmity, 34 Treaty of 1912, 209 sq. War of 1885, 74 Serbo-Croat Coalition, 91 sq. Serbs — Distribution of, 25 of Hungary, 61 sq., 83, 182 sq. §ibenik (Selenico), 131, 134 Simeon, Bulgarian Tsar, 85 Sisman, Bulgarian Tsar, 35 Slovene original appellation of Southern Slavs, 29 Slovenes, 169-78, 249, 250 Statistics of, 169, 252, 253 Sofia, 206, 231 Sokolovid, Mebemet, 59 Sonnino, Baron, 114 326 INDEX Southern Slav Committee — Funds of, 117, 118 Italian accusations against, 116, 117 Southern Slav State — Barrier to German advance, 307, 308, 314, 315, 317, 318 Future form of, 256 sq. Internal problems of, Chapter IX passim Statistics of population, 252, 253, 255 Strategical importance of, Chapter X passim Southern Slav Unity, idea of, 81 sq., 90, 135, 179, 182, 195 Spljet (Spalato), 106, 131, 153, 154, 164, 316 Statistical Tables — Agricultural holdings in Serbia, 100 Finances of Serbia, 98, 99 Population of the Banat, 191 Population of Bosnia (religious distribution), 251 Population of Dalmatia, 128 Population of Istria, Kranjska (Carniola), etc., 169 Population of the Southern Slav State, (all provinces), 252, 253, 255 Stephen, Nemanja, 36 Stephen II, Prvovencani, 37 Stephen III, (Rodoslav), 37 Stephen IV, (the Great), 38 Stephen V, Dragutin, 88 Stephen VI, Milutin, 38 Stephen VII, Decanski, 40, 41 Stephen VIII, Dusan, Tsar, 41-4 Stephen Lazarevic, " Despot " of Serbia, 55 Stephen Voislav, Grand Zupan, 35 Stephen Vukcic, 58 Strategical position in Adriatic, 104 sq., 136-50 Strategical importance of Southern Slav lands, Chapter Xpassim Strumica, 193 note, 247 Syrmia or Srem, 37, 38 Tommaseo, 133 Trialism, 91 Trieste, 106, 151, 169, 171, 172 Trogir, 131, 132 Turks, advance of, 39, 53 Tvrtko, Stephen, Ban of Bosnia, 53, 57 Unitary State as form of Southern Slav State, 265 Unitary State compared with federal, 262, 265, 266 Unity, idea of Southern Slav, 81 sq., 90, 135, 179, 182, 195 Uros, see Stephen Uros V (Tsar Uros), 52 Valona, 106, 110, 150, 151, 153 Velbuzd, Battle of, 40 Vladislav, King of Serbia, 37 Vlastela, 46 Vlastimir, Grand Zupan, 34 Voislav, Grand Zupan, 33 Vojvode, Serb, in Hungary, 62 Vojvodina, 62, 63, 83 Vidin, 36, 37, 38 Vis (Lissa), 106, 153, 161 Vukasin, 52, 53 Zadar, 129, 131 Besolutions of, 91 Zadruga, 102 Zagorija, 36 Zagreb (Agram), 311, 312 Zahumlija, (Primorija, Herce- govina), 36, 40, 43, 53, 57 See also Hercegovina Zakonik of Stephen Dusan, 42, 46 sq., 126 Zara, see Zadar Zeta (Montenegro), 36, 53 See also Montenegro Printed in Great Britain by "UNWIN BBOTHEB8, LIMITED WOKING AND LONDON D Taylor, A H E 463 The future of the soutl T38 Slavs PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY :Vnu2» awmlpt o.7-V;vtpPW3